own conclusions on the risks involved. His valuable insight provides crucial keys to a better understanding of the thinking of the Russian leadership.
Roderich Kiesewetter, a German politician representing the largest party in the governing CDU/CSU coalition, offers his views on the security architecture that has emerged since the 1990s. He argues that there was and is a lack of clearly defined Western strategic goals for NATO-Russia relations. However, Russia too “was equally incapable of defining such a vision itself” in the 1990s, according to Kiesewetter. This situation reminds of the current state of affairs. Kiesewetter examines obstacles hindering Western efforts towards promotion of democracy today and makes suggestions for the German policies towards Eastern Europe.
Łukasz Adamski explores the question of the perception of Russian foreign and security policy by the West and its political implications. He scrutinizes the fallacies underlying Western perceptions of Russian thinking and their possible resolution.
Michail Mironjuk and Dmitrij Stefanovic examine the reasons for distrust in Russian-Western relations, and focus on the role of military issues from a Russian perspective. This contribution helps to make the official Russian view on current security policies better understandable.
Reiner Schwalb draws on his long practical experience in Moscow when analyzing Russian programmatic military documents as well as Russian power structures (siloviki).14 He also elaborates on some concrete proposals for Germany’s future Eastern policy, including the field of military cooperation.
The volume contains a multifarious mixture of analytical reflections, competing interpretations and policy recommendations that can help to elaborate a more effective Western strategy towards Russia. The appearance of this collection is also an expression of the readiness of foreign policy experts from Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Germany and the USA to openly discuss and fundamentally reevaluate some burning security issues. This collection unites analysts with very different backgrounds and viewpoints within one volume. Hopefully, the book will thus serve as a forum upon which more fruitful future dialogue can be build.
Acknowledgements
My sincerest thanks go first and foremost to Marina and Alexander Stuppo. In addition, I am very grateful to Alexander Ebner, Joerg Forbrig, Andreas Umland, Robert Enz, Gabriele Metzler, Johannes Varwick, Marcus Pindur, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Peter Hoeres, Anatoliy Adamishin, Lilia Shevtsova, Ulrich Schlie, Daniel Hamilton, Kristina Spohr, Joseph Verbovszky, and Dominic Kahn for giving strength, providing a necessary word in a necessary moment, as well as for offering their support, wisdom, knowledge, encouragement and advice.
Many thanks also personally to each of the fascinating authors for their interest in the topic, their inspiration, cordial openness, stimulating discussions as well as for new friendships and impulses for new ways forward in the field of political science.
Normative rhetoric may seem “cannibalized” or “too visionary” for today’s times, but this volume profited from the wisdom of individuals who did not lose faith in values. These values will shape our future.
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Despite its heavy-handed clumsiness, Russia’s anti-NATO rhetoric is only gaining momentum. It has intensified in connection with the protests in Russia that erupted after the return of Alexey Navalny in January 2021. Navalny is now probably the best-known Kremlin critic in the West, following the poison attack against him and his subsequent medical treatment in Germany. All people protesting against the Kremlin in Russia are being accused of alleged criminal cooperation with the West and also with NATO. The accusations are constructed by Russian organs of power very coarsely, having no logic, let alone factual basis. The consequences are however becoming more dangerous for individuals. These blatant accusations by the Russian regime towards its critics, as well its fundamentally wrong and intentionally perverted interpretation of the historical development of international democratic institutions—including NATO—must be addressed clearly, over and over again.
1 See also the interview with Pavlo Klimkin in this volume.
2 See the contribution of Alexey Arbatov.
3 See, for instance, the contribution of John Kornblum in this volume.
4 Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr, eds. 2019. Open Door: Nato and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 3.
5 Goldgeier, James and Joshua R. Shifrinson, eds. 2020. “Special Issue: Legacies of NATO Enlargement: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Alliance Management.” International Politics 57 (3).
6 Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr, eds. 2019. Open Door: Nato and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr, eds. 2019. Exiting the Cold War, Entering the New World. Washington DC: Foreign Policy Institute: Johns Hopkins University SAIS.
7 Asmus, Ronald D. 2012. Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself in a New Era. New York: Columbia University Press; Hill, William H. 2018. No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989. New York: Columbia University Press; Sarotte, Mary E. 2019. “How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–1995.” International Security 44 (1): 7–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00353; Marten, Kimberley. 2018. “Reconsidering NATO expansion: a counterfactual analysis of Russia and the West in the 1990s.” European Journal of International Security 3 (2): 135–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.16 are only the few among the many.
8 For instance, the German volumes on the reunification process: Möller, Horst, Ilse Dorothee Pausch, Gregor Schöllgen, Hermann Wentker und Andreas Wirsching, eds. 2015. Die Einheit. Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; or Franzen, Christoph Johannes, Tim Szatkowski and Daniela Taschler, eds. 2020. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1989. Berlin: De Gruyter.
9 NATO. 2020. NATO 2030: United for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General. Brussels: NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
10 See also to the controversies on the so-called European autonomy as one of the latest developments. Borrell, Josep. 2020. “Why European strategic autonomy matters.” European External Action Service. Accessed January 19, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en.
11 Sarotte, Mary E. 2009. 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press; Nünlist, Christian. 2018. “Krieg der Narrative – Das Jahr 1990 und die
