a dead end,” he stated and then asked, “Where is the new road?” His answer: “It lies in scientific and technological innovation, and in the accelerated transition from factor-driven and investment-driven growth to innovation-driven growth” (Xi, 2014b, pp. 132–133). This notion was then applied to a new scheme for economic adjustment initiated in early 2016, proclaiming a new strategy to avoid the middle-income trap. This is “Supply-side structural reform,” which entails the promotion of innovation in technology, further development of the real economy, and improvement of the standard of living of ordinary people. And it aims, in the terminology of Marxist historical materialism, “to develop productive forces and to improve relations of production,” involving all aspects of politics, economics, society, culture, as well as ecology (Xi, 2017f, p. 275).
2.3.The Goals and Characteristics of China’s New Era
The most recent and comprehensive document further elaborating on the thought discussed above is undoubtedly the lengthy report titled “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” which Xi Jinping delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CPC on October 18, 2017 (Xi, 2017g). Among the many important issues raised and discussed in the document, Xi reiterates his narrative of the history of China. This narrative begins with the history of Chinese civilization, which has been in continuous existence for more than 5,000 years and has contributed numerous major achievements to the progress of mankind. China, however, failed to capture the earliest trend of industrialization and fell into the “darkness of domestic turmoil and foreign aggression” with the Opium War of 1840 (Xi, 2017g, p. 11). Many attempts were made by people with heroic intentions and deeds to liberate the nation from its miserable condition, but they all failed because of their inability to change the nature of the old society and consolidate the power of the Chinese people. The “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation,” as he terms it, began with this struggle and became successful at its earliest stage after the CPC was founded and finally achieved its goal in governing the country. After that, China went through many phases of ups and downs in the attempt to genuinely develop and rejuvenate the nation (Xi, 2017g, pp. 11–12).
The policy of reform and opening up led by Deng Xiaoping resulted in “three strategic goals for achieving socialist modernization in China.” These include, first, the provision for people’s basic needs and a decent standard of living, which has been significantly achieved. Second, the party aims to develop China into “a moderately prosperous society with a stronger economy, greater democracy, more advanced science and education, a thriving culture, greater social harmony and a better quality of life” by the year 2021 when the centenary of the CPC will be celebrated. After that, within a period of 30 years until the centenary of the PRC, China will arduously develop itself in order to “have basically achieved modernization and turned China into a modern socialist country” (Xi, 2017g, p. 23). The period of three decades is divided into two stages. During the first stage from 2020 to 2035, endeavors will be geared towards the basic realization of socialist modernization. Among the many goals to be achieved is that “China’s economic and technological strength be increased significantly,” and that “China becomes a global leader in innovation.” In other words, China will be able to surpass the middle-income trap. The second stage will cover the period from 2035 to 2050. At the end of this stage, China will hopefully have achieved its all-round goals as a modern socialist country; among many of its achievement will be that “China has become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” (Xi, 2017g, p. 25). We should note the precise terms being used here. At present, China views itself as a “major country” (see, for example, Xi, 2017g, pp. 17, 53). Within the next 15 years, China will become a “global leader in innovation” with the strength of productive forces and relations of production. Within the next 30 years, China will be “a global leader” in the international arena. To be sure, as Xi has affirmed, this position of global leader is totally different from a hegemon seeking dominant control in global politics.
2.4.The Policies and Pathways of China’s New Era
How will the above-mentioned goals and characteristics of China’s New Era be accomplished? What are the policies and pathways for China’s New Era? These questions are obviously not simple ones and involve many dimensions of planning and undertaking. However, one of the most recent and interesting sources from which we may be informed of Xi Jinping’s thoughts on this matter is his speech delivered at the opening of the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in Hainan Province on April 10, 2018. Established by political leaders from 26 Asian countries, including Australia, in 2001, the Boao Forum, which functions as an international non-governmental organization with its headquarters in Boao on the island and province of Hainan of China, has been recognized as the Asian equivalent of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. As was remarked in the news reported by Xinhua, Xi’s presence and speech at this significant event of BFA was indeed his “first home-court diplomacy since he was unanimously re-elected Chinese president.” It clearly reflects, as the headline of the news states, a “New Chapter for ‘Xiplomacy’” (Lu, 2018a).
Towards the end of this speech, Xi Jinping succinctly summed up that “In short, China will enter a new phase of opening-up” (Xi, 2018, p. 10). Xi recounted China’s experience during the past 40 years after the reform and opening up, or “China’s second revolution” as he put it, was launched (Xi, 2018, p. 4). Under this long period of development and perseverance, Xi confirmed, “China has lived up to its responsibility as a major country. From ‘bringing in’ to ‘going global’, from WTO accession to the Belt and Road Initiative,... China has become a key anchor and driver for the world economy and a positive force in advancing the noble cause of global peace and development” (Xi, 2018, p. 4). And in this new phase China will pursue policies of further opening up, including, first, broadening market access, second, creating a more attractive investment environment, third, strengthening protection of intellectual property rights (including, of course, China’s intellectual proper rights), and fourth, taking the initiative to expand imports (Xi, 2018, pp. 8–9). Xi ended the speech by referring to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that has, to date, been joined by more than 80 countries in the world. He reemphasized its main objective as a project for international cooperation with a view to creating opportunities and outcomes for the benefit of the world and all peoples. It is by no means a part of any “geopolitical calculation,” and thus contains no agenda to create any international bloc among nations or impose any business deal on others. The development of the project, Xi insisted, will rely on “the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits” (Xi, 2018, p. 10).
That the BRI is geared towards a grand infrastructure for logistics and transportation across Asia and Europe and beyond is evident in itself. However, it should be remarked, as well, that the BRI constitutes one of the three initiatives that Xi often mentions in his speeches at domestic conferences. These schemes are called “Three Initiatives for Balanced Regional Development” and include: (1) the BRI; (2) the Coordinated Development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei; and (3) the Yangtze River Economic Belt. In my view, they are all part and parcel of China’s scheme to overcome the middle-income trap and spread economic development into existing remote areas. As Xi has pointed out, the BRI “offers good development opportunities to the eastern, central and western regions, and especially to some marginal areas in the west which will become centers with great development potential as soon as they are interconnected with neighboring countries” (Xi, 2017j, p. 258). In other words, the BRI along with the other two initiatives are strategic pathways for the achievement of the “First Centenary Goal” by expanding new space for development (Xi, 2017d, p. 79).
2.5.China and ASEAN in the New Era
How do these goals, policies, and pathways relate to ASEAN? What constitutes the significance of ASEAN
