new squadron required training in that respect. In war games, indeed, very useful preliminary work can be done in this department" but that tactical insight which knows how to exploit a favourable situation is itself first trained on the open sea and in the last resort it is the sum of the impressions received which first enables the commander to come to the right decision in the time available, which is often only a matter of seconds. For such decisions there are no rules, however valuable certain tactical principles may be, which have been sanctified by experience.
In the era of sailing ships it was a simple matter, owing to the slow deployment for battle and the small range of the guns. But to-day it is altogether different, in view of the great speed of the ships and the huge range of the guns. The first shells usually arrive the moment the enemy is seen, and we have known cases in which the impact of the enemy's projectiles is the first notification of his being in the vicinity, and he has not become visible until some time afterwards.
With regard to England, we were faced with a particularly difficult, indeed almost insoluble problem. We had to deal with our enemy in such a way as to give greater effect to our smaller calibre guns at short range and be able to use a torpedo wherever possible. From the English we had to expect that in view of the greater speed possessed by their ships of every type and their heavier artillery, they would select the range that suited them and fight a "holding-off" action. That, indeed, is exactly what happened in the war. The necessity of practical training in this department illustrates the importance of the addition of a third squadron.
Further, Squadron III, comprising our latest battleships, was not at full strength, but just formed a division consisting of the Prinz Regent Luitpold, (flagship), and the battleships Kaiser, Kaiserin, and König Albert. In the course of the winter, beginning at the end of December, the Kaiser and König Albert had been away on a longish cruise in foreign waters. The ships had paid a visit to our colonies - the Cameroons and German South-West Africa - visited the harbours of Brazil and the Argentine, and then passed through the Straits of Magellan to the west coast of South America and Chile. The ships had behaved very well on the distant cruise, which was particularly arduous on account of the long sojourn in the tropics. In particular, the engine-room personnel had had an opportunity of becoming thoroughly familiar with the internal arrangements On the other hand battle-practice could not be carried out to the extent that it was at home, where no diversions were involved.
At the same time as we were starting on our Scandinavian cruise the English Fleet had assembled for a great test-mobilisation at Spithead. It was thus ready and thereafter continued so.
On our way north two French destroyers which we passed on July 16 so close that we could make out their names Stilette and Trombeau—reminded us that the President of the French Republic, Poincaré, was on his way from Dunkirk to St. Petersburg in the battleship France, accompanied by the cruiser Jean Bart, and might pass us at any time. We did not like the prospect of having to show him the usual courtesies on the high-seas—a salute—prescribed by international usage, so we drew ahead in order to avoid any chance of a meeting.
Our battle-practice was continued until July 24, on which day the high cliffs of the Norwegian coast were for the most part visible, thanks to the clear, fine weather. On July 22 we had crossed the 60th degree of latitude, which forms the boundary of home waters, but not for long. We stayed quite a short time in Norwegian waters, in fact just long enough to allow coaling from colliers sent to meet us at certain anchorages. My flagship Preussen and the battleship Schlesierr, which together formed one division, were looked after by the Dutch steamer Willi. The First Division was in the Nordfjord by Olde, the Second, comprising Hessen and Lothringen, was also in the Nordfjord, by Sandene, while the other half of the squadron, the Fourth Division, had called at Molde. In the same way the battle-cruisers and light cruisers of the Fleet, as well as the battleships of Squadrons I and II, were distributed among other inlets, notably the Sogne and Hardanger Fjords. The, very day we left, Saturday, July 25 the news reached us of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In view of that we were not at all surprised to get an order to hold ourselves ready to put to sea immediately. In the afternoon of the next day, Sunday, we left for the rendezvous appointed for the whole Fleet, about 250 nautical miles from the entrance to the Nordfjord.
After the Fleet had assembled the Flag Officers of the squadrons had a conference on the Fleet-Flagship, at which Admiral von Ingenohl explained the political situation and the necessity for our being prepared for the immediate outbreak of war. He also told us that England would probably remain neutral. On this subject we had received a report that King George of England had expressed himself in that sense to Prince Henry of Prussia. Not. withstanding this, every possible warlike precaution was taken for the rest of our homeward journey. But the Fleet was divided in such a way that Squadron I, under the command of Vice-Admiral von Lans, and comprising the four ships of the " Ostfriesland " class and the four of the "Nassau " class, with the battle-cruisers, steamed to Wilhelmshaven through the North Sea, while Squadrons II and III with the Fleet-Flagship returned to Kiel through the Kattegat. This distribution of the Fleet is manifest proof of our confidence that no attack threatened us from the side of England. It was only in the East that danger was visible, and accordingly it seemed inadvisable to remove all our big ships from the Baltic.
On July 29 the ships lay in Kiel Harbour and were engaged in effecting the pre-arranged measures which as a rule precede a regular mobilisation, measures which were ordered on account of the increasing tension of the political situation.
All our preparations were inspired by the impression that what we had to face was a war with Russia and France. Fuelling and taking in supplies took up the whole of July 29. We had not yet recalled the men on leave, as all hope of the maintenance of peace had not by any means yet been abandoned. It was only on the following day that the news became more menacing and England's attitude more hostile. Squadron III accordingly made preparations to go through the Canal into the North Sea, while the final steps were now taken to make the ships ready for the change to battle conditions, which might at any time become necessary.
On July 31 the Commander-in-Chief in the Friedrich der Grosse passed into the Canal on his way to the North Sea. It was obvious from this step that for us the centre of gravity of the war at sea now lay in the west. Shortly before his departure I had an interview with Admiral von Ingenohl in which he told me that in case of war my task with Squadron II would be to deal with Russia.
It is easy to understand that this commission, which put me in a position to lead and execute the first naval enterprises independently, had a great attraction for me. The appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief for the Baltic in the person of Prince Henry of Prussia had no material effect on my freedom of action at sea, once we had set out for enemy waters; and, besides, Prince Henry's professional knowledge, his whole mode of thought and conception of responsibility offered a guarantee that his appointment could only serve a useful purpose. It may here be said at once that the royal Commander-in-Chief grasped and carried out in the most typical fashion the difficult and thankless task of our defensive operations in the Baltic, for which we disposed of very limited resources, both as regards numbers and efficiency, after England had appeared on the scene as the principal enemy. A Russian invasion like that of East Prussia, which might easily have been followed by another from the sea, and would have meant the total destruction of numerous important and beautiful places on the Baltic coast, was spared us.
But our hopes of an independent Baltic operation were destroyed the very same day by the order to Squadron II to follow the others immediately to the North Sea. The High Sea Fleet was accordingly concentrated in the Jade on August 1 and at 8 o'clock in the evening the mobilisation order arrived, which was greeted by the crews of the ships with loud cheers.
Meanwhile, opinion had veered round completely as to the probable attitude of England, and it was accepted as certain in the Fleet that she would join the two opponents with whom we had alone been concerned at the outset. This view corresponded to the temper prevailing in the Fleet. We were fully aware of the seriousness of the situation, and that we should now be
