that, to facilitate the taking of Toulon, it would be necessary to make the attack at the outlet of the road. When the commandant of artillery sometimes pointed to this outlet on the map, and told him there was Toulon, Cartaux suspected he knew very little of geography; and when, in spite of his opposition, the authority of the representative decided on the adoption of this distant point of attack, the general was haunted by the idea of treasonable designs, and he would often remark, with great uneasiness, that Toulon did not lie in that direction.
Cartaux wanted one day to oblige the commandant to erect a battery, with the rear of the guns so close against the front of a house as to leave no room for the recoil. On another occasion, on his return from the morning parade, he sent for the commandant to tell him that he had just discovered a position, from which a battery of from six to twelve pieces would infallibly carry Toulon in a few days: it was a little hillock which would command three or four forts and several points of the town. He was enraged at the refusal of the commandant of artillery, who observed to him that, although the battery commanded every point, it was itself commanded by every point; that the twelve guns would have one hundred and fifty to oppose them; and that simple subtraction would suffice to show him his disadvantage. The commandant of the engineer department was called on for his opinion, and, as he concurred without hesitation in that of the commandant of artillery, Cartaux said that it was impossible to do any thing with those learned corps, as they all went hand-in-hand. At length, to put a stop to difficulties which were continually recurring, the representative decided that Cartaux should communicate to the commandant of artillery his general plan of attack, and that the latter should execute the details, according to the rules of his department. The following was Cartaux’s memorable plan:—“The general of artillery shall batter Toulon during three days, at the expiration of which time I will attack it with three columns, and carry it.”
At Paris, however, the engineer committee found this summary measure much more humorous than wise, and it was one of the causes which led to Cartaux’s recal. There was indeed no want of plans; for, the retaking of Toulon having been proposed as a subject for competition in the popular societies, plans poured in from all quarters. Napoleon says he must have received at least six hundred during the siege. It was to the representative Gasparin that Napoleon was indebted for the triumph of his plan (that which took Toulon) over the objections of the Committees of the Convention. He preserved a grateful recollection of this circumstance: it was Gasparin, he used to say, who had first opened his career.16
In all the disputes between Cartaux and the commandant of artillery, which usually took place in the presence of the general’s wife, the latter uniformly took the part of the officer of artillery, saying, with great naïveté to her husband, “Let the young man alone, he knows more about it than you do, for he never asks your advice; besides, it is you who are to give the account: the glory will be yours.”
This woman was not without some share of good sense. On her return to Paris, after the recal of her husband, the jacobins of Marseilles gave a splendid fête in honour of the disgraced family. In the course of the evening the conversation happened to fall on the commandant of artillery, who was enthusiastically praised. “Do not reckon on him,” said she; “that young man has too much understanding to remain long a sans-culotte.” On which the general exclaimed, with the voice of a Stentor, “Wife Cartaux, would you make us all out to be fools then?” “No, I do not say that, my dear; but ... I must tell you, he is not one of your sort.”
One day, at head quarters, a superb carriage arrived from the Paris road; it was followed by a second, and a third; and at length no fewer than fifteen appeared. It may be imagined how great was the astonishment and curiosity occasioned by such a circumstance in those times of republican simplicity. The grand monarque himself could not have travelled with greater pomp. The whole cavalcade had been procured by a requisition in the capital; several of the carriages had belonged to the Court. About sixty soldiers, of fine appearance, alighted from them, and inquired for the General-in-chief; they marched up to him with the important air of ambassadors:—“Citizen General,” said the orator of the party, “we come from Paris; the patriots are indignant at your inactivity and delay. The soil of the Republic has long been violated; she is enraged to think that the insult still remains unavenged: she asks, why is Toulon not yet retaken? Why is the English fleet not yet destroyed? In her indignation, she has appealed to her brave sons; we have obeyed her summons, and burn with impatience to fulfil her expectation. We are volunteer gunners from Paris: furnish us with arms, to-morrow we will march upon the enemy.” The General, disconcerted at this address, turned to the commandant of artillery, who promised, in a whisper, to rid him of these heroes next morning. They were well received, and at day-break the commandant of artillery led them to the sea-shore, and put some guns at their disposal. Astonished to find themselves exposed from head to foot, they asked whether there was no shelter or epaulement. They were told that all those things were out of fashion; that patriotism had abolished them. Meanwhile, an English frigate fired a broadside, and put all the braggadocios to flight. There was but one cry throughout the camp; some openly fled, and the rest quietly mingled with the besiegers.
Disorder and anarchy now prevailed. Dupas, the factotum of the General-in-chief, a man of no ability, made himself busy, and was continually meddling with the artillery-men in the arrangement of their field-train and batteries. A plan was formed to get rid of him. They turned him into ridicule, and urged each other on till they became very vehement in their jokes. On a sudden Dupas appeared among them with all his usual confidence, giving orders and making inquiries about every thing he saw. He received uncivil answers, and high words arose. The tumult spread on every side; cries of l’aristocrate and la lanterne were echoed from every mouth; and Dupas clapped both spurs to his horse, and never returned to annoy them.
The commandant of artillery was to be seen every where. His activity and knowledge gave him a decided influence over the rest of the army. Whenever the enemy attempted to make a sortie, or compelled the besiegers to have recourse to rapid and unexpected movements, the heads of columns and detachments were always sure to exclaim, “Run to the commandant of artillery, and ask him what we are to do; he understands the localities better than any one.” This advice was uniformly adopted without a murmur. He did not spare himself; he had several horses killed under him, and received from an Englishman a bayonet-wound in his left thigh, which for a short time, threatened to require amputation.
Being one day in a battery where one of the gunners was killed, he seized the rammer, and, with his own hands, loaded ten or twelve times. A few days afterwards he was attacked with a violent cutaneous disease. No one could conceive where he had caught it, until Muiron, his adjutant, discovered that the dead gunner had been infected with it. In the ardour of youth and the activity of service, the commandant of artillery was satisfied with slight remedies, and the disorder disappeared; but the poison had only entered the deeper into his system, it long affected his health, and well nigh cost him his life. From this disorder proceeded the meagreness, the feebleness of body, and sickly complexion, which characterized the General-in-chief of the army of Italy and of the army of Egypt.
It was not till a much later period, at the Tuileries, that Corvisart succeeded, by the application of numerous blisters on his chest, in restoring him to perfect health; and it was then that he acquired the corpulence for which he has since been remarked.
From being the commandant of artillery in the army of Toulon, Napoleon might have become general-in-chief before the close of the siege. The very day of the attack on Little Gibraltar, General Dugommier, who had delayed it for some days, wished to delay it still longer; about three or four o’clock in the afternoon, the Representatives sent for Napoleon: they were dissatisfied with Dugommier, particularly on account of his delay; they wished to deprive him of the command, and to transfer it to the chief of the artillery, who declined accepting it. Napoleon went to the General, whom he esteemed and loved, informed him of what had occurred, and persuaded him to decide on the attack. About eight or nine in the evening, when all the preparations were completed, and just as the attack was about to commence, a change took place in the state of affairs, and the Representatives
