An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense. Francis Hutcheson
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from Self‐Love. But as we are sure the DEITY has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the Desire of the Happiness of others, without any such Conception of it as the Means of our own; and are sensible that this subordinate Desire is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such ultimate publick Desires we often feel, without any subordinate Desire of the same Event, as the Means of private Good. The subordinate may sometimes, nay often does concur with the ultimate; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either alone: But the subordinate alone is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.
Benevolence is not the Desire of the Pleasures of the publick Sense.
Art. IV. This will clear our way to answer the chief Difficulty: “May not our Benevolence be at least a Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness? ” If it were so, it is very unaccountable that we should approve this subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a Wager, or other Considerations of Interest. [22] Both Desires proceed from Self‐Love in the same [22] manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the Motive of Interest might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.
Don’t we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a Publick Sense? Were it our only View, in Compassion to free our selves from the Pain of the publick Sense; should the Deity propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, but to continue him in Misery, or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the DEITY assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our
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Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we not upon this Scheme be intirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the [23] pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?
[23] ’Tis true, our Publick Sense might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man’s Taste of Meat or Drink might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong Desires of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a View to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any Desire of the Means of private Pleasure can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, ’tis certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the Happiness of others, as in any part of his Life. We do not therefore desire it as the Means of private Pleasure.
Should any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some confused Association of Ideas; as a Miser, who loves no body, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death: [24] let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this Association (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. [24] How would any Spectator like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it refined Wisdom, or a Perfection of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? ’Tis plain then we feel this ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others to be a most natural Instinct, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any confused Ideas.
The Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving distinterested Desires, has probably been attempting to define this simple Idea, Desire. It is called an uneasy Sensation in the absence of Good.* Whereas Desire
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is as distinct from any Sensation, as the Will is from the Understanding or Senses. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain.
We may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always toward private Good, that they are oftner employ’d about the State of others. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the Means of private Good, or publick. Thus an Epicurean who denies a future State; or, one to [25] whom God revealed that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a future Fame, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to others. Such Desires indeed no selfish Being, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we have not this power, we must be content to be thus “befooled into a publick Interest against our Will;” as an ingenious Author expresses it.18
The Prospect of any Interest may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the Means of obtaining it. Particularly, “if Rewards of any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, this would raise in us the Desire of having these Affections, and would incline us to use all means to raise them in our selves; particularly to turn our Attention to all those Qualities in the DEITY, or our Fellows, which are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections.” Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over‐ballance all Motives to Vice.
[26] This may let us see, that “the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments, as proposed in the Gospel, are not rendered [26] useless or unnecessary, by supposing the virtuous Affection to be disinterested;” since such Motives of Interest, proposed and attended to, must incline every Person to desire to have virtuous Affections, and to turn his Attention to every thing which is naturally apt to raise them; and must overballance every other Motive of Interest, opposite to these Affections, which could incline Men to suppress or counteract them.
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Proper Affections are Desire