Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence. Samuel Pufendorf
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Now that is simple esteem inside a state, by which each one is regarded at least as an ordinary and a complete member of the state, or as one who has not been declared a defective member of the state according to laws and statutes. And any and all free men and respected, or those who have not been branded by disgrace in process of law, rejoice in that esteem. Furthermore, this esteem in a state fails one either from mere status or from misdeed. The former is the case among slaves, who are not regarded as civil persons, or are understood not to have the standing of a citizen. For that slaves, at Rome, for example, were formerly regarded as no persons at all, and therefore lacked civil esteem,1 is perfectly clear from the fact that they had nothing of their own and acquired nothing for themselves; from the fact that anything could be inflicted upon them by their masters with impunity; moreover, that, according to the law of Aquila, an action <62> was brought against some one else who had done harm to slaves, just as though he had injured the cattle of another;2 that no kinship among slaves was recognized, nor was cohabitation among slaves regarded as marriage, exactly as is the case among beasts; that no credence was given in a court to their testimony even when under oath; and by other facts of this nature.
This esteem is lost as a result of antecedent misdeed, when some one, in accordance with the laws, because of a definite kind of misdeed (for not all misdeeds extinguish esteem in a civil sense), is branded with infamy; and this consists either in his being eliminated at the same time from natural existence; or utterly ejected from the state; or else retained, indeed, in the state, yet not as a complete member, but as a defective member, so that he rejoices, indeed, in domicile within the state, and in the common protection of the laws, but is excluded from public official duties and honourable associations, and is disdainfully deprived even of individual intercourse with all but the base. Such infamy can be invoked only by those in whose hands is the execution of the laws. By the judgement of private persons no one is brought into infamy in such a manner before that fact has been declared openly by a competent tribunal. And much less can any obligation of true infamy adhere by virtue of the mere undertaking of private citizens, without the authority [autoritatem] of the magistracy, because of failure to perform some act, any more than those private citizens are able by their own authority [autoritate] to grant effectively the rights of citizenship to any one. For it belongs to the same authority both to give, as it were, civil life, and to inflict civil death.
2. That is intensive esteem, in accordance with which persons equally honourable in civil capacity are preferred one above another, in proportion as one has a larger share than another of those things whereby the minds of others are commonly moved to show honour. Now honour, which corresponds to the intensification of esteem, is properly the signification of our judgement concerning the superiority of another; and therefore, in truth, honour is not in the person honoured but in the person who shows honour, although by a certain kind of metonymy, esteem also itself, or that which deserves honour, is denoted by this word, and, in a special sense, definite statuses which honour is wont to accompany, are called honours, because in due course these statuses are bestowed only upon those who surpass others in some point of superiority. That same esteem, as far as it produces in others the opinion of a special prudence and wisdom regarding the determination of practical affairs or of theoretical truths, is called authority [autoritas]. And as far as it suggests the widespread recognition of that superiority among large numbers of men, it is called reputation. After the analogy of passive natural qualities, one might call these not incon-<63>gruously passive moral qualities, because, as the former are understood to affect the senses, so the latter in a definite way affect the mind.3 Now one’s esteem is apt to be magnified primarily by notable achievements and a life led with great regard for the laws; by those things which are called the goods of the mind, with which belong to an excessive degree in the thinking of the ignorant, also the goods of body and fortune; by the condition of status, as that is conspicuous and splendid beyond other statuses; by moral position in status, for example, whether one be the first or the last in the same association; by the condition of public service, that is, in proportion to the distinction of the functions with which that service is performed; by age, because, forsooth, experience and prudence are judged to come from advanced years; finally, by lineage or family, because it is commonly believed that something of the worth of ancestors is transmitted to their descendants; and by such other things as are here valued. <64>
1. What should be regarded in appraising worth?
2. The worth of incorporeal things and actions.
3. Common worth and eminent worth, as also about money.
1. The most natural foundation of worth in things is their ability to exhibit some use in communal life.1 Hence things which are utterly useless we are accustomed commonly to call worthless. Now the use of a certain thing is defined not merely from the circumstance that it truly helps to preserve or to make pleasurable our existence, but in addition that it contributes some pleasure or ornament, even though this be in the sole opinion of certain men. Upon such things the luxury and the lustfulness of men have generally placed an inordinate worth. Now in comparing things with one another according to their worth, various considerations are commonly regarded. For here to such a degree does the necessity of a thing, or the nobility of its application, fail always to have chief consideration, that, by a singular provision of nature, those things which our life cannot do without are rather accorded the less worth, because nature presents a bounteous supply of them. Therefore it is rarity which is principally effective here, and this is held in an esteem none too slight when there are brought from far distant places things to which frequently the desires of men are violently drawn. For most men value chiefly those things which are to be had in common with a few; and, on the contrary, that thing is held cheap, whatever it may be, which is seen among the household goods of any and everybody.
Determinately, moreover, worth is commonly recognized from usage or custom, that is, a thing is commonly estimated at as much as is very generally offered or given for it.2 This is scarcely so that it does not have some range within which more or less can be demanded, except when the law has fixed the worth of a thing at a definite point. Now in common worth the labours and expenses which merchants undergo are customarily taken into account. There may also be certain estimable accidents of a thing because of which it may be legitimately bought or sold above or below the common price, <65> for example, because of a loss which is to follow, deferred profit, peculiar affection, or if it be bought or sold as a favour to another, when otherwise it was not to be bought or sold. These same accidents are customarily pointed out to the man with whom a bargain is being made about a thing, and can properly be imputed. That deferred or increased gain also which arises from delayed or anticipated payment of the worth can be computed. For the day of payment is a part of the price, and it means more to give something immediately than after a time; since, forsooth, in the meantime profit might have been secured therefrom.