IN computing the Quantities of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for our selves or others, when the Durations are equal, the Moment is as the Intenseness: and when the Intenseness of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the Moment is as the Duration.
8. HENCE the Moment of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the Duration and Intenseness.
9. THE Trouble, Pain, or Danger, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring
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or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the Sum of the Good. So the Pleasures which attend or flow from the means of prepollent Evil, are to be subtracted, to find the absolute Quantity.
[40] 10. THE Ratio of the Hazard of acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also the Hazard of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.
Cor. HENCE it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the [41] greatest Good, if the Uncertainty of the latter surpass that of the former, in a greater Ratio than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with smaller, but more probably successful Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but less Probability.
11. TO an immortal Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally acute in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.
12. BUT if the Duration of the Good be infinite, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as finite added to infinite, surpasses infinite alone.
[41] 13. TO Beings of limited certain Duration, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the Duration of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.
14. TO Beings of limited uncertain Duration, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according [42] to the Hazard of the Possessor’s Duration. This may, perhaps, account for what some alledg to be a natural Disposition of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, viz. that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the nearer Enjoyments than the more distant, tho of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.
15. THE Removal of Pain has always the Notion of Good, and sollicits us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by
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Intenseness and Duration, and affected by the Hazard and by the Uncertainty of our Existence.
These are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or [42] the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,
16. THAT our Desires toward publick Good are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.
17. OUR publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the Number of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when [43] the Moments and other Circumstances are equal.
18. WHEN the Moments themselves, and Numbers of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the Strength or Nearness of the Ties or Attachments to the Persons.
19. WHEN all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended Moral Excellence of the Persons.
20. IN general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the Quantity of the Good itself, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity of the Persons.
These seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our [43] Senses constitute Objects, Events or Actions good; and “we have Power to reason, reflect and compare the several Goods, and to find out the proper and effectual Means of obtaining the greatest for our selves or others, so as not to be led aside by every Appearance of relative or particular Good.”
Action from pure Desire or Affection.
V. If it be granted, that we have implanted in our Nature the several Desires above‐mentioned, let us next inquire “into [44] what State we would incline to bring our selves, upon the several Accidents which now raise our Passions; supposing that we had the Choice of our own State entirely, and were not, by the Frame of our Nature, subjected to certain Sensations, independently of our Volition.”
If it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between Affections and Passions,
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or that Desire may subsist without any uneasiness, since perhaps we are never conscious of any Desire absolutely free from all uneasiness; “let it be considered, that the simple Idea of Desire is different from that of Pain of any kind, or from any Sensation whatsoever: Nor is there any other Argument for their Identity than this, that they occur to us at once: But this Argument is inconclusive, otherwise [44] it would prove Colour and Figure to be the same, or Incision and Pain.”
There is a middle State of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuit of any important Good, nor know of any great Indigence of those we love. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to our selves or our Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely desire and pursue it, without any considerable Sensation of Pain or Uneasiness. Some Tempers seem [45] to have as strong Desires as any, by the Constancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of publick or private Good; and yet give small Evidence of any uneasy Sensation. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others: Nay, if we consult our selves, and not the common Systems, we shall perhaps find, that “the noblest Desire in our Nature, that of universal Happiness, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused uneasy Sensation:” except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively Imagination, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward universal Nature.* Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible toward a certainly future [45] Event, the fixed Time of its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any Pain attending such Desires. But tho this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.
Upon this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it difficult or uncertain to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour
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it would cost; we would set [46] about it with Diligence, but would never chuse to bring upon our selves any painful Sensation accompanying our Desire, nor to increase our Toil by Anxiety. Whatever Satisfaction we had in our State before the Prospect of this additional Good, we should continue to enjoy it while this Good was in suspense; and if we found it unattainable, we should be just as we were before: And we should never [46 ] chuse to bring upon our selves those Frettings
