A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. John Stuart Mill

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A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive - John Stuart Mill

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All kings are mortal, Socrates is mortal,

      are arguments precisely similar, and are both ranked in the first mood of the first figure.50

      [pg 128]

      The reasons why syllogisms in any of the above forms are legitimate, that is, why, if the premises are true, the conclusion must inevitably be so, and why this is not the case in any other possible mood (that is, in any other combination of universal and particular, affirmative and negative propositions), any person taking interest in these inquiries may be presumed to have either learned from the common-school books of the syllogistic logic, or to be capable of discovering for himself. The reader may, however, be referred, for every needful explanation, to Archbishop Whately's Elements of Logic, where he will find stated with philosophical precision, and explained with remarkable perspicuity, the whole of the common doctrine of the syllogism.

      All valid ratiocination; all reasoning by which, from general propositions [pg 129] previously admitted, other propositions equally or less general are inferred; may be exhibited in some of the above forms. The whole of Euclid, for example, might be thrown without difficulty into a series of syllogisms, regular in mood and figure.

      Though a syllogism framed according to any of these formulæ is a valid argument, all correct ratiocination admits of being stated in syllogisms of the first figure alone. The rules for throwing an argument in any of the other figures into the first figure, are called rules for the reduction of syllogisms. It is done by the conversion of one or other, or both, of the premises. Thus an argument in the first mood of the second figure, as—

      No C is B

       All A is B

       therefore

       No A is C,

      may be reduced as follows. The proposition, No C is B, being a universal negative, admits of simple conversion, and may be changed into No B is C, which, as we showed, is the very same assertion in other words—the same fact differently expressed. This transformation having been effected, the argument assumes the following form:

      No B is C

       All A is B

       therefore

       No A is C,

      which is a good syllogism in the second mood of the first figure. Again, an argument in the first mood of the third figure must resemble the following:

      All B is C

       All B is A

       therefore

       Some A is C,

      where the minor premise, All B is A, conformably to what was laid down in the last chapter respecting universal affirmatives, does not admit of simple conversion, but may be converted per accidens, thus, Some A is B; which, though it does not express the whole of what is asserted in the proposition All B is A, expresses, as was formerly shown, part of it, and must therefore be true if the whole is true. We have, then, as the result of the reduction, the following syllogism in the third mood of the first figure:

      All B is C

       Some A is B,

      from which it obviously follows, that

      Some A is C.

      In the same manner, or in a manner on which after these examples it is not necessary to enlarge, every mood of the second, third, and fourth figures may be reduced to some one of the four moods of the first. In other words, every conclusion which can be proved in any of the last three figures, may be proved in the first figure from the same premises, with a slight alteration in the mere manner of expressing them. Every valid ratiocination, therefore, may be stated in the first figure, that is, in one of the following forms:

      [pg 130]

Every B is C No B is C
All A is B, All A is B,
Some A is B, Some A is B,
therefore therefore
All A is C. No A is C.
Some A is C. Some A is not C.

      Or, if more significant symbols are preferred:

      To prove an affirmative, the argument must admit of being stated in this form:

      All animals are mortal;

       All men/Some men/Socrates are animals;

       therefore

       All men/Some men/Socrates are mortal.

      To prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed in this form:

      No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious;

      No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious;

       All negroes/Some negroes/Mr. A's negro are capable of self-control;

       therefore

       No negroes are/Some negroes are not/Mr. A's negro is not necessarily vicious.

      Though all ratiocination admits of being thrown into one or the other of these forms, and sometimes gains considerably by the transformation, both in clearness and in the obviousness of its consequence; there are, no doubt, cases in which the argument falls more naturally into one of the other three figures, and in which its conclusiveness is more apparent at the first glance in those figures, than when reduced to the first. Thus, if the proposition were that pagans may be virtuous, and the evidence to prove it were the example of Aristides; a syllogism in the third figure,

      Aristides was virtuous,

       Aristides was a pagan,

       therefore

       Some pagan was virtuous,

      would be a more natural mode of stating the argument, and would carry conviction more instantly home, than the same ratiocination strained into the first figure, thus—

      Aristides was virtuous,

       Some pagan was Aristides,

       therefore

       Some pagan was virtuous.

      A German philosopher, Lambert, whose Neues Organon (published in the year 1764) contains among other things one of the most elaborate and complete expositions which had ever been made of the syllogistic doctrine, has expressly examined what sort of arguments fall most naturally and suitably into each of the four figures; and his investigation is characterized by [pg 131] great ingenuity and clearness of thought.51 The argument, however, is one and the same, in whichever figure it is expressed; since, as we have already seen, the premises of a syllogism in the second, third, or fourth figure, and those of the syllogism in the first figure to which it may be reduced,

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