Russian reasons for recognition.
In short, Dr. Samkharadze’s book is a worthy addition to the literature on these events and their broader implications. It is well worth reading in the academic and policy analysis communities.
Prof. Neil MacFarlane
1. Introduction
The principle of territorial integrity of a state is an established, fundamental, sacrosanct principle of international law and a baseline for international relations. This principle however, was neglected twice in the short, six-month period running from February to August 2008 by four out of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. On the one hand, the USA, the UK and France recognised Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and on the other hand, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s secession from Georgia. The recognition of new entities without the consent of the parent state and the subsequent erosion of the territorial integrity principle has turned into one of the most pressing topics of international relations. It is an important bone of contention in current Russia-West discourse too. The recognition of tiny entities in the South Caucasus resonated as far as Latin America and Oceania, thus outgrowing the Georgia-Russian context and becoming a global issue.
The Russian Federation has been the most important stakeholder in all negotiations on protracted and frozen conflicts on the former Soviet territory, as the latter represents a zone of “privileged interests” for Russia. Hence, it is logical that Russia assumed the role of mediator in these conflicts in the early 1990s and was the only country to provide peacekeeping forces in Georgia, emphasising the significance this region bears for Russian national interests. Despite Russian covert and overt financial or political support to Georgia’s breakaway entities and despite those entities’ appeals to have their statehood recognised by the mighty northern neighbour, for almost two decades the Russian Federation adhered to the principle of territorial integrity and ruled out recognition of the independence of Georgia’s rebel provinces. The principle of inviolability of Soviet administrative borders was enshrined in the Charter establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was created in order to keep the former Soviet states together after the fall of the Soviet Union. The charter explicitly stated that “member states of the CIS will build their relations on the basis of the inviolability of state borders, the recognition of existing borders and the rejection of unlawful territorial annexations; the territorial integrity of states and the rejection of any actions directed towards breaking up alien territory”.1
Up until August 2008 Russia always supported UN Security Council resolutions reaffirming the territorial integrity of Georgia2. A sudden, unprecedented and, for many, an unexpected discontinuation of this policy occurred in the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. On August 26, 2008, the Russian Federation officially recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states3 calling on the rest of the world to follow suit and adapt to the new realities in the Caucasus. The fact that Moscow did not recognise other breakaway entities on the former Soviet territory—Transnistria and Karabakh—and most importantly Kosovo, which had been recognised by several dozen nations by that time makes the Georgian case even more peculiar. Being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and Contact Group on Kosovo, Russia has unequivocally supported the territorial integrity of Serbia and opposed granting independence to Kosovo.
The Russian Federation’s recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence had a tremendous impact on peace and stability in the region and the future aspirations of Georgia and the whole South Caucasus region. This decision completely changed the system of state relations in the former Soviet space. Since August 26, 2008 none of the states emerging from the ex-USSR could be sure of the inviolability of their territorial integrity. This assumption was shortly confirmed after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was condemned by the EU and the United States, and strained Russia’s relations with the West. This act had an overall adverse impact on Russia’s international image and relations and risked a new cold war4. Negotiations on the framework Russia-EU agreement were halted. The NATO-Russia Council was suspended. The United States Senate termed the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia an occupation of sovereign Georgian territory.5 This statement was echoed by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly6 and European Parliament Resolution.7 Although more than a decade has passed, the topic is still high on the agenda of not only the Georgian government but at Russia-EU, Russia-NATO and Russia-US summits.
Recognition of the independence of the two Georgian provinces eroded the territorial integrity principle and brought systemic change to the post-1945 order. It is undoubtedly a significant act both in international law and international relations. Furthermore, it is the most negative blow that any outside state has inflicted on Georgia in the course of the last 90 years. This act of recognition also raised numerous questions, which have paramount importance not only for the relations between Russia and Georgia, but for the state-of-play in the whole former Soviet space: Why did Russia apply a different policy of recognition to the Georgian breakaway territories from its mainstream policy? Is Russia’s recognition act the Kremlin’s “homemade response” to the Kosovo recognition? Did eventual NATO membership signalled to Georgia influence the Russian decision? How compliant was the Russian decision with the norms of international law? What does it imply regionally for the former Soviet republics?
This book, however focuses on two main questions:
Is Russian recognition of Georgia’s breakaway entities a deviation from its traditional recognition policy and compliant with international law?
Why did Russia extend recognition to Georgia’s breakaway entities whereas it continues to conduct a non-recognition policy towards other secessionist entities?
In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic I have divided my research into three major chapters. In chapter two, I explore the history of the development of norms of self-determination, secession and recognition in international law and their relevance and significance to international relations. Further, I review the existing sources of international law and provide examples of applications of these norms from international practice.
In chapter three, I look at the evolution of Soviet and Russian perspectives and policies on recognition of new states in the post WW-II period. I chose this period, because the contemporary world order was set with the establishment of the United Nations after 1945. For the purpose of analysis I have divided the cases into three sub-groups: states that were not recognised by the parent-state before their recognition by the USSR/RF; states that were recognised by Moscow after recognition by the parent state; and de-facto secessionist entities that have declared independence but were not recognised by the USSR/RF. I focus on the application of a particular norm by USSR/RF across similar cases to find out how consistent the Kremlin was in its recognition policy and to answer whether recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia represents an exception in general Soviet/Russian policy of non-recognition of secessionist entities. This part prepared an empirical basis to positively answer the first research question whether the recognition of Georgia’s breakaway entities is a deviation from the traditional mainstream policy of recognition by Russia.
In chapter four, I concentrate on the Abkhazia and South Ossetian cases. Here too, I offer a comprehensive picture of factors influencing the course of the conflicts. The chapter begins with a historical description of the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their evolution and ensuing conflict resolution formats. Then, I turn to an analysis of general Georgian-Russian
