Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to Shame.*
The third Class of Publick Desires contains many very different sorts of Affections, all those which tend toward the Happiness of others, or the removal of Misery; such as those of Gratitude, Compassion, [8] Natural Affection, Friendship, or the more extensive calm Desire of the universal Good of all sensitive Natures, which our moral Sense approves as the Perfection of Virtue, even when it limits, and counteracts the narrower Attachments of Love.
Secondary Desires of Wealth and Power.
Now since we are capable of Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Reasoning about the distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our original Desires, “secondary Desires of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary Desires, with strength proportioned to the several original Desires, and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, of the advantageous Object.” Hence it is that as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of Wealth or Power to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the Universality of these Desires of Wealth and Power, since they are the Means of gratifying all other Desires. “How foolish then is the Inference, some would make, from the universal Prevalence of these Desires, that human Nature is wholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own Advantage; since Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to [9] gratify our Publick Desires, or to serve virtuous Purposes, as the selfish ones?”
[9] “How weak also are the Reasonings of some recluse Moralists,
[print edition page 20]
who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a perfectly virtuous Character: since Wealth and Power are the most effectual Means, and the most powerful Instruments, even of the greatest Virtues, and most generous Actions?” The Pursuit of them is laudable, when the Intention is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the Poet’s Sentiments:
——— Hic onus horret, Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus: Hic subit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane est, Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.—HOR. Epist. 17.14
“Further, the Laws or Customs of a Country, the Humour of our Company may have made strange Associations of Ideas, so that some Objects, which of themselves are indifferent to any Sense, by reason of some additional grateful Idea, may become very desirable; or by like Addition of an ungrateful Idea may raise the strongest Aversion.” Thus many a Trifle, when once it is made a Badge of Honour, an Evidence of some generous Disposition, a Monument of [9] some great Action, may be impatiently pursued, [10] from our Desire of Honour. When any Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture is constituted as a Mark of Infamy, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, tho in itself most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of Living, of receiving Company, of shewing Courtesy, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneasy at their Condition, tho much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional Ideas.* Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these
[print edition page 21]
things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the publick Esteem, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.
The Uses of these Associations.
Should any one be surprized at this Disposition in our Nature to associate any Ideas together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what [11] great Evils, and how much Corruption [11] of Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of our Constitution, to consider “that all our Language and much of our Memory depends upon it:” So that were there no such Associations made, we must lose the use of Words, and a great part of our Power of recollecting past Events; beside many other valuable Powers and Arts which depend upon them. Let it also be considered that it is much in our power by a vigorous Attention either to prevent these Associations, or by Abstraction to separate Ideas when it may be useful for us to do so.
Concerning our Pursuit of Honour, ’tis to be observ’d, that “since our Minds are incapable of retaining a great Diversity of Objects, the Novelty, or Singularity of any Object is enough to raise a particular Attention to it among many of equal Merit:” And therefore were Virtue universal among Men, yet, ’tis probable, the Attention of Observers would be turned chiefly toward those who distinguished themselves by some singular Ability, or by some Circumstance, which, however trifling in its own Nature, yet had some honourable Ideas commonly joined to it, such as Magnificence, Generosity, or the like. We should perhaps, when we considered sedately the [12] common Virtues of others, [12] equally love and esteem them:* And yet probably our Attention would be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguished from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us a Desire of
[print edition page 22]
Distinction, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, thro’ a Confusion of Ideas, is reputed honourable.
This Desire of Distinction has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very Rarity, Difficulty, or Expence; by a confused Imagination that they evidence Generosity, Ability, or a finer Taste than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A Form of Dress, a foreign Dish, a Title, a Place, a Jewel; an useless Problem, a Criticism on an obsolete Word, the Origin of a Poetic Fable, the Situation of a razed Town, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:
Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum Subruit aut reficit.—HOR.15
Desires, selfish and publick.
[13/13] Art. III. There is another Division of our Desires taken from the Persons for whose Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. “The Desires in which one intends or pursues what he apprehends advantageous to himself, we may call SELFISH; and those in which we pursue what we apprehend advantageous to others, and do not apprehend advantageous to our selves, or do not pursue with this view, we may call Publick or BENEVOLENT Desires.” If there be a just Foundation for this Division, it is more extensive than the former Division, since each of the former Classes may come under either Member of this Division, according as we are desiring any of the five sorts of Pleasures for our selves, or desiring them for others. The former Division may therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the latter.
This Division has been disputed since Epicurus; who with his old Followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his Scheme,16 maintain, “that all our Desires are selfish: or, that what every one intends
[print edition page 23]
or designs ultimately, in each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure to himself, or the avoiding
