The Design of this Treatise.
Two ways of deducing the Laws of Nature.1. From their Effects.
This insisted on by Grotius, Sharrock, &c.
§I. It concerns us both, friendly Reader, “That you should be briefly acquainted with the Design and Method of this Treatise”; for thence you will immedately perceive, “What I have perform’d, or, at least, attempted; and what is further to be supply’d from your own Understanding, or the Writings of others.” The Laws of Nature are the Foundations of all moral and civil Knowledge, as in the following Work will at large appear. But these, as all other Conclusions, discoverable by the Light of Nature, may be deduc’d two ways; either from those manifest Effects which flow from them, or from the Causes whence they themselves arise. I have endeavour’d to discover them in this latter Method, by arguing from the Cause to the Effect. To the former Method of proving their Obligation, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause,) belongs what has been written by Hugo Grotius, and by his Brother, in his Posthumous Work, and by our Countryman Sharrock, who establish them from the approv’d Sentiments of various Authors of different Nations and Ages, as also from a Harmony in the Manners and Laws, if not of all, at least of the politer, Nations.1 Hitherto also is to be referr’d that Work of Selden’s, concerning the Laws of Nature and Nations, according to the Sentiments of the Hebrews.2 And, in my Opinion, all these Authors have deserv’d well of Mankind. But especially the Work of Hugo Grotius, which was the first of the kind, I think worthy, both of the Author, and of Immortality. For a few Slips, and those in Matters, in which the Customs of his Country seem to have biass’d that great Man, will easily obtain Pardon from a candid Reader.
Useful, tho objected against.
§II. Nor, truly, are the Objections, which are usually brought against this method of proving the Laws of Nature, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause, as Grotius does,) of so great weight, as to prove it altogether fallacious and useless; altho I readily acknowledge, that they may so far prevail with candid Inquirers after Truth, as to convince them, That it would be more useful and safe, to find out a fuller Proof, by searching into the Causes, which produce in the Mind of Man the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. This, however, will more plainly appear, if we briefly propose those Objections, with the Answers to them.
First Objection from insufficient Induction.
In the first place it is objected, “That the Induction is weak, which infers, from the Writings or Manners of a few Men, or Nations, the Opinion or Judgment of all.” Now there is scarce any Person so well acquainted with the Laws and Customs of any one State, that can ever have a perfect Knowledge of them all; much less that can attain to such a Knowledge of the Laws of all States, still less, of the inward Sentiments of each Individual, as may enable him, upon a just Comparison, to conclude, what those Notions are, in which all agree.
To this it is answer’d, “That the Judgments made by different Nations concerning matters of daily publick Practice, (such are Religion, or some sort of divine Worship in general, and a degree of Humanity, sufficient to prohibit Murder, Theft, and Adultery,) may with ease be every where observ’d by any Man, without so profound a Knowledge of their Laws”: and such Judgments sufficiently declare that they agree in the Laws of Nature; for that which we know by Experience, to be, as it were, naturally acknowledg’d good by many Nations, we presume, upon account of the likeness of human Nature, to be likewise acknowledg’d good by the rest; especially when our Adversaries cannot produce one undoubted Instance, to prove any Nation to be of different Sentiments. To me, truly, those Narratives of some few barbarous Americans, and the Hottentots, “That they have no religious Worship,” seem, not suspected only but, false; for such a negative Assertion is hardly capable of ever being prov’d by Testimony. Therefore Acosta3 and some others seem rashly to have form’d a Judgment concerning those, with whose Language, Manners, and Sentiments they could not thorowly acquaint themselves in so short a time. For we read, that both Jews and Christians were sometimes falsly accus’d by many, of the greatest Impieties, tho their Religion was more holy than that of other Nations. But, be that as it will, it is manifest, “That those Truths are with sufficient Clearness propos’d to all, which are readily acknowledg’d by almost every one, altho the same should be either overlook’d, or even oppos’d, by some few.” But this Observation will be the most proper, and of greatest use, when it appears manifestly from other Proofs than Testimony and Custom, “That these Propositions teach the true Means to the best End, and that all are indispensably oblig’d to pursue that End by those Means”; which may be best prov’d by a consideration of the Causes, which suggest such conclusions of Reason to our Minds.
Obj. 2. That they want a sufficient enacting Authority.
§III. A second Objection is, “That, altho certain Conclusions of Reason are approv’d of by our own Judgment, and the Practice of many others, yet the Authority of a known Law-giver is wanting, to give them the force of Laws to all Men; for otherwise,” (say they,) “who ever holds them in contempt, has the same Right to reject the Judgment of any others whomsoever, that they exercise in condemning his Opinion by their Words and Actions.” To this purpose, both Hobbes and Selden object, (beside the Antients,) but with very different Views.4
According to Hobbes,
For, as we shall shew in the following Treatise, the Point Mr. Hobbes aims at, is, “That none should believe themselves oblig’d by the Conclusions of Reason, with respect to their outward Actions, before a civil Magistrate is appointed; and that all his Appointments should be look’d upon, as the perfectly obligatory Judgments of right Reason.” It is to this purpose that he affirms, that “The Laws of Nature, altho they are laid down in the Writings of Philosophers, are no more, for that Reason, to be look’d upon as written Laws, than the Opinions of Lawyers are Laws, and that for want of a sovereign Authority.”5 He would not indeed deny them the Name of Laws, which he had before vouchsafed to give them, (tho improperly, as he elsewhere confesses;)6 he was willing however to insinuate, that they were not promulg’d by a sufficient Authority, tho Philosophers learn them from the Nature of Things, and thence transcribe them into their Writings. It is nevertheless manifest, if they be already truly Laws made by the Author of Nature, that they need no new Authority, after they are set down in writing by any one, to make them become written Laws.
And Selden, but with different Virtues.
But Mr. Selden denies, “That the Conclusions of Reason, consider’d barely in themselves, have the Authority of Laws,” upon no other account, than, in order to shew “the Necessity of having recourse to the Legislative Power of God, and of proving that God has commanded our Obedience to them, and, by making them known to us, has proclaim’d them his Laws.” And indeed he has judiciously, as far as I can judge, given this Hint to the moral Philosophers, who are wont to consider the Conclusions of their own Reason as Laws, without due Proof, that they have the necessary Form of a Law, or that they are establish’d by God. But when he is to shew the Manner wherein God might manifest to Mankind, these to be his Laws, he proposes two ways.7 1. That God himself pronounc’d them with his sacred Voice to Adam and Noah, in joining them perpetual Obedience; whence these Precepts of the Sons of Noah were handed down to all their Posterity by Tradition only. 2. That God has endow’d
