According to independent estimates, Russia has about 1,850 units of such nuclear weapons. See more: SIPRI Yearbook 2017.
24 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
25 These asymmetries included forward-deployed U.S. nuclear forces in Eurasia; the predominant share of ground-based missiles, especially heavy types, in the Soviet strategic forces, and the sea- and air-based components of the U.S. triad; and U.S. advances in long-range cruise missiles in the late 1970s, an attempt to create space-based missile defense in the early 1980s, and, recently, leadership in the development of defensive and offensive high-precision conventional long-range systems.
26 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
27 See more: Oleg Odnokolenko, Oleg. 2018. Interview with Colonel General Viktor Esin, who said: “If the Americans begin to deploy their missiles in Europe, we will have no choice but to abandon the doctrine of launch-on-warning and move to a doctrine of preemptive strike.” Zvezda Weekly (in Russian). November 8, 2018. https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/t/2018117102-0iaAI.html.
28 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, James R. 1975. Annual Defense Department Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150705-323.
29 Ogarkov, Nikolai. 1982. Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland. In Russian. Moscow: Voenizdat, 49.
30 Redstar.ru. 2003. “Current Goals in the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Red Star (in Russian), October 11, 2003. http://old.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html.
31 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
32 Ibidem.
33 Akhmerov, Yevgeny, Marat Valeev and Dmitry Akhmerov. 2016. “The Balloon Is a Friend of ‘Sarmat.’” Military Industrial Courier (in Russian), October 12, 2016. https://vpk.name/news/165525_aerostat__drug_sarmata.html.
34 Putin, Vladimir. 2018. “Presidential address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
35 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem.
38 This applies to U.S. systems such as the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (BGM-109), and airlaunched cruise missiles (AGM-84, AGM-158B, JASSM-ER). Russia is also increasing its arsenal of nonnuclear cruise missiles: Kalibr 3M-54 and 3M-14 sea-launched cruise missiles and the Kh-55SM, Kh-555, and Kh-101-type air-launched cruise missiles. By 2018, the number of high-precision cruise missiles in the Russian arsenal had increased more than thirtyfold, according to Putin, Vladimir. 2018. “Presidential address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
39 In particular, such systems are being developed by the United States as part of the Prompt Global Strike program, for example, the Alternate Reentry System (ARS). In parallel, the Boeing X-51A Waverider hypersonic air-launched cruise missile is being tested for deployment on heavy bombers. Russia is ahead of the United States in flight tests of hypersonic gliders for launch by ICBMs (such as the SS-19 or the new Sarmat heavy ICBM by 2020). Putin spoke about the new Avangard system during his March 1, 2018, address.
40 Einhorn, Robert and Steven Pifer. 2017. Meeting U.S. Deterrence Requirements: Toward a Sustainable National Consensus: A Working Group Report. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 20.
41 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
42 In 2010, the U.S. decided to withdraw the Tomahawk from nuclear service by 2014, but the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review announced the decision to return the SLCM to nuclear service aboard submarines.
43 UA-RU.info. 2020. “Russia Conducted Secret Military Exercises Near EU Borders—the Media.” Unified Information Portal (in Russian), December 17, 2011. Accessed November 30, 2020. http://ua-ru.info/news/41846-rossiya-provela-taynye-voennye-ucheniyau-granic-es-smi.html.
44 Arbatov, Alexey. 2015. “Nuclear Arms Control: The End of the Story.” Global Economy and International Relations 5: 5–18.
45 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 23. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
46 Putin, Vladimir. 2018. “Presidential address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
47 Kremlin.ru. 2016. “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” October 27, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151.
48 At least, this pertains to the author as a participant of those negotiations.
49 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
