since no major Sovietmilitary actions had taken place there. The Mujahideen groups comingfrom Malajat (the southern and southwestern suburbs of Kandahar)and other neighboring bases moved during the night to their designat-ed ambush sites. The ambush plan was kept secret from the localpopulation and local Mujahideen units since resistance groups basedin the ambush area were reluctant to participate, fearing retaliationdirected at their homes and families still living there.
The ambush groups moved into position during the night anddeployed patrols to secure the area. As the day began and localsstarted moving around, Mujahideen patrols temporarily detainedthe villagers to ensure secrecy. The Soviet convoy reached the killzone at 0900 hours. As instructed, the Mujahideen groups openedfire simultaneously, surprising the enemy. The column stopped andmany vehicles began moving north onto the open plain. The escort-ing tanks and APCs fired randomly in panic from on the roadwithout trying to maneuver or close with the ambush sites. Enemyvehicles moving north off the highway soon were out of range ofmany of the Mujahideen weapons.
In the meantime, several gasoline trucks caught fire and the firequickly spread to other vehicles. The chain reaction set off severalexplosions which threw burning debris on both sides of the road. Wescored direct hits on about 50 vehicles while many others were dam-aged in explosions caused by the blown up trucks and gas tankers. Theaction lasted 30 minutes. We withdrew before enemy aircraft could bescrambled. The enemy did not pursue us.
This ambush marked the beginning of a continuous battle forcontrol of the western road to Kandahar. Until the Soviet withdrawalin 1989, this road was under constant threat by the Mujahideen whowould set up road blocks, conduct ambushes, mine long stretches ofthe road and demolish bridges, underpasses and viaducts using unex-ploded aerial bombs. Faced with continuous Mujahideen ambushesand attacks on convoys along the highway, the Soviet forces estab-lished several security posts and fire bases in the area. They built amajor fire base at Kandahar Silo and another at Karez Slim in thenorthern plain overlooking the Kandahar western highway.
The Soviets set three security outposts at the points whereorchards and the green zone stretched to the road providing conceal-ment for Mujahideen in ambush. They were established on bothsides of Pasab and at Hauz-e Madad (Map 10a Deh-Khawaja 1 inVignette 9). The posts were protected by earth berms. The road-sidesecurity posts were connected to the main fire base at Karez Slim bycommunications trenches which allowed safe, rapid reinforcement.The twin Pasab posts were each manned by 10–15 men and each hada tank, a howitzer and a mortar. The security post at Hauz-e Madadwas two times as large as the two Pasab posts combined.
The new security arrangement impeded Mujahideen movement inthe area. Repeated attempts by the Mujahideen failed to knock out the Soviet outposts. Lala Malang sent for me and asked me to join in a coordinated attack on the Soviet security posts in November 1985. Mujahideen forces lacked the ability to knock out security posts sincethey had to fight from exposed positions with little cover and theylacked engineering equipment to neutralize mine fields around theenemy positions. Therefore, the Mujahideen could not sustain pressure on the outpost garrison. We Kandahar Mujahideen decided to first enhance our tactical sur-vivability and then renew attempts to destroy the enemy security 7 Lala Malang was a well-known Mujahideen commander who was based in Pashmol (hewas killed during a major Soviet sweep of the Arghandab Valley in 1987). Page 46 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War posts. We began to steadily improve field fortifications areas aroundKandahar. We dug trenches with overhead cover overlooking theenemy security posts. We constructed bunkers, underground nightshelters and covered access trenches, and stocked ammunition andsupplies in these prepared positions. Wherever possible, we built over-head cover using timbers covered with a thick layer of dirt as protec-tion against artillery and aviation. We prepared firing positions forour multi-barrelled rocket launchers. Each of these positions had apool of water so that the firing crew could splash water on the sitebefore firing to absorb the flames and fumes from the rocket launch. These positions significantly enhanced Mujahideen field sustain-ability and enabled them to fire on the enemy outposts aroundthe clock. Enemy attempts to dislodge the Mujahideen with airstrikes and artillery fire repeatedly failed. Enemy tanks and motor-ized rifle forces were also unable to penetrate the green zones toeliminate the positions.
Finally the enemy was forced to abandon his posts at Pasab andHauz-e Madad and shift his forces to Karez Slim. A local Mujahi-deen commander, Mulla Nek Mohammad, and some others intensi-fied their daily harassment of enemy movements in the area close to the green zone. Every morning, the Soviets would deploy securitypatrols from their base at Kandahar Silo to secure the highwayfrom the city to Sanjari area. The Karez Slim fire base covered thearea west of Sanjari.
As Mujahideen attacks further threatened the security of theenemy convoys on the highway, the Soviets decided to avoid the stretchof road they could not control. They constructed a detour road to thenorth of the highway. The bypass road was built in 1985 and connect-ed Sanjari and Karez Slim (See Map10a - Deh-Khwaja 1 in Vignette 9).
COMMENTARY
Soviet lack of adequate reconnaissance cost them dearly. Moving a convoy of supply vehicles in close terrain, without effective security arrangements, often resulted in major tactical setbacks. They further failed to cover the convoy movement with helicopter reconnaissance and helicopter gunships. The Mujahideen had calculated the reaction time for helicopter gunships from Kandahar air base. Timely action by helicopter gunships could have saved the day for the Soviet convoy, but they were apparently not planned for and not on call.
Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zonewould drive out of it. The security detail followed this SOP. Instead of aggressive efforts to use their armored strength and fire power to outflank the ambush groups and cut off their withdrawal, the Sovietsecurity vehicles passively remained with the embattled column and fired on suspected Mujahideen positions. They had little effect.
Later on, as the Soviet forces established stationary security posts in the key areas along the highway, they failed to support and sustain them in the face of constant Mujahideen attacks. This later led them to construct a bypass road further to the north away from the dangerous green zone. The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerilla war, the loss of initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of tactical combat.
What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to the ambush site. Simultaneous attack on the enemy column along its entire depth was perhaps the most decisive element in this ambush. In this case, the Mujahideen had approximately 40 combatants to a kilometer of ambush. This was much denser than usual Mujahideen ambushes andreflected that they were fighting from a green zone which could accomodate more combatants.
However, the Mujahideen failed to exploit the initiative they achieved through surprise by moving to the road to complete the destruction of a demoralized and panicked enemy. Instead, they pulled out immediately after their success. This failure to fully exploit an ambush became a hallmark of Mujahideen hit and run tactics throughout the war.
Later fighting confirms the importance of field fortifications and terrain to increase battlefield survivability and sustain combat despit eenemy air and artillery superiority. This was a lesson once learned bythe Mujahideen that was effectively implemented throughout the war. The Soviets and DRA, on the other hand, did not make a concerted effort to find and destroy these positions. The parochial nature of the resistance always affected selection
