ambush also lacked sufficient early warning which could communicate the size, composition and activity of approaching convoys. If the commander had early warning and a chain of command, he could have anticipated the arrival of vehicles using something other than sound, determined whether or not to attack the vehicles and gotten his new orders to his men in a timely manner.
VIGNETTE 16: SISAY AMBUSH
by Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq
(Haji Mohammad Seddiq is from No-Burja village in Logar Province. The village is in theTangi-Wardak area which connects the Saydabad District of Wardak Province to the Baraki Barak District in the Logar Province. Commander Seddiq's village is located on the borderbetween the two provinces. Therefore, his command fought in both provinces in coordination with other Mujahideen. Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq was affiliated withHekmatyar's HIH.)
In October 1985, several Mujahideen groups cooperated to establish an ambush at Sisay, some five kilometers north of the SaydabadDistrict Headquarters in Wardak Province. The ambush site is located along the main highway between Kabul and Ghazni. It is located atthe mouth of the valley which extends to Logar and offers concealed approach and withdrawal routes for an ambush force. The terrain facilitates the use of all types of weapons by an ambushing force, while restricting maneuver to a force caught in the kill zone.
Mawlawi Faizan, the Wardak provincial leader of HIH, was over-all commander of the Sisay combined ambush. He had information from his sources that a large Soviet/DRA column would move from Kabul to Ghazni. Mawlawi Faizan planned the ambush at Sisay and called on several local Mujahideen groups to participate (Map17 -Sisay). He assembled a combined force of 80 Mujahideen armed with four 82mm mortars, six 82mm recoilless rifles, four 60mm mortars,[6] ten RPG-7s and an assortment of Goryunov machine-guns, AK-47 assault rifles and bolt-action Enfield rifles.
I brought my group from Logar Province. It took us three hours to reach the ambush site. Normally, we organized our force into six-man teams, but due to the expected strength of the enemy column, we organized our force into 10-man teams. The ambush had three groups—an assault group, a support group and a heavy weapons group. The assault group had four teams (40 men) armed with the anti-tank weapons. It deployed on Guley hill close to the road. The support group was located behind the assault group. It had three teams (30 men) armed with the machine-guns. Its mission was to support the assault group with machine gun fire, evacuate the wounded and resupply ammunition. The heavy weapons group had one 10-man team armed with the mortars. It established firing positions across theWardak River. The firing sites were screened from observation by Khadibooch hill.
We occupied our prepared positions in the dark. At about 0900 hours, the forward security element of the Soviet convoy drove into the kill zone from the north. There were two BMPs and another APC in the forward security element. We let them pass. The forward security element just cleared the kill zone and then stopped. They must have assumed that the way was safe, since they then signaled the main body of the convoy to proceed. The forward security element waited while the main body, consisting of GAZ-66 trucks and armored vehicles, moved out of the green zone south of Shekhabad village and into the kill zone. As the column moved into the kill zone, we opened up on the forward security element with our anti-tank weapons. We destroyed both BMPs and the other APC. Then we shifted our fire to the main convoy. The fighting lasted for two hours. The enemy returned fire from his APCs and other armored vehicles, but their fire had limited effect against our well-prepared positions. We punished the enemy severely with our anti-tank fire and mortar fire. The enemy did little to change the situation or to try to gain the initiative. They merely returned fire and those caught in the kill zone died there. I commanded the first team of the assault group. By 1100 hours, we had destroyed all the vehicles in the kill zone and we swarmed into the area to capture whatever weapons and equipment we could carry. Then we withdrew. We left 17 armored vehicles and 45 GAZ-66 trucks and gas tankers burning in the kill zone. We captured four AK-74 assault rifles—the exclusive weapon of the Soviet forces. Mujahideen casualties were 10 KIA and two WIA.
COMMENTARY
Thorough planning, good intelligence, detailed instructions to the combat elements and a simple task organization all contributed to the success of the ambush. The heavily-armed Mujahideen were well-disciplined and controlled. They inflicted maximum losses on the Soviet column before moving forward to loot. This was very effective since it maximized their advantage of fighting from well-protected positions against an enemy caught by surprise and trapped in the open. Perhaps the ambush should have had four elements. The support group had a combat mission (machine gun support to the assault group and a logistics mission of ammunition resupply and medical evacuation). Perhaps these missions should have assigned to different groups. Further, the heavy weapons group needed more men. Ten men cannot adequately handle four mortars, let alone eight.
The Soviets contributed to their own disaster. The forward security element "cleared" the area by simply driving through it and since they were not fired on, they assumed that it was safe. This was a favorite Mujahideen ambush site complete with well-prepared positions. The Mujahideen had conducted several ambushes from this very site in the past. As a minimum, the Soviets should have sent a force to destroy the positions prior to the convoy departure. Then, the forward security element should have dismounted some troops to search the area for possible ambush and held it until the convoy passed. The forward security element further contributed to the disaster by stopping within anti-tank weapons range (300–800 meters) in an area where the terrain restricted vehicular movement and waiting for the convoy to catch up to it. When the Mujahideen fired on these stationary targets, the forward security element became a burning blockade which trapped the convoy. Had the forward security element moved well ahead of the convoy, it would have allowed part of the convoy to escape south and enabled the forward security element to return to provide fire power to help extricate the trapped vehicles. Had the forward security element moved off the road to the west and taken up covered positions out of anti-tank weapons range, it could have provided considerable immediate firepower to the convoy.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen conducted ambushes for harassment or for spoils. Often, harassing ambushes were small-scale ambushes which would only fire a few rounds into the convoy to destroy or damage some vehicles. Then the ambushers would withdraw without attempting to loot the column before the convoy commander could react Ambushes conducted for spoils (weapons, ammunition, food, clothing and other military supplies) were normally conducted by larger forces who could maintain their positions for up to an hour. Still, the ambush was a short-term action designed to capitalize on surprise and terrain. Roadblocks, discussed in a later chapter, were designed to fight the enemy to a standstill and prevent his passage for an extended period of time.
Ambushes for spoils were essential to maintaining the Mujahideen in the field. Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers. Most of them had family responsibilities. Normally all captured heavy weapons and ⅕th of the spoils went to the commander. The other ⅘ths was divided among the Mujahideen combatants. Many Mujahideen would take their captured Kalashnikovs and other trophies to Pakistan where they would sell them and then give the money to their families to live on.
Although the popular concept of the Mujahideen combatant is a hardened warrior clutching a Kalashnikov assault rifle, the most important Mujahideen weapon in the conflict was the RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher. This Soviet-manufactured,
