of the states a qualification of freehold was required. He thought that a wise provision; and if any alteration was to be made, he should be in favor of placing it there, rather than upon personal property. As it was, he thought it valuable as a moral means, as part of that moral force so essential to the support of any free government. He would not diminish that, for in the same proportion it should be, from any cause diminished, would the foundations of the republic be weakened. He also considered it as unreasonable, that a man who had no property should act indirectly upon the property of others. If gentlemen would look to the statute book, to the business of the Legislature, or to the courts of law, how much of all that was done, would be found to relate to the rights of property. It lay at the foundation of the social state, it was the spring of all action and all employment. It was therefore, he apprehended, wholly inequitable in its nature, that men without a dollar should, in any way, determine the rights of property, or have any concern in its appropriation. He also contended, that the principle of the resolution was anti-republican. It greatly increased the number of voters, and those of a character most liable to be improperly influenced or corrupted. It enlarged the field of action to every popular favorite, and enabled him to combine greater numbers. The time might come, when he would be able to command, as truly as ever a general commanded an army, sufficient numbers to affect or control the government itself. In that case, the form of a republican constitution might remain, but its life and spirit would have fled. The government would be essentially a democracy, and between that and a despotism there would be but one step. Such would be the tendency of the principle, and so far as it operated, it would change the structure of the constitution. The qualification which is required, was intended as a security for property. He considered it as a barrier, which ought not to be removed, and could not be, without danger to the State… .
… MR. BLAKE was in favor of reconsideration, because he thought the subject had not been fairly examined. He was not satisfied that the right of universal suffrage ought to be exercised, but many weighty reasons could be urged in favor of it, some of which he would state. He did not consider it as changing a fundamental principle of the constitution, if he did, he should oppose it. He said that the constitutions of most of the states in the Union required no pecuniary qualification; those of South Carolina and Virginia, which require a freehold, were exceptions, and he did not mean to speak of the states newly admitted. The example of other states, however, was not of much weight, as we ought to be an example to ourselves. Life was as dear to a poor man as to a rich man; so was liberty. Every subject therefore, involving only life or liberty, could be acted upon, with as good authority, by the poor as by the rich. As to property, the case was different. But our constitution involves all three, and the question is, how the power in relation to them shall be parcelled out. Our constitution has made the senate the guardian of property. The senate is the rich man’s citadel. There, and there alone, the rich man should look for his security. Every man who pays his tax—and he did not know why not paupers, as they were liable to military duty, ought to possess the privilege of voting. To deprive a man of this privilege till he acquires property, was an encroachment on the fundamental principles of our constitution. The constitutions of most of the other states give the right of voting to every man who pays his taxes; not mentioning anything about paupers. He said the requisition of property was in this town, for a long time, a dead letter, until the Legislature, a few years since, made some wise provisions concerning elections… .
… MR. QUINCY said, that the proposition before the committee had been considered by those in favor, as well as those against it, as one for universal suffrage; but that it was not such a proposition. Universal suffrage is suffrage without qualification. Suppose the proposition adopted—still you have not universal suffrage. The qualification of age, and of sex, remains. Women are excluded—minors are excluded. The real nature of the proposition is the exclusion of pecuniary qualification. This remark is material, because the only principle alleged in favor of the exclusion of pecuniary qualification is just as strong in favor of the exclusion of every other qualification. Other gentlemen had alleged reasons in favor of the proposition from considerations of inconvenience and of expediency. But the only gentleman who had alleged in its favor a principle, as the foundation of a right, was his colleague (Mr. Blake). His principle was this. “Life is precious. Liberty is precious. Both more precious than property. Every man, whose life and liberty is made liable to the laws, ought therefore to have a voice, in the choice of his legislators.” Grant this argument to be just. Is it not equally applicable to women and to minors? Are they not liable to the laws? Ought they not then to have a voice in the choice? The denial of this right to them shows, that the principle is not just. Society may make a part of its members obnoxious to laws, and yet deny them the right of suffrage, without any injustice.
Again—it has been said that pecuniary qualification was contrary to the spirit of our constitution. Those who took this ground had not favored the Convention with their definition of the spirit of our constitution, though it was very plain from the course of their arguments that what they understood by it, was a spirit of universal or unlimited liberty. Now, this is not the spirit of our constitution; which is a spirit of limited liberty; of reciprocal control. Reduced to the form of a definition, this is the meaning of the term, spirit of our constitution—The will of the people, expressed through an organization by balanced power. Every man, therefore, who would compare any given provision, with the spirit of our constitution, ought not to recur to principles of abstract liberty, but to principles of balanced liberty. With respect to those checks and balances, which according to the form of our constitution, constitute the character of Massachusetts liberty, those gentlemen take a very narrow view of the subject who deem that they exist only in the separation of the powers of government into the legislative, judicial and executive; or in the division of the legislative power among three branches. Every limitation of the exercise of any right or power, under the constitution, makes a part of that balance, which will be disturbed by its removal. The provision of a pecuniary qualification is of this nature. It is one of the checks in our constitution. How it operates, whom it affects, whom it benefits, are worthy of consideration. In the course of the argument in the Convention, it has been considered as a check, in favor of the rich, and against the poor. Now the fact is, that it is directly the reverse. If we should suppose the rich, acting as a class, this is the first provision, which they ought to expunge. And on the other hand, it is the last, with which the poor ought to consent to part. In its true character, this provision is in favor of the poor, and against the pauper;—that is to say, in favor of those who have something, but very little; against those who have nothing at all. Suppose all qualifications of property taken away, who gains by it? The poor man, who has just property enough to be qualified to vote? Or the rich, whose property is a great surplus? The rich man’s individual vote is, indeed, countervailed by it, as well as the poor man’s. But the great difference is this, that the poor man has thus lost his political all; he has no power of indemnifying himself. Whereas the rich, by the influence resulting from his property over the class of paupers, has a power of indemnifying himself a hundred fold. The theory of our constitution is, that extreme poverty—that is, pauperism—is inconsistent with independence. It therefore assumes a qualification of a very low amount, which, according to its theory, is the lowest consistent with independence. Undoubtedly it excludes some, of a different character of mind. But this number is very few; and from the small amount of property required, is, in individual cases, soon compensated.
At the present day, the provision was probably worth very little. In the present results of our elections, it would not make one hair white or black. But prospectively, it was of great consequence. In this point of view he put it to the consideration of the landholders, and yeomanry of the country. The principle was peculiarly important to them. Everything indicates that the destinies of the country will eventuate in the establishment of a great manufacturing interest in the Commonwealth. There is nothing in the condition of our country, to prevent manufacturers from being absolutely dependent upon their employers, here as they are everywhere else. The whole body of every manufacturing establishment, therefore, are dead votes, counted by the head, by their employer. Let the gentlemen from the country consider, how it may affect their rights, liberties and properties, if in every county of the Commonwealth there should arise, as in time there probably will, one, two, or three manufacturing establishments, each sending, as the case may be, from one to eight hundred votes to
