And this is not only evident to Reason, but in a manner to Sense too: For if we take a Survey of the admirable Structure of a Humane Body, both within and without; and see how every, even the most minute Part, hath its proper use, without any Design or Intention of the Parents, and with so great Exactness as the most excellent Philosophers and Physicians could never enough admire; it is a sufficient Demonstration that the Author of Nature is the most compleat Understanding. Of this a great deal may <10> be seen in (a) Galen, especially where he examines the Use of the Hands and Eyes; And
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the same may be observed in the Bodies of dumb Creatures; for the Figure and Situation of their Parts to a certain End, cannot be the Effect of any Power in Matter. As also in Plants and Herbs, which is accurately observed by the Philosophers. Strabo (a) excellently well takes notice hereof in the Position of Water, which, as to its Quality, is of a middle Nature betwixt Air and Earth, and ought to have been placed betwixt them, but is therefore interspersed and mixed with the Earth, lest its Fruitfulness, by which the Life of Man is preserved, should be hindred. Now it is the Property of intelligent Beings only to act with some View. Neither are particular Things appointed for their own peculiar Ends only, but for the Good of the Whole; as is plain in Water, which (b) contrary to its own Nature is raised upwards, <11> lest by a Vacuum there should be a Gap in the Structure of the Universe, which is upheld by the continued Union of its Parts. Now the Good of the Whole could not possibly be designed, nor a Power put into Things to tend towards it, but by an intelligent Being to whom the Universe is subject. There are moreover some Actions, even of the Beasts, so ordered and directed, as plainly discover them to be the Effects of some small degree of Reason: As is most manifest in Ants and Bees, and also in some others, which, before they have experienced them, will avoid Things hurtful, and seek those that are profitable to them.
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That this Power of searching out and distinguishing, is not properly in themselves, is apparent from hence, because they act always alike, and are unable to do other Things which don’t require more Pains; (a) wherefore they are acted upon by some foreign Reason; and what they do, must of necessity proceed from the Efficiency of that Reason impressed upon them: Which Reason is no other than what we call God. <12> Next, the Heavenly Constellations, but more especially those eminent ones, the Sun and Moon, have their Courses so exactly accommodated to the Fruitfulness of the Earth, and to the Health of Animals, that nothing can be imagined more convenient: For though otherwise, the most simple Motion had been along the Equator, yet are they directed in an oblique Circle, that the Benefit of them might extend to more Places of the Earth. And as other Animals are allowed the Use of the Earth; so Mankind are permitted to use those Animals, and can by the Power of his Reason tame the fiercest of them. Whence it was that the (b) Stoicks concluded that the World was made for the Sake of Man. But since the Power of Man does not extend so far as to compel the Heavenly Luminaries to serve Him, nor is it likely they should of their own accord submit themselves to him; hence it follows, that there is a superior Understanding, at whose Command those beautiful Bodies afford their perpetual Assistance to Man, who is placed so far beneath them: Which Understanding is none other
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than the Maker of the Stars and of the Universe. (a) The Eccentrick Motions of the Stars, and the Epicycles, as they term them, manifestly show, that they are not the Effects of Matter, but the Appointment of a free Agent; <13> and the same Assurance we have from the Position of the Stars, some in one Part of the Heavens, and some in another; and from the unequal Form of the Earth and Seas: Nor can we attribute the Motion of the Stars, in such a Direction, rather than another, to any thing else. The very Figure of the World, which is the most perfect, viz. round, inclosed in the Bosom of the Heavens, and placed in wonderful Order, sufficiently declares that these Things were not the Result of Chance, but the Appointment of the most excellent Understanding: For can any one be so foolish, as to expect any thing so accurate from Chance? He may as soon believe that pieces of Timber, and Stones, should frame themselves into a House; (b) or from Letters thrown at a venture, there should arise a Poem; when the Philosopher, who saw only some Geometrical Figures on the Sea-shore, thought them plain Indications of a Man’s having been there, such Things not looking as if they proceeded from Chance. Besides, that Mankind were not from Eternity, but date their Original from a certain Period of Time, is clear, as from other Arguments, so from the *Improvement of Arts, <14> and those desart Places, which came afterwards to be inhabited; and is further evidenced by the Lan-<15>guage
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of Islands, plainly derived from the neighbouring Continents. There are moreover certain Ordinances so universal amongst Men, that they don’t seem so much to owe their Institution to the Instinct of Nature, or the Deductions of plain Reason; as to a constant Tradition, scarce interrupted in any Place, either by Wickedness or Misfortune: <16> Of which sort were formerly Sacrifices, amongst holy Rites; and now Shame in Venereal Things, the Solemnity of Marriage, and the Abhorrence of Incest.
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Sect. VIII. The Objection concerning the Cause of Evil, answered.
Nor ought we to be in the least shaken in what has been said, because we see many Evils happen, the Original of which cannot be ascribed to God, who, as was affirmed of Him, is perfectly good. For when we say, that God is the Cause of all Things, we mean of all such Things as have a real Existence; which is no Reason why those Things themselves should not be the Cause of some Accidents, such as Actions are. God created Man, and some other Intelligences superior to Man, with a Liberty of Acting; which Liberty of Acting is not in itself Evil, but may be (a) the Cause of something that is Evil. And to make God the Author of Evils of this kind, which are called Moral Evils, is the highest Wickedness. But there are other Sorts of Evils, such as Loss or Pain inflicted upon a Person, which may be allowed to come from God, suppose for the Reformation <17> of the Man, or as a Punishment which his Sins deserve: For here is no Inconsistency with Goodness; but on the contrary, these proceed from Goodness itself, in the same manner as Physick, unpleasant to the Taste, does from a good Physician.
Sect. IX. Against Two Principles.
And here, by the way, we ought to reject their Opinion, who imagine that there are (b) two Active Principles, the one Good, and the other Evil.
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For from Two Principles, that are contradictory to each other, can arise no regular Order, but only Ruin and Destruction: Neither can there be a self-existent Being perfectly Evil, as there is One Self-existent perfectly Good: Because Evil is a Defect, which cannot reside but in something which has a Being; (a) and the very having a Being is to be reckoned amongst the Things which are Good.
Sect. X. That God governs the Universe.
That the World is governed by the Providence of God, is evident from hence: That not only Men, who are endued with Understanding; but Birds, and both Wild and Tame Beasts, (who are lead by Instinct, which serve them instead of Understanding) take care of, and provide for their Young. Which Perfection, as it is a Branch of Goodness, ought not to be excluded from God: And so much the rather, because He is All-wise, and All-powerful, and cannot but know every thing that is done, or is to be done, and with the greatest Fa-<18>cility direct and govern them; To which we may add, what was before hinted, concerning the Motion of particular Things, contrary to their own Nature, to promote the Good of the Whole.
