argument. Third, he attributes the fact that there are still claims of moral consensus mostly to wishful thinking or to political and other interests.
Engelhardt seems to be convinced that the impossibility of a true moral consensus on secular grounds is the logical consequence of the absence of an ultimate metaphysical principle of life and of our existence. However, he is aware that in the realm of religion moral pluralism, particularly with regard to human genetic engineering, is all but overcome. On the contrary, mutual religious anathematism rather intensifies than appeases moral dissent in genethics.
Nevertheless, these findings are viewed as encouraging rather than preventing moral statements based on outspoken confessional-religious background. A self-professed member of the Christian Orthodox church, Engelhardt therefore sketches Orthodoxy's understandings of the norms that should guide human genetic engineering so as to offer a more complete view of the moral diversity that characterizes our condition, as well as to present a theologically grounded approach to human genetic engineering that is, in the main, very positive. The reason for Christian Orthodoxy's surprising openness towards modern gene technology is, according to Engelhardt, the fact that orthodox religious ethic is oriented towards Eden before the Fall; therefore human enhancement is considered to be of vital necessity for all human beings in the present stage, i.e., after the fall.
The balls of impregnable religious pluralism and of the putative vanity of an objective judgment of religious truth claims are picked up by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf. Notwithstanding this skeptical attitude, like Engelhardt he does not argue for a general abandonment of theological bioethics, but for an open declaration of individual religious standpoints and traditions, in his case founded in a liberal Protestant culture of Lutheran tradition. Despite his radical noological and dogmatic skepticism he believes in the enlightenment and consensual power of historical critique. Thus, he conceives of a historical critique of religious semantics and concepts in moral debates on topics such as genetic engineering, as a major task of academic bioethics.
Current public bioethical debates, he contends, would be intensively contaminated by the application of religious overtones. In Graf's eyes an involvement of religious semantics is highly counterproductive to ethical debates; as it is a method of ‘suggesting authority’ which would be problematic as he contends that religious ideas are probably the most dangerous mental substance that we humans constantly have to deal with. Religious language is extremely flexible and prone to abuse. The metaphor of creation is very popular in debates on genetics, and it is used for discrediting any kind of genetic engineering, as well as for the exact contrary.
According to Graf, it is also typical for religious language to transcend its original context and infiltrate public secular moral language. Using the tools of a critical history of concepts, populist claims of an absolute human dignity or a Christian or Western conception of man (Menschenbild) with normative implications as well as references made to the world as a whole may represent strategies of political-religious semantics which would be of little help in resolving current bio-political problems. If there is a sustainable claim for religious truth with respect to anthropology and bioethics, then it is the idea of the fragmentary character of life and the tenet that man is to be defined as indefinable.
Petra Gehring is unlikely to have Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in mind when she points to a new order (caste) of professional theological bioethicists, raised over the last 30 years by the churches (in cooperation with academic theology) as effective instruments to assert themselves as social agents of bio-power. Like Graf she tries to support her general thesis using a historical analysis of discourses, in her case of churches’ statements and activities in discussions on abortion, xenotransplantation, brain death, and advance directives/living wills.
Although her contribution does not focus exclusively on the bioethical aspects of genetics, she holds as a central argument that the churches were strong forces in transforming the respective public health debates more and more into discourses on life and biology itself. In this sense genetization would be the extreme of the general bioethicization of the churches’ positions.
This, she argues, happened first in the discourse on abortion when the Roman Catholic Church in particular used its interpretation of a biological definition of life (which had already been coined in 19th century) to establish a rather patronizing position in the sense of a virtually absolute protection of life that ignored the woman almost entirely, and aimed at protecting the embryo as an entity separate from the mother. This theological development seems to correspond to major trends in recent public debates on moral issues. It represents a shift from earlier 20th century theological debate by both Catholic and Protestant denominations when arguments were based less on an understanding of the nature of life, and more on social relationships (family, national ties).
According to Gehring, this new theological tendency towards a science-based understanding of life is also responsible for the unexpectedly positive stance which Christian churches took towards xenotransplantation, and with regard to the closely related debate on brain death as well as the more recent debates on advance directives or living wills. The fact that the initial reaction of the German churches in this respect was characterized by a remarkable indifference is, in Gehring's eyes, additional evidence that the evolving ecclesiastical and theological view of human ethics is not based on a new theological metaphysic, but rather on the functionality of biology-grounded arguments and general adaption strategies.
The geneticist Hansjakob Mueller describes the discourse between theologians and natural scientists on ethical questions of modern genetics from his personal lifelong experience, rather than from a historical-analytical perspective. He is convinced that both disciplines share a mutual interest in the wonders and preservation of human nature, and that there is clearly the need for interdisciplinary ethical dialogue. Nevertheless, Mueller is skeptical about the role that theology can play in this regard. In his eyes theologians should be more open to the progress of scientific research without fear of weakening theological moral principles. On the other hand, he is also wary of a quasi-professionalization of theological bioethicists. Thus Mueller sees the task of theological ethics, as well as professional ethics in general, not in the reflection of general principles but in the formulation of clear guidelines for complex but concrete ethical issues. Mueller concludes that the diversity of approaches, both within natural sciences and within theology, must be taken seriously and be integrated in a constructive fashion into the interdisciplinary ethics debate.
Examining Constructive Efforts of Religious Genethics
Christian Theological Genethics
Critical analyses of theological or the churches’ bio-power are – as Friedrich Wilhelm Graf already convincingly argued – not the privilege of non-theological observers. In his chapter the Roman-Catholic theologian Dietmar Mieth, a strong representative of advanced theological bioethics, opens the focus of critical observation towards a more general analysis of bio-political instruments and semantics. In his eyes bio-power is not a quasi-subjective entity in the sense of Michel Foucault, but rather the interaction of various agents and stakeholders in the field of bioethics. For democratic society, he holds, the balancing powers and interests in a field of such vital interest must be as open as possible to public dialogue.
According to Mieth, prototypical instruments of bio-political maneuvering are moratoria. Moratoria may allow room for better ethical consideration and new empirical facts, but they are also never innocent in the sense that they usually are a first step on the path toward an ethical compromise. A good example for the ambiguous character of this political tool was the discussion on human cloning held in the Council of the European Union, particularly in its Advisory Group on Ethical Implications of Biotechnology in the 1990s. Regarding this subject, Mieth argues for a mediated position based on a selection of arguments. Although each of these arguments would be relative, Mieth is convinced that in sum they force not only a moratorium, but a ban on human cloning.
A second typical
