to virtue, or the proper good and perfection of moral beings.
CHAPTER IX.
Let us now enquire what judgment ought to be formed concerning death—The phenomenon fairly stated—Futurity wisely hid from us.
Yet we have reason to infer, that death is not a dissolution of our moral powers—It is not analogous to our make to suppose that it is.
But it is proper to consider this matter very fully and accurately—Our present connexion with a sensible or material world, by means of our bodies, is arbitrary, not necessary.
We may therefore survive such a connexion,—our perishing totally with our bodies, must be the effect of an arbitrary appointment that it shall be so.
But there is no reason to apprehend such an annihilating or destroying humour in nature—The destruction of unthinking matter is not properly destruction—Wherefore the destruction of a perceiving being cannot be inferred from the destruction of matter.
But there is no ground to think any particle of matter is ever destroyed: what we call so, is really but change of form—a fortiori, there is no reason to think any perceiving being is destroyed.
All that can be inferred from death is, That a particular order, in which certain sensations are now conveyed into our minds, then ceases—Whence a destruction of all thinking powers cannot be deduced.
There is no likeness, no parity between death and total destruction of our being, whatever view we take of it.
The Objections of Lucretius and Pliny against immortality, absurdly suppose, that matter can think, or that we are wholly body—The facts only prove a present dependence of our body and mind according to certain laws of nature.
But further, let us consider this is a very good first state for such a progressive being as man—And a first state cannot last always, but must give way to another.
It is therefore reasonable to think, that this state only ceases as the first state of progressive beings ought to do.
That our death is attended with pain, only proves, that the laws of union with body continue to operate till the union is quite dissolved.
There is a plain reason why there should be such a being in the scale of life—But there is no reason to think it proper, that our present union with a material world, should always continue, or be the only state in which our moral powers are placed.
Nay, it is evident, that union with body and a material world cannot always last.
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude, that our moral powers, naturally capable of lasting for ever without wearing out, are only united with bodies for a time, in order to the fulness of nature, and because it is a very proper first state for our powers to be formed and improved in.
Men must live upon earth by successive generations—Our earth could not be rendered more capacious without altering our whole mundan system—When our mundan system is able to hold out no longer, there is reason from analogy to think it shall be succeeded by another proper to succeed to it, perhaps rising out of its ruins.
But if so, we have yet better reason to think this is but our first state, which shall be succeeded by one very proper to follow it.
If mankind cease to be at death, there will necessarily be a void, a chasm in nature—But we have reason to conclude from experience and analogy, that fulness and coherence is the end of nature.
This idea of the universe is natural to the mind; it greatly delights in it—Wherefore it must be true—fulness in nature can only mean a progress toward fulness, without any interruption or breach—which cannot be the case if man is not immortal.
Hitherto we have only enquired what ought to be inferred from the course of nature by analogy—But this course proves the Author of nature to be perfectly well disposed.
Let us therefore consider how the argument will stand, when instead of nature, or the course of things, we say, the wise and good Author of nature—Then the argument in the weakest state must stand thus; all looks well, upon supposition that death is only a period to a first state, but it may be nothing else, nay, it looks like nothing else, and therefore it is probably nothing else.
Several considerations add strength to this argument—We can only infer confusion and disorder, from disorder and confusion—But our present state is an excellent first state considered as such: it therefore bespeaks a good orderly future state to succeed it.
It is no objection against this reasoning that death comes upon men at all ages—For as this is the necessary effect of good present laws, so it may also be requisite to general good in a future state.
To imagine we are destroyed at death, is to think worse of the Author of nature than we can of any rational creature.
The greater good of the whole cannot make it necessary—Tis in vain to say, we who know but a small part cannot be judge of the whole.
For we are able clearly to decide several truths with regard to right administration of a moral whole—As that the world or nature, must, in order to be perfect, be governed by good general laws.
That no effects of good general laws are evils—That a whole cannot be perfect if any greater quantity of happiness could take place in it—That the good of a moral system ought to be preferred to the good of a merely animal system.
The greater happiness of moral beings cannot require the destruction of moral powers,—or the discouragement of virtue in a future state,—far less the absolute misery of virtue—Nay, the general good of a moral system must make it necessary, that tried and improved virtue be promoted.
It cannot require that the present connexions of things should be changed in favour of vice—It cannot require that moral agents should become not such—And far less can it require, that moral agents well disposed and greatly improved, should be pushed backwards, and placed in disadvantageous circumstances for moral exercises, or virtuous improvements, and the enjoyments resulting from them.
All these reasonings must hold good, if there be order in what we see at present, in that part chiefly wherein virtue is concerned. And if this state really be, as it is, a very proper first state for moral improvement.
It may be objected, how can a present state be a school to form us for a quite different state—And therefore to clear up all difficulties, a few considerations are added to shew, that our present state is a very proper school for our formation, culture and discipline with regard to any state into which we may pass; however new it may be, or different from the present, and that with respect to our understanding or our will; with respect to science or temper; knowledge or virtue; our rational faculties, or our appetites, affections and passions.
To ask, why is not virtue completely happy here, or since it is not, why we ought from analogy to conclude a succeeding state of virtue shall be completely happy, is to ask, why the end does not precede the means, or the effect its cause; why education must precede perfection, or spring, harvest. The law here is, that we reap as we sow. And that it is reasonable to think is the universal law throughout moral systems—The law with regard to our future state—And where this law obtains the administration is just, it is perfect.
Add to all this our natural desire and pre-sentiment of a future state—For there is no instance in nature of any merely animal appetite, or instinct made in vain; or to be disappointed.
