An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature. Nathaniel Culverwell

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An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature - Nathaniel Culverwell Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics

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γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβὴς, καὶ φιλότεχνος, ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ ἀπερίτμητος;19 Nature is in all things accurate and punctual, ’tis not defective nor parsimonious, nor yet sprouting and luxuriant: and consonant to this is that sure axiome, Natura nihil facit frustra20 [nature does nothing in vain]. Thus God set up the world as a fair and goodly clock, to strike in time, and to move in an orderly manner, not by its own weights (as Durand would have it)21 but by fresh influence from himself, by that inward and intimate spring of immediate concourse, that should supply it in a most uniform and proportionable manner.

      Thus God framed this great Organ of the world, he tuned it, yet not so as that it could play upon it self, or make any musick by vertue of this general composure, (as Durand fansies it) but that it might be fitted and prepared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of his powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creatour in a most sweet and harmonious manner.

      And thus Nature is that regular line,22 which the wisdome of God himself has drawn in being, τάξις γὰρ ἢ τάξεως ἔργον ἡ φύσις23 [for nature is order or a work of order], as he speaks, whereas that which they miscall’d Fortune, was nothing but a line fuller of windings and varieties; and as Nature was a fixt and ordinary kinde of Providence, so Fortune was nothing but a more abstruse, and mysterious, and occult kinde of Providence, and therefore Fortune was not blinde, as they falsely painted and represented her; but they themselves were blinde and could not see into her. And in this sense that speech of that grave Moralist Seneca is very remarkable, Providentia, fatum, natura, casus, fortuna sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina24 [providence, fate, nature, chance, fortune are various terms for the same God].

      But then secondly, Nature as ’tis scattered and distributed in particular beings, so ’tis the very same with essence it self, and therefore spirituals, as they have their essence, so they have their Nature too, and if we gloried in names, ’twould be easie to heap up a multitude of testimonies in which these two must needs be ἰσοδυναμου̑ντα [synonymous].

      And thus Nature speaks these two things.

      1) It points out Originem entis [the origin of being], ’tis the very Genius of Entity, ’tis present at the nativity of every being, nay ’tis being it self. There is no moment in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its Nature.

      [27] 2) It speaks Operationem entis [the action of being], and ’tis a principle of working in spirituals, as well as principium motus & quietis [the origin of motion and rest] in corporeals. All essence bubbles out, flows forth, and paraphrases upon it self in operations. Hence it is that such workings as are facilitated by custome, are esteemed natural. Hence that known speech of Galen, Ἐπίκτητοι φύσεις τὰ ἔθη;25 Customes are frequently adopted and ingraffed into Nature. Hence also our usual Idiom calls a good disposition a good nature. Thus the Moralists expresse Vertues or Vices that are deeply rooted, by this terme πεφυσιωμένα26 [naturalized].

      And so some, and Grotius amongst the rest, would understand that place of the Apostle, Does not even Nature it self teach you, of a general custome:27 but that word Αὕτη ἡ φύσις [nature itself] does plainly refuse that interpretation; and the learned Salmasius does both grant and evince, that it cannot be meant of custome there.28 And thus having seen what Nature is, ’twill be very easie in the next place to tell you what the Law of Nature is.

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       Of the Nature of a Law in General

      [28] Before we can represent unto you the Law of Nature, you must first frame and fashion in your mindes the just notion of a Law in general. And Aquinas gives us this shadowy representation of it; Lex est quaedam regula & mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur1 [law is a certain rule and measure, according to which any agent is led to act, or restrained from acting]. But Suarez is offended with the latitude of this definition, and esteems it too spreading and comprehensive, as that which extends to all Naturals, I, and to Artificials too; for they have regulas & mensuras operationum [rules and measures of their operations]; Thus God has set a Law to the waves, and a Law to the windes; nay, thus clocks have their lawes, and Lutes have their Lawes, and whatsoever has the least appearance of motion, has some rule proportionable to it. Whereas these workings were alwayes reckoned to be at the most but inclinationes, & pondera [tendencies and gravitations], and not the fruits of a legislative power. But yet the Apostle Paul, to staine the pride of them that gloried in the Law, calls such things by the name of Law as were most odious and anomalous. Thus he tells us of Νόμος θανάτου, & Νόμος ἁμαρτίας2 [the law of death and the law of sin], though sin be properly ἀνομία [lawless]: Thus he mentions Legem membrorum3 [the law of members], the same which the Schoolmen call Legem fomitis4 [the law of passion]

      And yet this is sure, that a rational creature is only capable of a Law, which is a moral restraint, and so cannot reach to those things that are necessitated to act ad extremum virium5 [to the limit of their powers].

      And therefore Suarez does give us a more refined description, when he tells us that Lex est mensura quaedam actuum moralium, ita ut per conformitatem ad illam, Rectitudinem moralem habeant, & si ab illa discordent, obliqui sint6 [law is a certain measure of moral acts, such that by conformity to it, they are judged morally right, by disagreement with it, morally wrong]. A Law is such a just and regular tuning of Actions, as that by vertue of this they may conspire into a moral musick, and become very pleasant and harmonious. Thus Plato speaks much of that Εὐρυθμία & συμφωνία [melody and harmony] that is in Lawes, and in his second book De Leg.7 he does altogether discourse of harmony, and does infinitely prefer mental and intellectual musick, those powerful and prac[29]tical strains of goodnesse, that spring from a well-composed spirit, before those delicious blandishments, those soft and transient touches that comply with sense, and salute it in a more flattering manner; and he tells you of a spiritual dancing that is answerable to so sweet a musick, to these τὰ θείοτατα αὐλήματα8 [most divine flutings]. Whilest the Lawes play in consort, there is a Chorus of well ordered affections that are raised and elevated by them.

      And thus as Aristotle well observes, some Lawes were wont to be put in verse, and to be sung like so many pleasant odes, that might even charme the people into obedience.

      ’Tis true, that learned Philosopher gives this reason of it, they were put into verse, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιλάθωνται,9 that they might remember them the better: but why may not this reason also share with it, that they might come with a greater grace and allurement, that they might hear them as pleasantly as they would do the voice of a Viall or an Harp, that has Rhetorick enough to still and quiet the evill spirit? But yet this does not sufficiently paint out the being of a Law, to say that ’tis only regula & mensura [rule and measure]; and Suarez himself is so ingenuous as to tell us that he cannot rest satisfied

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