Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we should desire and use all means to prevent it, but should never voluntarily bring upon our selves the uneasy Sensation of Fear, which now naturally anticipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the Suffering itself. If the Evil did befal us, we should never chuse to increase it, by the Sensations of Sorrow or Despair; we should consider what was the Sum of Good remaining in our State, after subtracting this Evil; and should enjoy our selves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good, nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the absolute Good yet remaining with us; or perhaps we should pursue some other attainable Good. In the like manner, did our State and the Modifications of our Mind depend upon our Choice, should we be affected upon the apprehended Approach of Good or [47] Evil, to those whom we love; we should have desires of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no uneasy Sensations. We do indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with uneasy Sensations; but these Sensations do not seem the necessary Result of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present Constitution of our Nature, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some sedate Tempers equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of Ferment, Confusion, and Pain, which attend the same Desires in the Passionate.
[47] According to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the Modifications or Passions of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon our selves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for our selves,
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or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with uneasy confused Sensations, which often occasion Fretfulness, Anxiety, and Impatience. We find violent Motions in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining [48] the Good desired. When it is first obtained, we find violent confused Sensations of Joy, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of Sorrow and Dejection, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of Fear; and Reflection, attended with Sensations of Sorrow, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our publick Desires are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good or Evil to others, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon our Choice, but arise from the very Frame [48 ] of our Nature, however we may regulate or moderate them.
The Necessity for these Sensations.
VI. Let us then examine “for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in us.” Would not those first sorts of Sensations, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our Reason and pure Desires, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called Passions, or those Sensations which [49] attend our Reflection upon the Presence, Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil?
The common Answer, that “they are given to us as useful Incitements or Spurs to Action, by which we are roused more effectually to promote our private Good, or that of the Publick,” is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rousing us to Action, more than a calm pure Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil would do, without these confused Sensations? Say they, “we are averse to Labour; we are apt to be hurried away by Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; we are often so indolent and averse to the vigorous Use of our Powers, that we should neglect our true Interest without these solliciting [49] Sensations.” But may it not be answered, that if Labour and vigorous Use of our Powers
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be attended with Uneasiness or Pain, why should not this be brought into the Account? The Pursuit of a small Good by great Toil is really foolish; violent Labour may be as pernicious as any thing else: Why should we be excited to any uneasy Labour, except for prepollent Good? And, when the Good is prepollent, what need of any further Incitement than the calm Desire of it? The same may be said of the Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; if their absolute Pleasures be greater than [50] that of the good from which they divert us, why should we not be diverted from it? If not, then the real Moment of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.
If indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other Desires should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthning and fixing our private Desires, the like Sensation joined to publick Affections is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to preserve [50] an Equilibrium. But the first Question is, “whence arose the Necessity of such additional Incitements on either side?”
It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of Nature, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the whole. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There is probably an infinite Variety of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is absolutely Good, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the inferior Natures, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude,* that there are in the Universe as many Species of superior
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Natures, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted upon by Simplicius, that the universal [51] Cause must produce τα μέσα, as well as τα πρω̑τα, και τα ἔσχατα. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of Natures superior to ours: If not, it must certainly be in the whole better that it should have its imperfect [52] Inhabitants, whose State is absolutely Good, than that it should be desolate.
All then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to shew, that “these confused Sensations are necessary to such Natures as we are in other respects: Particularly that Beings of such Degrees of Understanding, and such Avenues to Knowledge as we have, must need these additional Forces, which we call Passions, beside the first Sensations by which Objects are constituted Good or Evil, and the pure Desire or Aversion arising from Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil.”
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From the Imperfection of our Understanding, which required Sensations of Appetite.
Now our Reason, or Knowledge of the Relations of external Things to our Bodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some pleasant Sensation which teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some painful Sensation which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; we need also to be directed when our Bodies want supplies of Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend: Here then [52] appears the first Necessity of uneasy Sensation, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.
[53] Again, our Bodies could
