activity” dominate the description of Russia. Thus, her role for years ahead seems be already to be predetermined.
The document’s key passage, however, addresses a different issue, namely, that of political solidarity between the Alliance members in response to Russia’s actions.10 This is the crucial question as the Alliance members often have different ideas about how to preserve or increase security. The geopolitical situation of Europe’s East remains fragile because of Russia’s breaching of treaties, engaging in hybrid warfare, supporting populist leaders and movements, undermining faith in democratic institutions and other malevolent actions. When undertaking them, the Kremlin instrumentalizes the eastward enlargement of NATO of the 1990s to legitimize them. It refers to a “promise” of the West about non-expansion of NATO that was allegedly made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War.
The West, however, never gave a (written) guarantee to the Soviet Union that it would not expand NATO to the East of the GDR border after 1990. This has been clarified by historians.11 Still the Kremlin refers to NATO’s enlargement when justifying its malicious interference in the affairs of other countries. NATO’s enlargement serves as a—if not the predominant—rationale for Russia’s intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries in the post-Soviet space including East-Central Europe. In this regard, “NATO’s enlargement” has become not only a figure of speech, but also a dangerous political tool. It can become a justification for preparing and starting new wars.
The Alliance and Moscow are today not any longer in a confrontational, but in an interdependent relationship. Obviously, this circumstance has, however, not prevented recent escalation of tensions. The political aim is therefore to turn the two sides’ objective interdependence to a positive direction, and make it a source of cooperation. It may be insufficient or even a fallacy to merely believe that “Russia’s leaders shall choose a more constructive path” by themselves. The role of the West remains decisive, and it should turn to historical experience to learn how to deal with the current situation. Within Russia, alarming tendencies in the interpretation of history are increasing, leading to reinterpretation of entire historical epochs by the highest state leadership and culminating in the prosecution of historians and journalists intensified by the Russian state in 2020 and continued in early 2021.
In summer 2020, a number of leading American experts on Russia called the state of relations between Russia and the USA a “dangerous dead end.”12 Following this logic, the danger of nuclear war is becoming, once again, very real. Since the invention of atomic weapons, deterrence has been a basis for Western security policies, yet to proclaim today a necessity for a new strategy is insufficient. An attempt to reinforce existing efforts of developing a new strategy relying on knowledge of first-class experts is one purpose of this book.
The Contributions
With its three main parts, each anchored both in the past and the present, this collected volume seeks to achieve a better understanding of the NATO enlargement processes of the 1990s, Russia’s place in them, the policy followed and negotiation practices, as well as the underlying thinking of its main actors.
Alexey Arbatov starts with a comprehensive survey of the issues of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, and delves deeply into the historical origins of the current security dilemma. A profound understanding of the role of nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation are indispensable for the survival of human civilization. Nuclear weapons play today, to be sure, a predominantly political role, rather than a military one. Nevertheless, the state of relations between NATO (as, among others, a nuclear alliance) and Russia by early 2021 causes considerable alarm.13
John Kornblum, a direct participant of many basic international negotiations between Russia and NATO and one of the authors of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, highlights the “urgent necessity to act” in today’s world. He makes readers aware of the historical lessons from the Quadripartite Agreement which began the European security conference project. Kornblum’s chapter draws attention to the changes faced by the incoming Biden administration and its Western allies, and the need for a new “Atlantic paradigm” in the digital era. It expresses his hope that democracy and democratic values will remain the “operating system” of this paradigm.
Liviu Horovitz bases his analysis of the NATO enlargement process on newly declassified archival documents. He argues that the role of idiosyncratic motives of particular Western governments during the enlargement processes of the 1990s has been underestimated. The commonly held assumption that NATO enlargement was a Western expansion to Eastern Europe, which exploited Russia’s weakness, continues to dominate. Horovitz reconstructs British internal deliberations between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Prime Minister’s Office. He reveals a desire for securing America’s place in Europe as the main motive of the British actors in the 1990s.
Steven Pifer offers an exceptionally deep insight into the Bill Clinton’s Administration’s hopes and aspirations after German reunification and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. He traces three main tracks in “reshaping Europe,” including the evolution of relations of the US with former Warsaw Pact members, building a relationship between NATO and Russia, and the creation of a partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Pifer provides reflective criticism of all three of these tracks.
Marcin Zaborowski provides a historical overview of the external (predominantly Russian) influence on the nations of East-Central Europe. He explores their attitudes and threat perceptions, as well as resulting defense acquisition policies and defense spending decisions along NATO’s “Eastern Flank.”
Andreas Heinemann-Grüder analyzes “realist” offensive and defensive narratives of Russia’s actions towards Ukraine after the annexation of the Crimea. NATO’s enlargement often serves as a determining factor within these narratives, a conscious or unconscious provocation by the West, or even a self-fulfilling prophecy. These findings underline the interrelation of NATO and Russia, as well as the blind spots associated with the Alliance’s enlargement. Heinemann-Grüder provides a detailed examination of NATO-Ukraine relations and a prognosis for both Brussels and Kyiv based on the lessons learned from the Russian-Ukrainian War.
Mariana Budjeryn and Andreas Umland address in their contribution the security assurances that Kyiv received in 1994, from the United States, United Kingdom and Russian Federation, in exchange for Ukraine’s signature under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and atomic disarmament. They argue that Russian actions towards Ukraine since 2014 have been profoundly undermining the rationale of the entire international nonproliferation regime.
Pavlo Klimkin, a former Ukrainian foreign minister, explores, in a brief interview with the editor, the Ukrainian position on various questions of Ukraine’s international relations. He touches the 1994 security guarantees to Kyiv and their remaining political value, the Ukrainian perception of the “transatlantic community of values and convictions,” Ukraine’s strategic goals for the years to come, the lost and real chances for successful security treaties, and Ukrainian hopes for a future transatlantic partnership.
Gleb Pavlovsky, a former adviser to Vladimir Putin, offers an exclusive view on the thinking within the Kremlin—and what’s behind it. Pavlovsky provides a detailed analysis based on the sophisticated concept of “unconscious decentering.” He lays out how the Russian leadership (including, presumably, the President of the Russian Federation himself) assesses world relations and Russia’s role in them. He shows what the Kremlin is betting on in the realm
