of bio-power are the politics of language. A good example, also from the field of human cloning, is the differentiation between in vivo and in vitro cloning in combination with the terms reproductive and non-reproductive or even therapeutic cloning. Although such differentiation is necessary, Mieth is convinced that in many debates it tends to complicate rather than solve problems – he cites as an example the Human Rights Convention for Biomedicine. Still, Mieth argues for a prohibition of reproductive and in vivo cloning, but for greater leniency regarding other forms.
Mieth argues that analyzing the elements of bio-power does not interfere with taking a position within the respective debates, lest theology in particular would lose its very character. Here again Mieth seeks to combine an emphatic and principalist position (a practical Kantian apriorism) that – in his eyes – demands absolute protection of the embryo and its dignity with a combination of arguments. Concerning the question of human cloning, such arguments include the idea that humans are the image of God, as well as the diversity of humanity, finiteness, and the vulnerability of humanity. Each of these theological arguments, he concedes, is relative, but in their sum they are compelling. Applied to the question of the ethical status of the early embryo, he holds that this argues clearly for the official position of the Roman Catholic magisterium, i.e., the assumption that an embryo is to be treated like a person because of the unity and the continuity of human development.
Bio-power is not only a controversial issue, but also one of real political forces. Therefore, Mieth concludes his chapter with a hint at the dangers of an instrumentalization of women by invasive medical techniques of fertilization and at the powerful economic interests associated with these techniques. Hence, he argues for a strategic alliance of moral theology with a new form of feminism.
A bio- and genethical position which is quite close to that of Dietmar Mieth is presented by another Roman Catholic moral theologian and bioethicist, Eberhard Schockenhoff. He is convinced that – even on theological grounds – there is no principal verdict against gene technology in general. It is evident for him, however, that at least the most extreme interventions that gene technology potentially provides, i.e. the cloning of an entire human individual, are associated with the most serious ethical problems. However, less radical applications of the technology, such as genetic diagnostics are also not without ethical problems or a priori admissible.
Schockenhoff's foundational normative conviction in this context is represented by the Kantian idea that human dignity is based on the principal and unconditional acceptance of the individual per se. Schockenhoff is also a determined defender of a continuity argument with regard to human development from its earliest stages. Nevertheless, in his contribution to this volume he reserves the principal deontological arguments mostly for issues surrounding genetic manipulation. Regarding prenatal diagnosis, his arguments are mostly consequentialist. Thus, he refers to practical problems such as the risk of damaging an embryo, and to possible socio-psychological effects such as the predicted decline of social acceptance of children with congenital disabilities and the growing pressure on parents to prevent giving birth to handicapped children. Thus, he pleads for, at the very least, a right not to know.
He holds that the cloning of human beings is incompatible with the notion of the personal dignity and individual purpose of each human being. The systematic argument carrying this normative statement rests on the idea that human freedom is a finite freedom, and that it is based on a natural condition which must, in its genetic basis, not be modulated by intentional acts of other individuals. Any intentional interference in the genetic structure would – as Schockenhoff agrees with Jürgen Habermas1 – unduly limit the chance for an unimpeded development and self-understanding of the individual.
Confronted with such rather restrictive genethical reasoning, more liberal Protestant theologians like Ted Peters ask the question (as he does in the title of his essay): Is the Human Genome Sacred? There are tendencies in public opinion and as well in ethical and theological debates to treat the genome as the essential substrate of human nature and thereby as a quasi-metaphysical matter. From this perspective any attempt at modifying the human genome becomes sacrilegious, as an attempt to play God. Such normative assessments may be traced back to positions taken by scientists, especially with regard to genetics. Particularly in the early stages of molecular biology and genetic research scientists tended to treat the genome as an absolute, immutable, and deterministic blueprint of the development of an organism.
In his chapter Peters criticizes both tendencies as attempts to essentalize the genome, in particular the human genome. Like Rehmann-Sutter he points to recent publications of genetic research which describe the dynamic interaction between genome and external influences (epigenetics). He holds that theologians, in particular Christian theologians, should be sensitive regarding tendencies to view human nature solely from a biological perspective (also referred to as biologization); rather, they should focus on the holistic concept of the human person lest the Christological base of theological anthropology will be neglected.
Peters cites the chimera question as an example for the problematic aspects of this biologization of human nature. The diversity of chimera categories (human to human; human to nonhuman; nonhuman to human), and even more the inherent quantitative and functional complexities, highlight the medical and ethical problems and contradictions that would result from genetic essentialism and a blanket negation of any kind of chimera research or production. Thus, according to Peters, not polemical or hysterical warnings of playing God, but avoiding bio-idolatry should be the central mandate of theological genethics, particularly in the realm of a Reformed Theo- or Christocentrism.
Jewish, Islamic, and Buddhist GenEthics
Quite distinct from Christian positions, in particular the Roman Catholic position, is Judaism's perspective on genethics. Ronald M. Green, a philosophical bioethicist with a Jewish background, alludes to this in his chapter. Judaism is, in general quite liberal with regard to a number of topics, e.g. abortion, in vitro fertilization, prenatal diagnostics, and research involving human stem cells. Not surprisingly, then, Israel has more infertility clinics per capita than any nation in the world. To be sure, debates are also ongoing among Jewish scholars and the public regarding the severity of a child's anticipated congenital abnormalities and/or the threat to the mother's physical or mental health that justify intervention. Still, the climate of discourse is quite different from that among other religions, in particular Christian denominations.
It may be surmised that this openness towards modern forms of medical treatment and diagnosis is peculiar to the secularization of religious perceptions that are found, in particular, among Reform Judaism. According to Green, however, this is not the case. The same liberal attitudes are prevalent among Orthodox Judaism as well. Thus, Green deduces that the foundations for this relatively liberal attitude towards genethical issues are to be found in the religious tradition and literary sources of Judaism itself.
In support of this hypothesis, Green identifies three broad principles as the supporting pillars of Jewish biomedical ethics that are relevant to genetic science: (1) the stringent obligation to preserve human life through medical healing and medical research; (2) a developmental view that accords nascent human life moral weight proportional to gestational age, and (3) Judaism's openness to the application of technological advances, including human biology, for the improvement of human life. Green agrees with other Jewish ethicists that these three ethical principles can be traced back to the Bible and the Talmud.
Following Green's analysis of the respective ethical discourses, it becomes evident that the three pillars are themselves based on three deeper bioethical convictions: (1) the fundamental ethical value of human reproduction; (2) a rather exclusivist concept of human life as fully developed personal life, paired with a quite restrictive view of the inherent moral value of basic forms of human life such as the fetus (in Judaism, the fetus is not regarded as a person), and (3) the theological concept of human co-creatorship with God, paired with the religious concept of the intentional imperfection of the creation that allows, or even demands,
