Conclusion.
Man therefore is made (as all the better ancients ever believed and taught) for eternal progress in moral perfection and happiness, proportionally to his care and diligence to improve in it.
PART II Introduction.
How it is proposed to answer all objections.
All objections which terminate in demanding an impossibility, are absurd.
What the ancients meant by the inhability or obliquity of a subject, or necessity of nature.
Such an inhability or necessity does not suppose any limitation upon the divine, creating power.
All objections which terminate in demanding a change to the worse, are absurd—They do ultimately terminate in demanding an impossibility.
CHAPTER I.
Some objections against man, are really objections against his perfection,—for all our powers, dispositions and affections are so many capacities of perfection and happiness.
So are all the laws relative to their improvement or degeneracy—The law of habits in particular, which is so extensive.
The objections against man’s imperfections are no less absurd,—they know no stop.
They really demand a physical impossibility.
Hence we may see, that the only question concerning man must be, “Whether being naturally qualified for a very noble end, he does not deserve his place in the rising scale of life and perfection?”
Which he certainly does,—or plainly appears to do, in whatever light we consider his powers and affections.
CHAPTER II.
The objection taken from the prevalence of vice considered—Not so much vice in the world as is generally imagined.
In consequence of the excellent laws of our nature, some vices (morally speaking) are absolutely unavoidable,—because narrow views and wrong affections of ideas, are hardly avoidable.
But if vice once enters it must spread.
No objection can be brought from hence which does not terminate in an absurdity.
Illustration.
Vices are really but the corruptions, degeneracies, or abuses of good and useful affections.
Some are misguidances of self-love, which is a very necessary principle in our frame.
This was the opinion of the best ancient moralists.
—Who set us an excellent example of the best manner of confutation, even in questions of the greatest importance.
As does Lord Shaftsbury in several instances well worthy our consideration and imitation.
But more vices are the misguidances or degeneracies of benevolent affections themselves—Instances from Shaftsbury to prove this.
Nature could not possibly have done more to preserve us from degeneracy and corruption, or vice, than it has done,—for the original forces of affections stand right in us.
Illustration.
And nature hath given us a guiding principle,—which acquires strength in the properest manner.
Illustration.
If it be a perfection to have natural freedom and power, it must be a perfection to have moral freedom and power—But none call the first into question.
Reason, as such, must depend upon culture.
We may as well pretend to infer from vices, which prevail among mankind, that there is no such thing as a principle of self-love in our nature, as that there is no such thing as a principle of benevolence in it—But none do the first.
This reasoning applied to ignorance—of the natural—and of the moral world.
This reasoning applied to tyranny.
—and to superstition, which is found to go hand in hand with tyranny.
Without a mixture of good and evil, there could be no place or room for prudence,—that is, for good and bad choice.
Hence we see the necessity of evils,—or, at least, of pleasures far inferior to other pleasures, and so comparatively evils.
Several virtues presuppose not only physical but moral evils.
Every state of the body politic, as well as of the natural body, is incident to particular diseases or vices.
Some reflexions on the vices to which an opulent flourishing state is subject.
Men may chuse their state, but every one hath its natural, necessary attendants and consequences.
Yet in declaiming against these vices several things are misrepresented—Luxury, for example, is declaimed against in a very vague manner.
The polite arts are no part of luxury,—and they do not effeminate a people.—But other arts must be united with them to render a nation equally brave and polite.
Upon the whole, it is virtue alone that is the cement of society—’Tis virtue, and political wisdom, which educe good out of moral evil.
—Even as excrements may be rendered useful.
Supposing vices to be necessary, yet since good may be educed out of them by virtue and political wisdom, the wisdom of the moral world will stand on the same footing as the wisdom of the natural world.
But vices are in no proper sense mechanical effects, but of a very different nature.
CHAPTER III.
The objections taken from physical evils considered.—These evils classed.
Unless there be a mixture of good and evil, there can be no room for right and wrong conduct, prudent and imprudent choice.
Physical evils cannot but take place in a world filled with variety of beings, if each being must have its particular structure subject to general ascertainable laws.
We must be able to say with assurance, that we have quite exhausted the science of nature, before we can affirm, that several evils we complain of, are absolutely unavoidable by prudence and art.
But which is of principal consideration, all physical evils proceed from the uniform operation of good general laws.
Illustration.
Let those who object against physical evils, as absolute evils, well consider the excellent concatenation of things natural and moral, or how all things hang together in nature.
An illustration of this taken from an author,—whose principles have no necessary connexion with that kind of reasoning.
My Lord Shaftsbury
