in his speech delivered on September 21, 2012 in Nanning at the opening ceremony of three simultaneous events including the 9th China–ASEAN Expo, China–ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, and the 2012 Forum on China–ASEAN Free Trade Area. It is noteworthy that this was less than two months before Xi became the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and around six months before he was elected President. The most important point Xi often repeated in this speech was that the relations between ASEAN and China “have taken an historic leap from being comprehensive dialogue partners and good-neighborly partners of mutual trust to being strategic partners sharing extensive common interests” (Xi, 2012).
The keyword here is “strategic partners”. The term “strategic partner” or its abstract form — “strategic partnership” — signifies differing ideas and courses of action in international discourses. In the context of Chinese diplomacy, as Li Chenyan points out, the term was first used after the end of the Cold War as “one of the important measures” in China’s approach to “adjust its relations with major powers and improve relations with neighboring countries” (Li, 2012, p. 54). Li further explains that the term “strategic partnership” is normally used elsewhere in international relations as part of “high political level dialogue” covering areas such as “politics, military affairs, and security”; but for China, strategic partnerships “are mainly involved in low political level cooperation with symbolic rather actual meaning,” focusing more on “economic, scientific and cultural fields” (Li, 2012, p. 61). This kind of meaning and discourse was quite evident in Xi’s 2012 speech when, towards its end, he made “a four-point proposal” for a China and ASEAN strategic partnership consisting of: FTA development, two-way investment, connectivity, and people-to-people exchanges (Xi, 2014c). Moreover, Xi Jinping has also been consistent in using this term. Five years later, in his speech at the 2017 APEC Summit, while “calling for closer cooperation between APEC and ASEAN,” he clearly reiterated China as “a strategic partner of ASEAN” and “backs ASEAN’s core role in regional cooperation” (China Daily, 2017).
In general, Xi occasionally mentions ASEAN in his addresses concerning global issues and broad areas relevant to the problems and solutions inherent in his vision of China. The availability of natural resources and the low cost of labor in ASEAN countries have made the old normal path of economic growth in China less viable, thus requiring the Chinese economy to put more stress on a new innovative model for further development (Xi, 2017k, p. 217). In the international arena, the ASEAN Regional Forum has become an important institutional basis for further free trade agreements and other global governance functions (Xi, 2017e, p. 489). Moreover, the Master Plan on the Connectivity of ASEAN provides leverage for effective policy coordination in China’s BRI schemes along with coordination initiatives in other regions of the globe (Xi, 2017l, p. 556). The only speech, included in the two volumes of The Governance of China, which deals directly with the region is the one Xi addressed at the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia on October 3, 2013. Understandably then, in this speech he focused on ASEAN as part of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and underlined “Indonesia’s standing and influence in ASEAN” (Xi, 2012, p. 320).
The key to the answers to the questions posted at the beginning of this section, however, can be found in Xi Jinping’s lecture: “Forging a Strong Partnership to Enhance Prosperity of Asia,” which he delivered on November 7, 2015, at the National University of Singapore on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Singapore. The main points he made here strongly reflect the themes of the new era we have seen above.
As we have always seen in his Marxist-based narratives, Xi underscores history both in terms of past events and the developmental laws of mankind. China and many of its Southeast Asian neighbors are not only geographically connected by mountains and rivers but also share “a recorded history of more than 2,000 years,” enriching each other in all dimensions including values, religions, arts and cultures (Xi, 2015, p. 8). The historical occasions that highlight this connection, especially in the case of Singapore, were the voyages of Zheng He in the early 15th century and the subsequent migrations of Chinese people from Guangdong and Fujian provinces to Southeast Asia (Xi, 2015, p. 6). As for the present, “the tide of history moves on and we must follow it,” Xi proposes, it is time for “a new historical starting point” for China to expand and deepen its relations with its neighbors against the backdrop of Asian dynamic economic growth (Xi, 2015, pp. 11–12).
However, it was hinted in this lecture that, for China, Singapore holds the most significant status among Southeast Asian nations. Xi Jinping underscores the fact that Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in 1978, establishing relations and cooperation between the two countries and, more importantly, it was the exemplar and models provided by Singapore under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew that showed the way for China. Xi points out that “Singapore succeeded in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions by combining Eastern values with an international vision” (Xi, 2015, p. 7). Deng came to witness “first-hand” the achievement of Singapore and drew important lessons from it. Exchange and cooperation subsequently followed, with opportunities for both. Xi Jinping himself visited Singapore many times and was actively involved in this cooperation from 1999 to 2007 while he held leading positions in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, which formed major areas of governmental links and economic transactions between the two countries (Teo Chee Han’s welcoming remarks in Xi, 2015, pp. 1–2). Xi recounted that, in 2010, (while Vice-President) he joined Lee Kuan Yew in unveiling a commemorative marker in honor of Deng Xiaoping on the banks of the Singapore River (Xi, 2015, p. 7). According to Xi, at least in 2015 alone, China was Singapore’s biggest trading partner, while Singapore was “an important investment destination” for China. It is not surprising that their long relations and “closely aligned” development strategies will be expanded “into an all-round cooperative partnership progressing with the times” in this new era (Xi, 2015, pp. 7–8).
The same theme of peaceful development, a shared future of humanity and global security without a hegemonic order, is also insisted on in the context of Southeast Asian countries. It is also addressed with reference to Asia as a whole. Xi specifies endeavors for cooperation in four major aspects (Xi, 2015, pp. 12–13). First, “to uphold peace and stability” in Asia — it is a task for which China shares responsibility with all of its neighbors. Second, to “form synergy” in development strategies so that mutual assistance and cooperation can be further enhanced, resulting in “more momentum to growth” in all participating countries. Third, Asian countries should “actively pursue security cooperation,” taking a “holistic approach” in dealing with “both traditional and non-traditional security issues” (see Somboon, 2019, for further discussions). Fourth, “the close bonds” among Asian peoples, whose civilizations share “collective Asian values and an Asian identity,” should be strengthened.
However, we should note Xi’s adamant standpoint when it comes to issues China regards as its own core interests. This can be seen from the matter of the South China Sea being addressed in this lecture right after the four aspects of cooperation mentioned above. As Xi firmly puts it in anticipation of the audience’s skepticism:
I know that people have been closely following China’s policy on the South China Sea. Let me make this clear: The South China Sea islands have been China’s territory since ancient times. It is the bounden duty of the Chinese government to uphold China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate maritime rights and interests. The starting point and ultimate purpose of China’s policy toward the South China Sea is to maintain peace and stability there (Xi, 2015, p. 14).
This is an unyielding position expressed in straightforward terms. Xi often uses differing historical contexts to explain China’s change in many of its stances and policies. However, the statement above, with its emphasis on persistence from “ancient times”, should remind us of how history may not bring a different situation in certain matters. And this includes issues concerning South China Sea.
Like the other Xi Jinping
