to general laws.
III. They are accounted for morally by shewing the laws to be good.
Hence we see how moral philosophy ought to be carried on, and what is its end and business.
It is a mistake to imagine, that natural philosophy only can be carried on in that manner: or that it is a material system only which can be governed by general laws. Moral powers, and their exercises, necessarily suppose general laws established with regard to them.
We are as sure as we can be of any thing by experience and consciousness, that we have a certain sphere of power, activity or dominion.
But a sphere of activity cannot take place but where general laws obtain.
Here some few remarks are made upon the disputes about liberty and necessity: the doctrine of necessity was very properly called by the ancients, the doctrine of inactivity.
The enquiry in which man is chiefly concerned, is the extent of his power or sphere of dominion: accordingly the design of this treatise is to enquire into the powers and affections belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to them.
This enquiry is carried on in the same way with natural philosophy.
Accordingly as the one, so the other may proceed in the double manner of analysis and synthesis.
Hypotheses are not admitted in either, any further than as questions, into the truth or reality of which it is worth while to enquire.
As natural philosophy proceeds from causes to effects, or from effects to causes, and so is compounded of experiments and reasonings from experience, so moral philosophy in like manner, &c.
The following treatise therefore consists of observations or experiments, and reasonings from experiments about the human mind, in order to give a satisfying answer to this question, “Are all the effects and appearances relative to the constitution of the human mind, effects of faculties, powers, dispositions and affections, which with all the laws and connexions belonging to them, tend to produce good, order, beauty and perfection in the whole?”
CHAPTER I.
The first general law relative to mankind, is one that extends to, or runs thro’ the whole of our constitution and circumstances. It may be called the law of our power, or activity, or the law of industry. For, in consequence of it, is it that certain effects depend upon our will, as to their existence and non-existence; and according to it, it is that any goods may be procured, or any evils may be avoided by us; and that, in general, the greatest part of our goods and evils, whether natural or moral, are of our own making or procuring.
This is matter of universal experience. And were it not so, we would be a very inferior creature to what we now are in consequence of the power allotted to us, natural and moral: we could not be capable of virtue or merit.
But such a state of things, or such power, supposes general laws to take place with regard to us; or fixed connexions of things. For how otherwise could evils be avoided or goods be procured?
It is fit to enquire a little more particularly into our sphere of activity, and the laws relating to it.
First general law. Intelligent power, depends upon knowledge and encreases with it—in the natural—and in the moral world.
It is because the acquisition of knowledge depends on us, that we have power, or can acquire and augment it.
Wherefore if knowledge be progressive, intelligent power must likewise be progressive.
But knowledge cannot but be progressive—whether knowledge by induction from experience—or scientifick, abstract knowledge.
Knowledge must likewise depend upon our situations for taking in ideas or views.
But men must be placed in various situations, and therefore they must have various views with respect to the sensible world.
And with respect to the moral world.
Knowledge must depend on application to acquire it.
It must likewise depend upon differences with respect to natural abilities.
But different abilities are necessary for many reasons.
Progress in knowledge must depend on social assistances. This likewise is necessary for various reasons.
These are the most remarkable circumstances or general laws relating to progress in knowledge, and consequently to intelligent power. And all these laws are very fitly established.
Yet there are several instances of the care and concern of nature about mankind with regard to knowledge, very consistent with these laws of progress.
Several instances are mentioned.
But as considerable as these circumstances are, they amount but to a very small share of what nature hath done for us, in order to qualify us for progress in knowledge.
We have an appetite after knowledge, and progress in it is rewarded by itself, every step our application advances.
New and uncommon objects wonderfully attract our attention.
The excellent final cause of this.
Yet this itch of novelty is for good reasons checked or ballanced by the power of habit or usage over us.
The mind is exceedingly delighted with comparing ideas, and tracing agreements and differences.
It is particularly pleased with beautiful objects, or such objects as are regular and have unity of design.
Thus we are naturally led to enquire after analogies, harmonies and general laws. Nature is beautiful, because nature works always consonant to itself, and by a few simple general laws.
We have likewise implanted in us by nature a sense of moral beauty; and thus we are naturally led to enquire after the utility, or the good final cause of laws and their operations.
We are likewise considerably assisted and directed in our researches after knowledge, by the natural delight of our mind in great objects.
But let us consider a little our faculties, by which we acquire, or lay up and retain knowledge, and have social correspondence.
The imagination is a most useful power—by it we have memory—it renders us capable of many delightful imitative arts—which is more, it renders us capable of social commerce by discourse—we could not have mutual commerce by discourse about moral objects, were not the moral world analogous to the sensible; so that moral ideas may be pictured to us under sensible images—The right method of teaching any language, would at the same time teach us this beautiful and exceeding useful analogy.
Moreover, it is by our fancy that our passionate part is touched: truths cannot find their way to the heart but thro’ the imagination.
We are so constituted for very good and wise reasons.
Imagination is not an ingovernable faculty, as is commonly imagined— but it is much neglected in education.
The other faculty of our minds that remains
