NDC was designated a separate organization in the 1992 revision of the constitution, and under the 1998 constitutional revision, the NDC became the primary organ of power in the state, to which other branches of power are now subordinate. It is an independent entity in charge of overall decision-making and guidance for defense projects, with the MPAF under its control. Figure 2 provides one view of the lines of power, influence, and control during peacetime. The NDC and, more importantly, the Supreme Commander (Kim Jong Il) has the power to declare war, issue mobilization orders in an emergency, promote senior military officers, and guide the armed forces and defense construction work.
The NDC membership also is unique in that its membership does not appear to be linked to ceremony, but the members of this commission are there because they have a particular competency or have a responsibility for a critical security-related portfolio.
The CMC (of the KWP) is next in order of seniority and guides development and production of munitions and has command and control over North Korea’s armed forces, that is, the day-to-day running of the military. Since the 1998 restructuring and the elevation of the NDC, the CMC no longer plays a vigorous role in military policy. Nevertheless, the CMC plays an important role on three levels: (1) propagates the party line on military policy; (2) is critical to regime security in that it is populated with essential personnel and plays a role in power politics within the regime; and (3) on the policy side, it ensures that the KWP apparatus fulfills its defense-related responsibilities.
Source: Used courtesy of Ken Gause, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies program, CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA.
Figure 2. Information, Influence, and Coordination Within the North Korean Leadership Structure.
North Korea employs a highly inflexible Sovietstyle military doctrine which emphasizes decisions being made at the top and carefully scripted war plans (which no one outside of North Korea has seen), discouraging operational flexibility and initiative. Hence, we deliberately list control before command.
Minister of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF). The MPAF is responsible for management and operational control of the armed forces. Prior to 1992, it was under the direct control of the president, with guidance from the NDC and the KWP Military Affairs Department. The 1992 state constitution shifted its control to the NDC. The minister of the PAF officially comes next in the chain of command of North Korea’s armed forces after the NDC, but his office has no control over policymaking or decision-making in the KPA. See Figure 3 for this peacetime command and control structure.
The MPAF, in peacetime, has responsibility for matters such as the procurement of weapons, defense research and development, intelligence-gathering, and military training. Foreign exchanges and liaison is the province of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The armed forces have little input into this area, although they are consulted. Even when direct military talks occur between North Korea and another state, the military participants are closely briefed as to what they may say by the KWP hierarchy.
Source: Ken Gause, North Korean Civil-Military Trends, September 2006, p. 19.
Figure 3. North Korean Military Command and Control.
North Korea’s military structure combines elements of those of China and the former Soviet Union, with the General Staff organizationally under the command of MPAF; functionally, however, the two are separated. In peacetime, MPAF takes charge of military administration, while the General Staff is responsible for operational command. During wartime, the Supreme Commander would exercise both military administration and operational control directly through the General Staff, bypassing MPAF. This dual chain of command ensures that only Kim Jong Il in his capacity as Supreme Commander is able to take the military command at anytime, regardless of peacetime or wartime.
MPAF has a single command system: the Chief of the General Staff has direct command over the Ground Forces corps (artillery corps, tank corps, and light infantry), the Naval command and the Air Defense command. In order that no high-ranking military officer can conspire with another to topple Kim Jong Il, the present structure forces each one to stand alone and to take control and punishment from the supreme commander.
To ensure political control, a secondary control and command path extends down via a separate chain-of-command to the lowest-levels of the KPA. The General Staff’s Department’s Operations Bureau is responsible for all operational aspects of the KPA, including broad-spectrum planning for the Air Force and the Navy, as well as paramilitary units. It is in direct contact with KPA Supreme Commander Kim Jong Il, and in the event of emergency, Kim can bypass the chain of command and issue orders directly to the Operations Bureau.
Two secondary paths exist to ensure political control of the KPA. The first extends through the KWP Central Committee to the Central Military Committee and to the General Political Bureau subordinate to the NDC. From the General Political Bureau, it extends down via a separate chain-of-command to the lowest levels of the KPA. The second extends from the NDC to the State Security Department. This department controls the MPAF’s Security Command, which also maintains representatives to the lowest-level of the KPA.
If North Korea exercised its mandate of unifying the peninsula under the military option, the MPAF probably would establish two or three army commands to control corps combat operations. These army commands could be responsible for East Coast, West Coast, and Central offensive operations crossing over the DMZ.
MPAF has been relegated to managing the peacetime administrative and logistic functions of the KPA, while the NDC is the wartime command and the General Staff Department probably would run the war, all lead by Kim Jong Il.
WMD Weapon Control and Command. Information concerning the specific control and command of WMD is vague and unclear due to the newness of this aspect of the KPA. The control and command of chemical and nuclear weapon usage probably falls directly under of Kim Jong Il for the initial application of these weapons through the General Staff of MPAF. Subordinate to the General Staff is the Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau, which is responsible for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) defense within the KPA and the production, distribution, and storage of chemical weapons and defensive equipment.
North Korea’s military control, command, and communications system consists of extensive hardened wartime command facilities, fiber-optic cable, and digital switching stations. This network is supported by redundant communication systems, which are believed to be largely separate from systems supporting other sectors of North Korea such as industry and government.
Conventional Forces
Origins and Evolution. The 20th century history of Korea is essential to understanding North Korea’s national objectives. Until the end of World War II in 1945, Korea remained a single, ethnically and culturally homogenous — but not independent — country for over 1,000 years. Korea initially was divided on a “temporary” basis by the United States and the Soviet Union along the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender and demobilization of occupying Japanese forces in Korea. The separation of the Koreas resulted in a split between communism and democracy/capitalism, both tempered by fighting the injustices from the colonization of Korea by the Japanese.
The origins of the KPA are a fusion of Koreans fighting in China for the Chinese Revolution and against
