by one or forty-five, it is utterly in vain to complain that you have no representation. But any other distribution of representation than according to population, is unequal and unjust. He alluded to the case mentioned yesterday by the gentleman from Roxbury of one senator for the county of Suffolk for every 7,500 inhabitants, while there was in the county of Berkshire but one for every 20,000, which he pronounced to be an instance of most gross and cruel inequality. He stated the case of an individual lately deceased whose property of 1,300,000 dollars alone, would have as much influence in the senate as 1300 independent farmers with a property of 1000 dollars each. This principle conferred upon a dangerous part of the community an undue and unwarrantable share in the representation. A man of 1,300,000 dollars property surrounded by 1299 others of no property, confers on them an influence equal to the same number of independent men worth 1000 each. He contended that if it was a sound principle that property should confer the right of representation, it ought not to be restricted, and Suffolk should have eight senators. Imposing the restriction was admitting that the principle was false and unjust. Taking population as the basis, no inequality would result. He protested against any misapprehension of his feelings and motives—he had no disposition to excite jealousies, nor to prevent the exercise of rights—if they were founded upon principle. He professed a great respect for the people of the metropolis—but he protested against their borrowing, through the respect entertained for the town, any influence that was not secured to every other part of the people… .
… MR. SALTONSTALL of Salem observed that this Convention exhibited a singular and most interesting scene. A free people by their delegates assembled to deliberate upon the constitution under which they have so long lived, inquiring into its operations, and whether there is any evil that requires amendment. It is a subject of gratitude that while the nations of the old world are obliged to submit to reforms, dictated by standing armies, we are witnessing this quiet scene. But there is also much cause of anxiety. A short time since we were all happy under the present constitution. There was no symptom of uneasiness, no project for a convention. Our government secured to us all the objects for which civil society was instituted. The separation of a part of the Commonwealth, rendered it expedient to propose to the people the question of a convention, and it was adopted by a very small vote,—a fact which shows conclusively that no evil was pressing on the people; that no grievance loudly demanded a remedy. But now, amidst constant professions of veneration for the instrument, every part of it is attacked, and we are called on to defend the elementary principles of government. First, we abolish one session of the Legislature, which has existed for two centuries; we then dispense with the necessity of a declaration which has existed from the beginning; we disown that the people ever enjoyed their rights in the election of counsellors. And now the foundation of a great branch of the government is attacked, as unjust and aristocratic. Is the constitution to be thrown by as an old-fashioned piece of furniture, that answered well enough in its day, but is now fit only to be stowed away in the lumber room with the portraits of our ancestors? Let us rather meet the objections, listen to the arguments, correct the evil, if one is shown to exist, and the constitution will come out of the fiery furnace unhurt, still more precious for the trial it has endured. Mr. S. then observed that he had not expected a serious attempt would be made to change the basis of the senate; that it had not been a cause of dissatisfaction; that nothing had been written or said against it until the separation of Maine; that there was occasionally some difficulty as to the fractions, and some irritation in the formation of districts, but no serious disaffection; and he believed no objection was ever made to it in the Legislature, as unjust or unequal. He had thought also that the constitution was endeared to the people from the circumstances under which it was made,—in the midst of war; our independence not yet secure; while our armies were yet in the field. At such a time the convention met, and deliberately discussed the great principles of government, and framed the present system of government. There were circumstances also calculated especially to endear this part of the constitution to us. When the convention assembled, a majority were opposed to two branches; they thought the people needed no check: like the gentleman from Worcester [Mr. Lincoln], they thought the people were capable of self-government. Its analogy to the old council had also a tendency to render it odious; it also savored a little of aristocracy, and the leaders of that day had been irritated under the influence of the old government; yet they listened to the sages who were with them, and adopted the principle. The present basis of the senate is perfectly defensible in theory. Some check on the popular branch is necessary; this is admitted by all. Mr. S. then referred to history,—the English parliament,—to the national assembly, &c., to show its necessity. There are times when popular ferments are excited, that would destroy everything fair and valuable in society, if unchecked. Mr. S. then remarked on the different systems proposed. That by Mr. Dearborn would be no check. Both branches will be chosen by the same people in the same districts. Both would be subject to the same influence; be under the same control; and the senate would have no more operation as a check, than the same men in the other branch. Another proposition is the novel, the fanciful, the fallacious one by the gentleman from Worcester, which would have the senate the popular branch, to be checked by the house! A popular branch of thirty-six to be checked by three hundred and fifty! But what is to check the house? That will be the popular branch, emanating from the people, warmed with all their passions. What are these corporate rights? There is nothing tangible in them, which can form a check. Mr. S. then went on to show that there was no analogy between this plan and the constitution of the United States, as had been argued by Mr. Lincoln. He thought the people would never adopt a system of cheeks, by making different tenures to office, or different qualifications to voters. What then remains but to preserve the present basis; to cling to that which has been so wise in theory, and so salutary in practice? It is an admirable provision,—the representation of a great interest, and yet not dangerous to any other. It is the result of a new modification which will give a spirit of independence to the senate, and make them indeed a check—not to thwart the other branch, but to watch, to cause deliberation. Property should be represented, because it is the greatest object of civil society; it is not mere inert matter, but a living principle, which keeps the great machine of society in motion. It is the universal stimulus. The principle of the senate is not unequal in its operation, but the same everywhere, in all places; not for Suffolk or Essex—Essex has nothing to gain, but may lose much, by this arrangement. It is not for the rich, but for the security of all men and all interests, as it will make an effectual check for the preservation of every right. If in theory this is wise, how much more valuable is it after forty years’ experience. Experiment is worth everything upon this subject. We should be unwilling to touch what is made venerable by age. We should cautiously advance any theory of our own, against a system that has been in operation half a century. The situation of Massachusetts is a proud one. She has braved the storm which has overwhelmed so many old governments. They that laughed us to scorn are now looking to us with admiration, and studying our systems… .
… MR. LINCOLN rose to explain. He thought it disengenuous in gentlemen, to allude to a proposition which he had made, without any connection with any other. This question should depend on its own merits, and the Convention may reject or adopt the proposition which he had presented. He did not contend that it was just and equal in itself, but in connection with the representation in the senate, on the basis of valuation, it would form an effectual, and the only effectual check.
MR. LOCKE proceeded to compare the three systems of representation which had been proposed, and to argue in favor of the adoption of that reported by the committee. He said he understood, that some gentlemen approved of the plan proposed by the gentleman from Roxbury, for the senate, and that they thought it fair to couple it with the house of representatives, proposed in the system of the select committee. To him it appeared manifestly unjust to take this part of the system, without at the same time adopting the part relating to the senate. He observed, that some went on the principle, that the senate was founded on the basis of property. This was not true. The basis was taxation. The wealthy districts were allowed a greater proportion of representation in the senate, not with a view to the protection of property, but because they were made to contribute so much to the support of the public burdens. He concluded by giving his testimony to the fairness and liberality of the members of the committee from the large towns, and their readiness to yield everything that could be demanded in the spirit of fair and equal compromise.
MR.
