of interesting details from the bolitos. Years later, when the case finally went to trial, some of what he learned would seem hauntingly pertinent. Several of the bolitos might have been able to provide important corroborating testimony, had they still been alive. El Canche, Marco Tulio, and El Pitti, whose real name was Arni Mendoza Jeréz, claimed to have at least glimpsed the shirtless man who had stepped out of the garage. El Canche said that he was muscular, a common soldier type. Most notably, in light of evidence that would eventually emerge, Marco Tulio and El Canche both mentioned seeing a large black vehicle, which one of them identified as a Jeep Cherokee.
El Canche, who disappeared soon after his conversation with MINUGUA, said that he ran into El Chino Iván at a Burger King in downtown Guatemala City the day after the murder, and that El Chino Iván was clearly distressed. He told El Canche that he’d been hungry the previous night, and that finding the little door to the garage left open had entered through it and walked all the way to the parish-house kitchen, where he’d eaten from the refrigerator. Guillamón believed that was the likeliest explanation for the half-empty pitcher of orange juice in the kitchen and the piece of hot dog in the potted plant next to the bishop’s body.
The day after the encounter in the Burger King, El Chino Iván’s father phoned MINUGUA’s investigators to say that his son had information about the Gerardi case and that he was frightened. El Chino Iván—who was tall, fair-skinned, and well spoken — soon turned up at MINUGUA headquarters and told Rafael Guillamón that Rubén Chanax had told him that he was with G-2, Military Intelligence. He said that Chanax often boasted about his knowledge of weaponry and that he had said that in ninety days a limpieza social, or social cleansing, of the park—an operation, usually carried out by police, in which undesirables were “eliminated”—was going to begin. El Chino Iván asked for protection. His father wanted him to go to the United States, but it was his immediate fate to pass into the custody of the police as a protected witness alongside Rubén Chanax.
When Guillamón interviewed Chanax, he asked about El Chino Iván’s assertion that he worked for G-2. Chanax admitted telling him that, but said that he’d been lying. He only wanted to frighten his friend, to keep him from robbing and breaking into cars near the park. Chanax said that he had been shanghaied into the Army when he was sixteen, like so many other poor Guatemalan boys. He remembered the names of his commanding officers and squad leaders. There was really no reason to doubt that he had a military past, and that, like some of the others who lived in the park, he had drifted into the life of the homeless after being discharged. Later Chanax told someone else in MINUGUA that El Chino Iván worked for military counterintelligence.
Were these claims simply fantasies and boasts? Apparently Chanax did not repeat them to Otto Ardón and his prosecutors or to the police.
THE FIRST PIECE OF EVIDENCE that pointed, however circumstantially, to a military connection to the crime was the license-plate number that the taxi driver had given to Father Quiróz. The minister of the interior had asked Ronalth Ochaeta for the name of the witness who had taken down the plate number, claiming that without this information he couldn’t attempt to identify its owner. But Arturo Aguilar and Rodrigo Salvadó had already hired, with Ochaeta’s permission, a tramitador, someone whose job it is to undertake bureaucratic procedures—guiding paperwork through red tape, knowing when to grease a palm—on behalf of others, an occupation that is a Latin American institution. The tramitador took care of the necessary business at the registry of motor vehicles and discovered that the license-plate number had once been attached to the Chiquimula military base.
The Chiquimula base had been shut down the year before, and the vehicle that bore license-plate number P-3201, a pickup truck, was now registered to the Army High Command in Guatemala City. ODHA passed this information to the commission appointed by President Arzú, and from one day to the next, according to Ronalth Ochaeta, all records of the plate vanished except for the documents ODHA had in its possession. When Ochaeta complained that the Arzú commission was not cooperating in regard to the information, the Defense Ministry issued a statement explaining that the pickup had been sold, but then was forced to acknowledge that the pickup had been sold without the license plates. Finally it was acknowledged that one of the two plates numbered P-3201, which should still have been in the possession of the Army High Command, was missing.
On April 28, the same day Mynor Melgar learned of Father Quiróz’s encounter with the taxi driver, an anonymous telephone call had been received by a receptionist at the archbishop’s office. A woman said to tell Archbishop Penados to investigate “Colonel Lima Oliva,” and then she said, “Investigate the Limas.” She described herself as a friend of the archbishop and of Monseñor Quezada, a prominent bishop with a conservative reputation, but she would not give her name. This was just one of countless anonymous tips that reached ODHA. The legal team and the Untouchables had quickly learned that information arriving in this manner was often intended to mislead, and so far almost none of it had proved useful.
There was no Colonel Lima Oliva in ODHA’s database. But there was a Captain Byron Lima Oliva in the EMP’s Presidential Guard. Indeed, he was the officer who had been thrown from his horse and broken his arm during the incident in 1996 that cost the milkman Sas Rompich his life. And there was a recently retired Colonel named Byron Disrael Lima Estrada, who turned out to be the father of the young Lima in the EMP. Colonel Lima Estrada lived in the Colonia Lourdes, a comfortable neighborhood where military officers make their homes. The retired colonel was said to run a little grocery store out of his garage.
Colonel Lima Estrada was a most unlikely shopkeeper. In 1988, he had commanded the Chiquimula military base—the same base to which plate number P-3201 had formerly been assigned. That immediately caught ODHA’s eye. The colonel had had an exemplary military career during the cold war period. A number of files on him held by the U.S. Defense Department and the CIA had been declassified, and the records were posted on the National Security Archive Web site maintained by George Washington University. Colonel Lima Estrada was an anticommunists’ anticommunist and a legendary counterinsurgency officer. The colonel’s visceral hatred of communists was explained by his painful personal history: his father, a military officer who had led a lethally repressive operation against university students after the coup in 1954, was assassinated by left-wing guerrillas in the 1960s. Lima Estrada was a graduate of Guatemala’s Escuela Politécnica, the training academy for Army officers. He had studied at the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas, and also took an elite U.S. military course in counterespionage and “special operations” in Panama.
During the 1970s, Lima Estrada was an officer in the Regional Telecommunications Center, a special political-intelligence unit inside the presidential palace, described in the National Security Archive as a predecessor of the EMP’s “notorious ‘Archivo.’” By 1981 he’d been promoted to the rank of colonel. According to one declassified U.S. intelligence report, in the early 1980s Colonel Lima Estrada “was extremely successful as commander of the most important Mil Zone (20 Quiché).” Apparently he’d assumed his command in El Quiché just after Bishop Gerardi had closed the diocese there. At least five massacres of Mayan peasants by the Guatemalan Army occurred under Colonel Lima Estrada’s command in El Quiché. In an interview given to the Wall Street Journal in 1981, the colonel named Napoleon and Hitler among his heroes. Later he commanded an airborne special forces unit that played a central role in counterinsurgency campaigns and also, according to the National Security Archive, “founded an elite ‘Kamikaze’ Counterinsurgency Tactical Unit to carry out political executions and other hits, directed by the president and his key intelligence advisers.” Those advisers met in secret to decide the life and death of Guatemalans under the auspices of a group known as CRIO (Centro de Reunión de Información y Operaciones) that was later revived, according to the National Security Archive, under the government of General Mejía Víctores, which took power after a coup against General Ríos Montt in 1983.
During that era of massacres in the countryside, the Guatemalan Army received fulsome public support from President Ronald Reagan, who famously declared General Ríos Montt
