beginning with the prohibition of testing any antisatellite systems against real orbital targets and establishing strict rules for rendezvous and proximity maneuvers of satellites. It is also essential to move on to discussing a mutual pact not to develop capabilities and methods of cyber attack against strategic command-and-control information systems.
Concurrent with intensified negotiations on the issues of nuclear disarmament and the limitation of non-nuclear weapons systems, it might be eventually possible to include other states in this process in a phased and selective way. All of these measures are necessary to provide a foundation for the real intensification of cooperation between leading powers in the fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism, which will otherwise inevitably increase.
Amid the current deplorable political and strategic situation, it may seem that the above proposals are utopian. However, experience shows that the situation can change very quickly—both for the better and for the worse. To avoid the latter, every effort must be made to achieve the former. The main prerequisite is the recognition by political leaders and elites of the leading powers that the task of saving and updating the system and regimes of nuclear arms control is the top priority, just as the preceding generation saw it after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The dynamic changes in the world order, military technology, and strategic thinking do not mean that nuclear arms control is no longer needed. On the contrary, these changes make arms control an even more essential condition for the survival of human civilization than it was during the past Cold War.
Alexey Arbatov is the Head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow.
1 An earlier version of this study was published at © Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Arbatov, Alexey. 2019. “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 22, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/22/nuclear-deterrence-guarantee-or-threat-to-strategic-stability-pub-78663.
2 The USA and Russia have reached an agreement on the extension of the “New Start” treaty under the new U.S. administration of President Biden in January 2021. Nevertheless, the negotiations on all the mentioned treaties to be extended or revised retain great relevance (note by O. Schmies).
3 Dvorkin, Vladimir. 2019. “Preserving Strategic Stability Amid U.S.-Russian Confrontation.” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 8, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/02/08/preserving-strategic-stability-amid-u.s.-russian-confrontation-pub-78319.
4 Tzu, Sun. 2019. The Art of War. Translated by Lionel Giles. Internet Classics Archive. Accessed November 30, 2020. http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.
5 Kaplan, Fred. 1983. The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 269.
6 Ellsberg, Daniel. 2017. The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner. New York: Bloomsbury, 100–104.
7 McNamara, Robert S. 1968. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York: Harper and Row, 61–62.
8 Bush, George. 1990. “Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability.” The American Presidency Project, June 1, 1990. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/263949.
9 For the purposes of this work, the term “strategic nuclear forces” is used almost as a synonym of the term “strategic arms,” although in the future there may be a discrepancy due to the development of strategic arms with non-nuclear warheads.
10 Von Clausewitz, Carl. 1989 (first published 1832). On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: Part I, chapter 1, section 28.
11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2017. SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1990. SIPRI Yearbook 1990. World Armaments and Disarmament. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–51.
12 Highly survivable capabilities refer to missile forces at sea and land-based mobile launchers. Heavy bombers in this case are not taken into account, since they are not kept in a state of high combat readiness, have a long flight time, and are not guaranteed to break through enemy air defenses.
13 Dvorkin, Vladimir. 2017. “Reduction of Offensive Weapons.” In A Polycentric Nuclear World: Challenges and New Opportunities (in Russian), edited by Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center: ROSSPEN, 54–74.
14 Putin, Vladimir. 2012. “Be strong: Guarantees of Russian National Security.” Rossiiskaya Gazeta (in Russian), February 20, 2012. http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html.
15 Ibidem.
16 Pilkington, Ed and Martin Pengelly. 2018. “‘Let It Be an Arms Race’: Donald Trump Appears to Double Down on Nuclear Expansion.” Guardian, December 24. https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/dec/23/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-arms-race.
17 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
18 Ibidem.
19 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
20 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
21 Ibidem.
22 Kremlin.ru. 2018. “Заседание дискуссионного клуба ‘Валдай.’” October 18, 2018. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848.
