Secession in International Law
2.3.4. Secession in Violation of International Law
2.4. Recognition in International Law
2.4.1. What is Recognition?
2.4.2. Evolution of Recognition
2.4.3. Theories of Recognition
2.4.5. Criteria for Recognition
2.4.6. Modalities and Forms of Recognition and Non-Recognition
3. The Soviet and Russian Practice of Recognition of New States after 1945
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Recognition of States Emerging out of Colonial Rule
3.3. Recognition of States Outside of the Colonial Context
3.3.1. Group 1—Recognition of Israel and Bangladesh
3.3.2. Group 2—Recognition of Eritrea, East Timor, South Sudan
3.3.3. Group 3—Non-Recognition of Northern Cyprus, Karabakh, Transnistria, Kosovo
4. Russian Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
4.1. Introduction
4.2. History of Conflicts and Peace Processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
4.2.1. The Status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Within Georgia in the Soviet Era
4.2.2. The Outbreak of Conflicts and Subsequent Peace Process
4.3. Georgian-Russian Relations in 1991-2008
4.5. Reasons for Russia’s Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Foreword
Russia’s diplomatic recognition of Georgia’s secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the end of August 2008 was a momentous event. It breached Russia’s (and the USSR’s) longstanding embrace of the international legal principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which was reaffirmed in the founding documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It also jeopardised Europe’s post-World War II territorial settlement based on those principles. In these respects, it appeared to present a fundamental challenge to the European and international legal and political order.
It was also a curious event. In justifying their actions in legal terms, Russian spokespersons cited the right of defence against aggression, the right to national self-determination, and the responsibility to protect, the right to protect Russian citizens outside the country, and to protect Russian peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia. This scattershot (spaghetti on the wall) approach suggested a certain amount of confusion and “grasping at straws” in the Russian legal approach.
Ambiguity prevailed also in Russian political reasoning for the decision. Was it a response to the April 2008 NATO Bucharest Declaration and the prospect of eventual Georgian membership in the alliance, given Russia’s claim to a zone of “privileged interest” in the former Soviet space? Was it payback for NATO intervention in Kosovo and the subsequent recognition of that territory by many Western states? Was it an opportunity to demonstrate Russia’s return to great power status? Was it a manifestation of Putin’s antipathy towards colour revolutions and concern over possible demonstration effects in Russia itself? Or was it a manifestation of personal animus, given that Putin and Saakashvili despised each other?
When viewed comparatively, one notes that recognition has not been repeated in other similar situations in, for example, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and eastern Ukraine. Why just Georgia?
Russian experts themselves had no clear understanding of the reasons for recognition, as I discovered in long conversations in Moscow in 2009.
This book constitutes an able and well-informed effort to sort out the confusion. It begins with a careful unpicking of relevant international law on self-determination, secession, and recognition. It continues through a close examination of the historical and political background to the conflicts in Abkhazia. Finally, it turns to Russia, discussing Soviet/Russian historical behaviour on recognition, establishing the deviant quality of the recognition decisions regarding Georgia’s breakaway territories. The analysis then turns to the evolution of Georgian-Russian relations, and the war and recognition.
