WITH AUBRY.—ANECDOTES RELATIVE TO VENDEMIAIRE.—NAPOLEON GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.—INTEGRITY OF HIS MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.—HIS DISINTERESTEDNESS.—NICK-NAMED PETIT-CAPORAL.—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SYSTEM OF THE DIRECTORY AND THAT OF THE GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.
September 1st—6th. On the 1st of September we found from our latitude that we should see the Cape Verd Islands in the course of the day. The sky was, however, overcast, and at night we could see nothing. The Admiral, convinced that there was a mistake in the reckoning of our longitude, was preparing to bear westward to the right, in order to fall in with the islands, when a brig, which was ahead of us, intimated by a signal that she had discovered them on the left. During the night the wind blew violently from the south-east, and if our mistake had been the reverse of what it was, and the Admiral had really borne to the right, it is not improbable that we should have been thrown out of our course; a proof that, notwithstanding the improvements in science, mistakes are very apt to take place, and that the chances of navigation are very great. As the wind continued to blow strong, and the sea was boisterous, the Admiral preferred continuing his course, rather than waiting to take in water, of which he believed he had already a sufficient store. Every thing now promised a prosperous passage; we were already very far advanced on our course. Every circumstance continued favourable; the weather was mild, and we might even have thought our voyage agreeable, had it been undertaken in the pursuit of our own plans and in conformity with our own inclinations: but how could we forget our past misfortunes, or close our eyes on the future?——
Occupation alone could enable us to support the languor and tedium of our days. I had undertaken to teach my son English; and the Emperor, to whom I mentioned the progress he was making, expressed a wish to learn also. I endeavoured to form a very simple plan for his instruction, in order to save him trouble. This did very well for two or three days; but the ennui occasioned by the study was at least equal to that which it was intended to counteract, and the English was laid aside. The Emperor occasionally reproached me with having discontinued my lessons: I replied that I had the medicine ready, if he had the courage to take it. In other respects, particularly before the English, his manners and habits were always the same: never did a murmur or a wish escape his lips; he invariably appeared contented, patient, and good-humoured.
The admiral, who, on account of our reputation, I suppose, had assumed great stiffness, on our departure from England, gradually laid aside his reserve, and every day took greater interest in his captive. He represented the danger incurred by coming on deck after dinner, owing to the damp of the evening; the Emperor would then sometimes take his arm and prolong the conversation, which never failed to gratify him exceedingly. I have been assured that the Admiral carefully noted down every particular that he could collect. If this be true, the remarks which the Emperor one day made, during dinner, on naval affairs—on the French resources in the south; those which he had already created, and those which he contemplated; and on the ports and harbours of the Mediterranean: to all of which the Admiral listened with deep attention, and as if fearful of interruption—will compose a chapter truly valuable to a seaman.
I will now return to the details collected during our ordinary conversation. The following relate to the siege of Toulon.
In September 1793, Napoleon Buonaparte, then in his twenty-fourth year, was yet unknown to the world which was destined to resound with his name. He was a lieutenant-colonel of artillery, and had been only a few weeks in Paris; having left Corsica, where political events had forced him to yield to the faction of Paoli. The English had taken possession of Toulon; an experienced artillery-officer was wanting to direct the operations of the siege, and Napoleon was fixed on. There will history take him up, never more to leave him;—there commences his immortality.
I refer to the Memoirs of the Campaign of Italy for the plan of attack which he adopted, and the manner in which that plan was carried into effect. It will there be seen that it was he, and he alone, who took the fortress. This was a great triumph, no doubt: but to appreciate it justly, it would be necessary to compare the plan of the attack with the account of the evacuation; the one is the literal prediction, and the other is the fulfilment word for word. From this moment the young commander of artillery enjoyed the highest reputation. The Emperor never looks back to this period without pleasure, and always mentions it as the happiest portion of his life. The taking of Toulon was his first successful achievement, and it naturally excites the fondest recollections. The history of the campaign of Italy will present a faithful picture of the three generals-in-chief who succeeded each other during the siege: the inconceivable ignorance of Cartaux, the gloomy brutality of Doppet, and the honest courage of Dugommier. Of them I shall here say nothing.
At the first breaking out of the Revolution, there was nothing but disorder in the matériel and ignorance in the personnel of the French army, which was owing both to the confusion of the times and the rapidity and irregularity with which the promotions had been made. The following story will afford an idea of the state of affairs and of the manners of the time:—
On his arrival at head-quarters, Napoleon waited on General Cartaux, a fine figure, covered with gold lace from head to foot, who asked him what duty he had been sent upon. The young officer modestly presented the letter which directed him to superintend, under the general’s command, the operations of the artillery. “This was quite unnecessary,” said the fine-looking man, twirling his whiskers; “we want no assistance to retake Toulon: however, you are welcome, and you may share the glory of burning the town to-morrow, without having experienced any of the fatigue.” And he made him stay to sup with him.
A party of thirty sat down to table; the general alone was served like a prince, while every one else was dying of hunger; a circumstance which, in those days of equality, strangely shocked the new guest. The next morning, at break of day, the general took him out in his cabriolet, to admire, as he said, the preparations for attack. As soon as he had crossed the height, and come within sight of the roads, they got out of the carriage, and entered some vineyards by the road side. The commandant of artillery then perceived some pieces of ordnance, and some digging, for which it was literally impossible for him in the slightest degree to account. “Dupas,” said the general haughtily, turning to his aide-de-camp, his confidential man, “are those our batteries?”—“Yes, general.”—“And our park?” “There, close at hand.”—“And our red-hot balls?”—“In yonder houses, where two companies have been employed all the morning in heating them.”—“But how shall we be able to carry these red-hot balls?” This consideration seemed to puzzle them both completely, and they turned to the officer of artillery, and begged to know whether, through his scientific knowledge, he could not explain how the thing was to be managed. Napoleon, who would have been very much tempted to take the whole for a hoax, had his interrogators evinced less simplicity, for they were more than a league and a half from the object of attack, summoned to his aid all the gravity he was master of, and endeavoured to persuade them, before they troubled themselves about red-hot balls, to try the range of the shot with cold ones. After a great deal of trouble, he at length prevailed on them to follow his advice, but not till he had very luckily made use of the technical term coup d’épreuve, (proof-shot,) which took their fancy, and brought them over to his opinion. They then made the experiment, but the shot did not reach to a third of the distance required: and the general and Dupas began to abuse the Marseillais and the Aristocrats who had, they said, maliciously spoiled the powder. In the mean time the representative of the people came up on horseback: this was Gasparin, an intelligent man, who had served in the army.—Napoleon, perceiving how things were going on, and boldly deciding on the course he meant to pursue, immediately assumed great confidence of manner, and urged the representative to intrust him with the whole direction of the affair. He exposed, without hesitation, the unparalleled ignorance of all who were about him, and from that moment took upon himself the entire direction of the siege.
Cartaux was a man of such limited
