uniformly rejected ; and in many societies a similar fate became cus \)mary in case of any proposition that did not emanate froi \ the responsible executive.* The practical abandonment "q)f the Initiative ensued. Branches got tired^f^ending up proposals which uniformly met with defeat. But the right of the whole body of members themselves to decide every question as it arose was too much bound up with their idea of democracy to permit of its being directly abrogated, or even expressly criticised. Where the practice did not die out from sheer weariness, it was quietly got rid of in other ways. In one society after another the central executive and the general secretary—the men who were in actual contact with the problems of administration—silently threw their influence against the practice of appealing to the members' vote. Thus the executive committee of the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers made a firm stand against the members' habit of overruling its decision in the grant of benefits under the [rules. The executive claimed the sole right to decide who wias eligible under the rules, and refused to allow discontented claimants to appeal through the ofificial circular. This caused great and recurring discontent ; but the executive committee
> Report for 1869.
Fortnightly Return, 1 8th Janiftry 1 849.
' The political student will be reminded of the very small number of cases in which the Initiative in Switzerland has led to actual legislation, even in cantons, such as Ziirich, where it has been in operation for over twenty years. See Stiissi, Referendum und Initiative im Canton Zurich.
Primitive Democracy 25
held firmly to their position and eventually maintained it. When thirteen branches of the Operative Bricklayers' Society proposed in 1868 that the age for superannuation should be lowered and the office expenses curtailed, the general secretary bluntly refused to submit such inexpedient proposals to the members' vote, on the excuse that the question could be dealt with at the next delegate meeting.* The next step was to restrict the number of opportunities for appeals on any questions whatsoever. The Coachmakers' executive announced that, in future, propositions would be put to the vote only in the annual report, instead of quarterly as hereto- fore, and this restriction was a few years later embodied in the rules.* Even more effectual was the enactment of a rulej throwing the expense of taking a vote upon the branch whichl had initiated it, in case the verdict of the society proved to', be against the proposition.' Another device was to seize the' occasion of a systematic revision of rules to declare that no | proposition for their alteration was to be entertained for a specified period : one year, said the General Union of Car- penters in 1863; three years, declared the Bookbinders' Consolidated Union in 1869, and the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons in 1878 ; ten years, ordained the] Operativ e Brid clayers' Society in 1889.* Finally, we have'^ the Re ferendumj abolished altogether, as regards the making^ or^alteration of rules. In 1866 the delegate meeting of the_ Amalgamated Society of Carpenters decided that the execu- tive should " not take the votes of the members concerning any alteration or addition to rules, unless in cases of great emergency, and then only on the authority of the General Council."* In 1878 the Stonemasons themselves, who forty years previously had been enthusiastic in their passion for voting on every question whatsoever, accepted a rule
Monthly Circular, April 1868.
Quarterly Report, November 1854 ; Rules of 1857.
' Rules of the Associated Blacksmiths' Society (Glasgow, 1892), and many others.
Monthly Report, October 1889.
' Monthly Circular, April 1866.
26 Trade Union Structure
wtrfch confined the work of revision to a specially elected committee.
Thus we see that half a century of practical experience [of the Initiative and the Referendum has led, not to its extension, but to an ever stricter limitation of its application. iThe attempt to secure the participation of every member in /the management of his society was found to lead to in- stability in legislation, dangerous unsoundness of finance, and "general weakness of administration. The result was the early abandonment of the Initiative, either by express rule or through the persistent influence of the executive. This produced a further shifting of the balance of power in Trade Union con- stit>itions. When the ri^ht qf jputtin^ guestions to the-A tote "Ca me practically to be confins djto theexecutive, the(Referen- ,(m m ceased to provide the members with any effectiv e control. If the executive could choose the issues to be submitted, the occasion on which the question sh9irid-bft.gHjt, and the form in judiich it should be couched, the^eferendum/far from supplying any counterpoise to the exectrttvej^ was soon found to be an immense addition to its power. Any change which the executive desired could be stated in the most plausible terms and supported by convincing arguments, which almost invariably secured its adoption by a large majority. Any executive resolution could, when occasion required, thus be given the powerful moral backing of a plebiscitar^vofe.* The reliance of Trade Union democrats on the^ Referendum resulted, in fact, in the virtual exclusion of the generafbody of members from all real share in the government. And
' Mr. Lecky points out (Democracy and Liberty, vol. i. pp. 12, 31, 32) how, in France, " successive Governments soon learned how easily a plebiscite vote could be secured and directed by a strong executive, and how useful it might become to screen or justify usurpation. The Constitution of 1795, which founded the power of the Directors ; the Constitution of 1799, which placed the executive^ power in the hands of three Consuls elected for ten years ; the Constitution of i!o2, which made Buonaparte Consul for life, and again remodelled the electoral system ; the Empire, which was established in 1804, and the additional Act of the Con- stitution promulgated by Napoleon in 1815, were all submitted to a direct popular vote." The government of Napoleon III., from 1852 to 1870, was ratified by four separate plebiscites. See also Laferri^re, Constitutions de la France depuis fj8g ; Jules Clire, Histoire du Souffrage Universel.
Primitive Democracy 27
when we remember the practical subordination of the" executive committee to its salaried permanent officer, we shall easily understand that the ultimate effect of such a Referendum as we have described was a further strengthen- i ng of th e^ in fluence of the general secretary. who^raf?e3~tHe^ propositions, wrote the arguments in support of them, and edited the official circular which formed the only means of communication with the members. ,
We see, therefore, that almost every influence in the' Trade Union organisation has tended to magnify and con-i solidate the power of the general secretary. |lf democracy could furnish no other expedient of popular control than the- mass meeting, the annual election of public officers, the Initiative and the Referendum, Trade Union history makes it quite clear that the mere pressure of a dnnnigtrative needs w ould inevitably result in ^ the genera^ body of citizens losin g all ef fective control over th e government.^ It would not Se difficult to point to influential Irade Unions at the present day which, possessing only a single permanent official, have not progressed beyond the stage of what is virtually a personal dictatorship. But it so happens that the very development of the union and its business which tends, as we have seen, to increase the influence of the general secretary, calls into existence a new check upon his personal authority. If we examine the constitution of a bank or joint stock company, or any other organisation not formed by the working clas^Ke shall find it almost invariably the rule that the chief exe^R^e officers are appointed, not by the members at large, but by the governing committee, and that these officejp are allowed a free hand, if not absolute power, in the choice and dismissal of their- subordinates. Any other plan, it is contended, would seriously detract from the efficient working of the organisation. Had the Trade Unions j,adopted this course, the^^ne^jJ^-^cretary would have been absolutely supreme. But working-class organisations in England have, almost v#lhout exception, tenaciously clung to the direct elec^n of all officers by the general
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