this the greatest part of Mankind are govern’d, it being the good Fortune of few to be able to enquire into, and to know, the Causes of Things.
VI. Conscience doubting. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §8.
And yet it chances often, to some Men especially in singular Cases, that Arguments may be brought on both sides, and they not be Masters of sufficient Judgment to discern clearly which are the strongest and most weighty. And this is call’d a †DOUBTING CONSCIENCE. In which Case this is the Rule: As long as the Understanding is unsatisfied and in doubt, whether the thing to be done be good or evil, the doing of it is to be deferr’d. For to set about doing it before the Doubt is answer’d, implies a sinful Design, or at least a Neglect of the Law.
VII. Error, vincible and invincible. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §11.
Men also oftentimes have wrong Apprehensions of the matter, and take that to be true which is false; and then they are said to be in an Error; and this is called Vincible Error, when a Man by applying due Attention and Diligence might have prevented his falling thereinto; and it’s said to be Invincible Error, when the Person, with the utmost Diligence and Care that is consistent with the common Rules of Life, could not have avoided it. But this sort of Error, at least, among those who give their Minds to improve the Light of Reason, and to lead their Lives regularly, happens not in the common Rules of living, but only in peculiar Matters. For the Precepts of the Law of Nature are plain; and that Legislator who makes positive Laws, both does and ought to take all possible Care, that they may be understood by those who are to give Obedience to them. So that this Sort of Error proceeds only from a supine Negligence. But in particular Affairs ’tis easie for some Error to be admitted, against the Will, and without any Fault of the Person, concerning the Object and other *Circumstances of the Action.
VIII. Of Ignorance, and the various Kinds of it. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §10.
Where Knowledge simply is wanting as to the Thing performed or omitted, such Defect of Knowledge is call’d Ignorance.1
This Ignorance may be two Ways consider’d, either with respect to its Origin, or with respect to its Influence on the Action. With reference to this latter, Ignorance is of two Sorts, one being the Cause of the Thing ignorantly done, the other not; on which account the first of these is call’d Efficacious Ignorance, the other Concomitant.
EFFICACIOUS Ignorance is the Want of such Knowledge as, had it not been wanting, would have hindred the Action: Such was Abimelech’s Ignorance, Gen. XX. 4, 5. who, had he known Sarah to have been Abraham’s Wife, had never entertain’d any Thoughts of taking her to himself. Concomitant Ignorance is the Want of such Knowledge, as had it not been wanting, would not have hindred the Fact: As suppose a Man should kill his Enemy by a chance Blow, whom he would otherwise have kill’d, had he known him to have been in that particular Place.
Ignorance with respect to its Origin is either Voluntary or Involuntary. Voluntary Ignorance is either contracted by mere negligence, idleness and unattention; or else affected, that is, proceeding from a direct and formal Contempt of the means of informing our selves in what we were able, and what it was our Duty to come to the knowledge of. Involuntary Ignorance consists in the want of knowing such Things, as it was neither in our Power, nor a part of our Duty to come to the knowledge of. This likewise is of two Sorts: The former is, when in doing a Thing a Man is not able to overcome the Ignorance from which it proceeds, and yet is in Fault for falling into that Ignorance; which is the Case of Drunken Men. The latter is, when a Man is not only ignorant of such Things as could not be known before the Action, but is also *free from any Blame upon the account of his falling into that Ignorance, or his continuing in it.
IX. The Will, unforced and free. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 4.
The other Faculty, which does peculiarly distinguish Men from Brutes, is called the Will; by which, as with an internal Impulse, Man moves himself to Action, and chuses that which best pleases him; and rejects that which seems unfit for him. Man therefore has thus much from his Will: First, that he has a Power to act willingly, that is, he is not determin’d by any intrinsick Necessity to do this or that, but is himself the Author of his own Actions: Next, that he has a Power to act freely, that is, upon the Proposal of one Object, he may act or not act, and either entertain or reject; or if divers Objects are propos’d, he may chuse one and refuse the rest. Now whereas among human Actions some are undertaken for their own Sakes, others because they are subservient to the attaining of somewhat farther; that is, some are as the End, and others as Means: As for the End, the Will is thus far concern’d, That being once known, this first approves it, and then moves vigorously towards the achieving thereof, as it were, driving at it with more or less earnestness; and this End once obtain’d, it sits down quietly and enjoys its Acquist with Pleasure. For the Means, they are first to be approv’d, then such as are most fit for the Purpose are chosen, and at last are apply’d to Use.
X. The Will spontaneous chargeable with the Action. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 4. §2.
But as Man is accounted to be the Author of his own Actions, because they are voluntarily undertaken by himself: So this is chiefly to be observ’d concerning the Will, to wit, that its Spontaneity, or natural Freedom, is at least to be asserted in those Actions, concerning which a Man is wont to give an Account before any human Tribunal. For where an absolute Freedom of choice is wholly taken away, there not the Man who acts, but he that imposed upon him the Necessity of so doing, is to be reputed the Author of that Action, to which the other unwillingly ministred with his Strength and Limbs.
XI. The Will variously affected. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 4. §4.
Farthermore, though the Will do always desire Good in general, and has continually an aversion for Evil also in general; yet a great Variety of Desires and Actions may be found among Men. And this arises from hence, that all Things that are Good and Evil do not appear purely so to Man, but mixt together, the good with the bad, and the bad with the good; and because different Objects do particularly affect divers Parts, as it were, of a Man; for instance, some regard that good Opinion and Respect that a Man has for himself; some affect the outward Senses; and some that Love of himself, from which he desires his own Preservation. From whence it is, that those of the first Sort appear to him as reputable; of the second as pleasant; and of the last as profitable: And accordingly as each of these have made a powerful Impression upon a Man, it brings upon him a peculiar Propensity towards that way; whereto may be added the particular Inclinations and Aversions that are in most Men to some certain Things. From all which it comes to pass, that upon any Action several Sorts of Good and Evil offer themselves, which either are true or appear so; which some have more, some less Sagacity to distinguish with solidity of Judgment. So that ’tis no wonder that one Man should be carried eagerly on to that which another perfectly abhors.
XII. The Will byass’d by Natural Inclinations. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 4. §5.
But neither is the Will of Man always found to stand equally poised with regard to every Action, that so the Inclination thereof to this or that Side should come only from an Internal Impulse, after a due Consideration had of all its Circumstances; but it is very often pusht on one way rather than another by some outward Movements. For, that we may pass by that universal Propensity to Evil, which is in all Mortals (the Original and Nature of which belong to the Examination of another *Forum;) first, a peculiar Disposition of Nature puts a particular kind of byass upon the Will, by which some are strongly inclin’d to certain sorts of Actions; and this is not only to be found in single Men, but in whole Nations. This seems to proceed from the Temperature of the Air that surrounds us, and of the Soil; and from that Constitution of our Bodies which either was deriv’d to us in the Seed of our Parents, or was occasion’d in us by our Age, Diet, the want or enjoyment of Health, the Method of our Studies, or way of Living, and Causes of that sort; beside the various formations of the Organs, which the Mind makes use of in the Performance of its several Offices, and the like. And here, beside that
