A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland

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A Treatise of the Laws of Nature - Richard Cumberland Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics

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promoted.

       Chapter VI

      In the four first Sections are deriv’d from that general Precept, all those Laws which concern the Happiness, 1. Of different Nations, which have any mutual Intercourse. 2. Of single States. 3. Of any smaller Societies whatsoever, as of Families and Friends. In §5. is shewn, that the same general Law directs human Actions of every kind, as well those of the Understanding and Will, as those of the Body, which are govern’d and determin’d by the Mind. Hence is prov’d, that by this Law is enjoin’d, in the Understanding, Prudence in all kinds of Actions, as well relating to God as Man; whence arise, 1. Constancy of Mind, and its several Branches. 2. True Moderation, which comprehends Integrity and Industry. In the Will, from an Union of Prudence with Benevolence, arise Equity, the Government of all the Affections, and those Virtues which regard the special Laws of Nature. In §9. is explain’d the Difference between Actions necessary to this End, (the common Good,) and Actions indifferent; wherein there is room for Liberty, and for the Interposition of the supreme Powers.

       Chapter VII

      In the three first Sections is handled more at large the Origin of Dominion, as well over Things as Persons; and it is deduc’d from that Law of Nature, which enjoins the making a Division of Rights, and the preserving it when made. In §4. is shewn, that this Law is suppos’d in the very Definition of Justice. Thence is deduc’d (§ 5.) the Difference between Things or Persons sacred, and such as are allotted to common Uses. In §6. the Origin of the divine Dominion is deduc’d from the Judgment of the divine Wisdom, which is analogous to, or resembles, this Law of Nature. It is prov’d, that these Conclusions of human Reason agree with the Judgment which God himself makes. The 7th Section renders a Reason, why it was thought proper to add any thing to the common Doctrine, which derives God’s Right of Dominion over the Creatures, from his having created them. In §8, 9. from the Law of Nature, appointing the introducing and the preserving of Dominion, many things are deduc’d concerning a plenary Division of Dominion, as well over Things as Persons and their Labours, to be made, (either by Consent, Arbitration, or Lot,) or to be preserv’d: Concerning transferring Rights by Covenants; the Rise of their obligatory Force, and that it reaches not to Things unlawful. In § 10. is shewn, that from the same Law is deriv’d the Obligation to Benevolence, Gratitude, a limited Self-Love, and the natural Affection of Parents towards their Children, and to constitute a civil Power, (§ 11.) which may controul that of the Subject: That it is necessary (§ 12.) that the forming and preserving States be enjoin’d by a Law of Nature, obliging to the performance of external Actions, before such States are formed. Whence, in § 13. are deduc’d other Corollaries of the utmost Importance, as well in Things Sacred, as Civil.

       Chapter VIII

      In §1. is shewn, that all Obligation to the exercise of moral Virtues flows immediately from hence, that such Actions are enjoin’d by the Law of Nature. From the Law, requiring the Settlement of private Dominion, or Property, in order to the common Good, are inferred (§ 2.) the Duties, 1. Of giving to others. 2. Of reserving to our selves, those things which are necessary or highly serviceable to this end. In §3. is shewn, that the common Good of the whole System of Rationals ought necessarily in both Cases to be regarded; and that the Nature of Mediocrity consists in giving no Part more or less, than a due regard to the whole requires. From the former are deduc’d (§ 4.) Precepts; 1. Concerning Gifts, in which Liberality; and, 2. Concerning Civility or good Manners, in which the Virtues peculiar there to are conspicuous. In §5. Liberality is defin’d, with its subordinate Virtues, Prudence, and Frugality, and the Vices opposite to these. In §6. the Virtues relating to Conversation or good Manners are defin’d in general; and in particular, Gravity, Courteousness, Taciturnity, Veracity and Urbanity, and the contrary Vices. From the latter part of the Law explain’d in the 2d Section, is deduc’d (§ 7.) the Obligation to a limited Self-Love, whose Branches take care of the Mind, and of the Body, which is chiefly provided for by Temperance; which §8. is defin’d, and its Parts enumerated: those belonging to the Preservation of the Individual are here explain’d, as in §9. are those that relate to the Propagation of the Species; and it is prov’d, that the same Law commands us to take care of the Education of our Children. §10. Passes on to the Care of the Means, which are Riches and Honours; whence Occasion is taken to define Modesty, Humility and Magnanimity. In § 11, 12, 13. is explain’d the Method of deducing the practical Rules of right Reason, by which Actions are directed according to all the Virtues. In § 14, 15, 16, 17. is shewn, that the common Good, as being the greatest of all, is a Measure naturally fix’d and divided into Parts, by means whereof the value of all things Good and Evil, and consequently the measure of all Affections conversant about them, may be naturally ascertain’d and determin’d.

       Chapter IX

      Deduces Corollaries from what has been already deliver’d, which regard, 1. The Decalogue. 2. Civil Laws. The Decalogue is taken in to Consideration, because in that God himself has collected the Fundamentals of the Jewish Polity. But in the Fundamentals of every Polity it is necessary, that all those Laws should be comprehended, which naturally oblige all. Tho I deny not, that in those Fundamentals of the Jewish Polity something is contain’d peculiar to that Nation. But we have purposely omitted that in our Deduction, which is included in the four first Sections. From our Principles we do deduce more particularly (§ 5.) that it is necessary for the publick Good, that Societies with Power Imperial, or Civil Government, be establish’d and preserv’d. The first appearance of Civil Government is to be seen in a Family. The Power of the Husband over the Wife, of the Fathers over their Children; and the just Bounds of Imperial Power, are drawn from the Relation which they bear to this, as to the End intended. In §7. it is prov’d, that supreme Powers cannot lawfully be punish’d by their Subjects. And (§ 8.) that a very extensive Power is given to Sovereigns, according to these Principles; but that Hobbes’s Principles overthrow the Foundations of all Government. 1st, (§ 9.) Because they represent the Nature of Princes as more fierce and cruel than that of wild Beasts. 2dly, Because he denies to all, and consequently to Princes, that right Reason, by which they might determine, according to the nature of Things, or of Causes and Effects, what sort of Actions are good or bad to any others besides themselves: And Hobbes’s Argument is likewise refuted, by which he endeavours to prove, that we ought therefore to obey the Reason of the Commonwealth, be cause there is no such thing as Reason which is right, or which can judge according to a Rule establish’d and enforc’d by the Nature of things. It is shewn, (§ 10.) that Hobbes’s Doctrine of the Right of every Man to every thing, would not suffer any Man to enter into Civil Society; and that his Notions excite Subjects to Rebellion: That his Doctrine, concerning Compacts and Oaths, (§ 11.) is dangerous to the supreme Powers. It is shewn, (§ 12.) that by transferring of Rights to the same Person, (by which alone Hobbes teaches, that a Commonwealth can be form’d,) no one is bound to yield Obedience to a Prince. (§13.) That Hobbes takes away from Princes, all those things, which, for Flattery’s sake, he would seem to bestow upon them more than other Philosophers have done. He even accuses them of the worst of Crimes, whilst he contends, that they are bound by no Laws. He deprives Princes of all Commendation for Wisdom and Justice; and they themselves, in most States, openly and constantly reject what Hobbes ascribes to them; the very same things being elsewhere denied them by Hobbes himself, as is prov’d by undeniable Instances: as also a Confutation of his Opinion, that Compacts do not bind Supreme Powers to their Subjects, nor to other States. It is lastly shewn, that Hobbes’s Doctrine concerning Treason, encourages Subjects to commit that Crime.

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