reason to reject the argument that descriptive relativism leads to moral relativism is as follows. Descriptive relativism, if true, is something that anthropologists ought to discover. Moral relativism, on the other hand, is not a matter for anthropology. Consider an analogy. Anthropologists and historians have provided convincing evidence that human societies throughout history have had a great variety of scientific and medical beliefs. For instance, commonplace beliefs in some societies have been that Earth is the center of the universe, that the motion of the sun is due to the gods’ pulling a fiery chariot, that insanity is caused by demonic possession, that base metals can be turned into gold through chemical manipulation, and sickness is caused by an imbalance in the four bodily humors.
As a matter of mere description, there is no problem noting that these empirical claims were widely believed in assorted societies throughout history. Nevertheless, modern science and scientific medicine have now shown that all of those beliefs are false. Thus we may say that descriptive scientific relativism is true, even though Earth is not the center of the universe, the sun doesn’t really move across the sky, demons aren’t behind insanity, alchemy is a failure, and humorism has been completely discredited. That’s just to say that people have had many false scientific beliefs. Perhaps people have had lots of false moral beliefs as well. Knowing what people in fact believe very rarely tells us what they ought to believe. Therefore the second premise of the relativist’s argument, that if descriptive relativism is true then moral relativism is true, is also false.
A chief complaint against moral relativism is the Criticism Objection: if moral relativism is true, then meaningful criticism of either other societies, or even of one’s own, is impossible. Here’s why. Under moral relativism, the moral truth itself varies from one society or culture to the next. An act might be morally wrong in one society but morally permissible or even obligatory in another–not simply believed to be permissible or obligatory, but in fact permissible or obligatory. It would therefore make no sense whatsoever for people in the first society to criticize the members of the second society for their moral views since those views are, by hypothesis, true (in that society). To criticize them is to criticize the truth, which is surely misguided. Here is an illustration.
Female genital mutilation is a common practice in 30 different countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 200 million women and girls are living with the consequences of having their genitalia ritually mutilated19. The procedure–typically involving prepubescent girls–can include removal of the clitoral hood, partial or total removal of the clitoris, removal of the labia minora, and the stitching together of the labia majora with thorns, allowing only a small opening for urine and menstrual blood to pass through. Their legs are tied together for weeks afterwards to allow the scar tissue to form. Village elders carry out these operations typically without sterilization or anesthesia. Medical consequences include loss of sexual pleasure, infertility, reproductive and urinary tract infections, and various risks concerning childbirth. Girls have also died from shock, blood loss, and infection as the result of female genital mutilation.
According to WHO, there is no medical benefit to these surgeries. So why are they performed? The answer is because of social mores. Social groups that practice female genital mutilation often do so because of their ethical views about proper sexual behavior, coupled with the idea that only by crippling women’s libidos can they resist the temptations of illicit sex. There are also aesthetic beliefs regarding modesty and femininity, and the proper way that women should look. Finally, practitioners often believe that there are religious reasons for female genital mutilation, although no major religion condones it.
If we accept ethical relativism, then mutilating the genitals of young girls without their consent is morally acceptable–at least in places like Somalia and Egypt who do it to over 95% of their females. Again, not only do Somalians and Egyptians believe that it is morally acceptable, but it really is morally acceptable. Of course, it is immoral to maim children in other places, like the United States. Under ethical relativism, here are two true propositions:
Pro-FGM:
There is nothing wrong with female genital mutilation (in central Africa).
Anti-FGM:
Female genital mutilation is immoral (in the United States).
While it is consistent to hold both Pro-FGM and Anti-FGM, the objection to moral relativism is that one should not hold them both, because it is entirely reasonable to criticize female genital mutilation as cruel and wicked butchery. This is not ethnocentrism; in fact it takes the beliefs and practices of foreign cultures more seriously than does moral relativism. Moral relativism presumes that different cultures are so estranged that they cannot sensibly have a dialogue together about morality; instead each must go their own way. Yet allowing the possibility of criticism means that people from differing cultural traditions can reason together, discussing and critiquing each others’ views, to discover the moral truth. Somalians are just as entitled to criticize Americans for failing to practice female genital mutilation. Accepting moral relativism precludes substantive ethical dialogue among differing cultures, but rejecting moral relativism allows potentially fruitful debate. In this way all cultures are treated as equal partners in the practice of reason. In other words, despite cultural relativism’s pretensions to promoting tolerance and equality, in fact it does the opposite. True respect for the views of others comes from taking those views seriously through critical engagement.
Not only does the Criticism Objection apply to the criticism of foreign cultures, but also to one’s own culture. For example, in 1830 slavery was widely accepted in the United States as morally permissible. There had been an abolitionist movement in North America since colonial times, but in 1830 it was still a minority voice. If we accept moral relativism, then both of these propositions are true:
Pro-slavery:
There is nothing wrong with US slavery (in 1830).
Anti-slavery:
There is something wrong with US slavery (now).
Given the truth of Pro-slavery, it must have been the case that in 1830 the abolitionists were just all mistaken. They were wrong for wanting to abolish slavery, and misguided in condemning slave-owners. Why? Because owning slaves was entirely morally permissible. If you think that in 1830 the abolitionists were on the side of the right and the good, despite being a minority, then Pro-slavery is false. Since moral relativism implies that Pro-slavery is true, just as it implies that Anti-slavery is true, moral relativism must also be false. Moral relativism prevents the coherent criticism of the failings of one’s own society every bit as much as it disallows the coherent criticism of the practices of other cultures. If you think that we ought to review the popular morality of our culture, and aim for its improvement, then you have a reason to doubt that moral relativism is correct.
Annotated Bibliography
1 Bennett, Jonathan (1974), “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” Philosophy 49:188, 123–134. A wonderful, lively discussion of the conflict between moral instincts and moral principles.
2 Brown, Donald E. (1991), Human Universals. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.). A work of anthropology in which the author argues for an extensive list of universal human traits.
3 Gilbert, Daniel (2005), Stumbling on Happiness20. (New York: Random House). This is a book by a psychologist aimed at a popular audience. In it Gilbert addresses the question of why people are so lousy at predicting what will make themselves happy in the future.
4 Hales, Steven D. (ed.) (2011), A Companion to Relativism21. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell). A comprehensive review of contemporary scholarship on relativism, with a half-dozen articles that discuss recent thinking on moral
