refutation is here inserted, because it is of great moment to my argument, or to prove the sociality of our make.
Such evils as result from social dependence and union, are really goods.
Vices punish themselves according to the natural course of things.
Several goods must fall to the share of the vicious, according to the excellent general law of power and industry.
(Here in the marginal notes, a treatise of Plutarch is referred to, where this question is fully handled, “Why the wicked are not visibly punished here in an extraordinary manner?” He hath quite exhausted that subject: and many of his reasonings coincide with the Scripture-reasons.)
Vice always produces misery in some manner and degree.—Much more of what is called misfortune, is owing to imprudence or vice than is commonly imagined, or, at least, duly attended to—History and poetry prove this.
Reflexions on the imitative arts to illustrate this.
In objections against providence, external goods and evils are much overrated.
External goods depend in general on the law of industry, which is an excellent institution of nature.—But they alone, or without virtue, cannot make man happy—Such is his frame.
The punishment of vice, as well as the reward of virtue, is wisely left in some measure to society.
Unless we suppose a mixture of goods and evils dependent on other causes than virtue,—or if we suppose external motives to virtue bestowed in a distinguishing, remarkable manner,—Virtue could not be tried as it ought to be in its first state of education and discipline, and pure love of virtue for its own sake could not be acquired,—for which end we are framed and placed as we are.
The evils which happen to the virtuous, at the same time that they only happen in consequence of excellent general laws, afford occasions and materials of great virtues,—which are their own reward.
Some reflexions on the arguments for a future state from what is called present inequality with respect to virtue and vice.
The argument stated in its true light,—and it is indeed demonstrative.
CHAPTER IV.
A complex view of the objections made against our frame and situation, in which all the parts of our constitution are shewn to be admirably adjusted one to another,—And that no change can be proposed or imagined, which is not either physically absurd,—or morally so,—tending to introduce an alteration much to the worse.
Conclusion.
A review of the manner in which we have proceeded in this enquiry—Why we have not entered into the examination of particular characters.
It is enough for our purpose to have accounted for all the powers and affections of which all the different characters among mankind are formed,—and for all the laws according to which our affections are variously mixed and compounded, &c.
As in the material world, it is sufficient to delineate the general laws from which phenomena result, so here.
And as, in the one case, so in the other, so soon as we are able to consider phenomena, as resulting from general laws, which make a whole, we are no more startled at any particular appearances,—but immediately discern order.
—’Tis to help one to take such an united view of mankind, that is, of the frame and constitution of human nature, that the principal powers and laws of powers belonging to it have been delineated in this Essay.—For this all is accounted for that is to be accounted for; namely, the powers and their laws constituting man, and the circumstances calling them forth into action; or, affording them means, subjects, materials, and occasions of exerting and gratifying themselves.
If the contriver and productor of a system be perfect, the system must be perfect—But many arguments a priori, prove the Author of the universe to be an all perfect mind.
Some observations upon these arguments to shew they are not so abstruse as is said by some, but that they are easy consequences necessarily following from a few self-evident principles.
Arguments therefore a priori and a posteriori, exactly agree or tally together, to prove the universal system, of which we are a part, to be perfectly well constituted, and under an infinitely wise and good administration.
Revelation concurs with them, and is attended with a truly philosophical evidence that proves its truth,—and it makes no encroachment upon the province or exercises of reason.
Instead of a recapitulation, the Contents being digested into a regular summary to serve that purpose; another view of human nature is laid before the reader, in twelve propositions, which sets the same truths that have been already proved in a light somewhat new.
An excellent hymn in praise of the creation quoted from an ancient writer.
A beautiful reasoning about immortality quoted from another.
Some observations on the account given us of a future state by the christian religion.
The design of this essay being in the text to prove the truth of this proposition, “That man is well made for immortal progress in virtue, which is excellently well taken care of and provided for here, and from thence to infer a future happy state for the virtuous”—And by the marginal notes to “prove the antiquity and universality of this persuasion”; some reflexions are made on the opinion of those who assert the ancients were not able to know any thing distinctly of God or a future state; or, at least, have produced no conclusive arguments on these subjects.
Some Corolaries are added relating to the improvements of moral philosophy and right education, which obviously follow from the sketch of moral philosophy delineated in this essay, and well deserve the serious attention of all who have the best interests of mankind seriously at heart.
The treatise ends with a quotation from Cicero, to prove that unactive knowledge is of little use in comparison of that which prompts to the virtuous activity for which we are made—And another, that contains the substance of what we have proved concerning man, most elegantly expressed from the same Author.
FINIS.
Introduction<1>
Natural philosophy distinguish’d from moral.
Every one who knows what natural philosophy is, or how it proceeds in its enquiries will easily conceive what moral philosophy must mean; and how it likewise ought to be pursued: for all enquiries into fact, reality, or any part of nature must be set about, and carried on in the same way; and an enquiry into human nature is as much an enquiry into fact, as any question about the frame and texture (for instance) of any plant, or of the human body.<2>
But both are enquiries into fact or nature.
The objects of science are justly divided into corporeal, or sensible ones; and those which not being perceived by the outward senses, but by reflexion on the mind itself and its inward operations, are therefore called intellectual or moral objects. Hence the consideration of the former is stiled Physiology, or Natural philosophy; and that of the other is called Rational, or Moral philosophy. But however philosophy may be divided; nothing can be more evident, than, that the study of nature,
