An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature. Nathaniel Culverwell
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A Law is borne ex cerebro Jovis [from the brain of Jove], and it is not brachium seculare [a worldly arm], but Coeleste [a heavenly one] that must maintain it, even humane Lawes have their vertue radicaliter, & remote [fundamentally and ultimately] (as the Schooles speak) from this eternal Law. Thus that famous and most renowned Orator and Patriot (Tully I mean) does most admirably expresse the lineage and descent of Lawes in this golden manner. Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse Populorum, sed aeternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem illam Legem & ultimam mentem dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei.9 Which I shall thus render, Wise men did ever look upon a Law, not as on a spark struck from humane intellectuals, not blown up or kindled with popular breath, but they thought it an eternal light shining from God himself irradiating, guiding and ruling the whole Universe; most sweetly and powerfully discovering what wayes were to be chosen, and what to be refused. And the minde of God himself is the centre of Lawes, from which they were drawn, and into which they must return.
Thus also that florid Moralist Plutarch resolves all Law and Justice into that Primitive and eternal Law, even God himself, for even thus he tells us. Justice (saies he) does not only sit like a Queen at the right hand of Jupiter when he is upon his throne, but she is alwayes in his bosome, and one with himself; and he closes it up with this, that God himself is τω̑ν νόμων πρεσβύτατος, καὶ τελειότατος.10 As he is the most ancient of dayes,11 so also is he the most ancient of lawes; as he is the perfection of beings, so is he also the rule of operations.
Nor must I let slip that passage of Plato, where he calls a law Ζη̑νος σκη̑πτρον,12 the golden Scepter by which God himself rules and commands; [36] for as all true Government has a bright stamp of divine Sovereignty, so every true Law has a plain superscription of his Justice. Lawes are anoynted by God himself, and most precious oile drops down upon them to the skirts of a Nation; and the Law of Nature had the oile of gladnesse poured out upon it above its fellowes.13
So then, that there is such a prime and supreme Law is clear, and unquestionable; but who is worthy to unseal and open this Law? and who can sufficiently display the glory of it? we had need of a Moses that could ascend up into the Mount, and converse with God himself, and yet when he came down he would be faine to put a veile upon his face, and upon his expressions too, lest otherwise he might too much dazzle inferiour understandings;14 but if the Schoolmen will satisfie you, (and you know some of them are stiled Angelical, and Seraphical)15 you shall hear, if you will, what they’l say to it.
Now this Law according to them is Aeterna quaedam ratio practica totius dispositionis, & gubernationis Universi.16 ’Tis an eternal Ordinance made in the depth of Gods infinite wisdome and councel for regulating and governing of the whole world, which yet had not its binding vertue in respect of God himself, who has alwayes the full and unrestrained liberty of his own essence,17 which is so infinite, as that it cannot binde it self, and which needs no Law, all goodness and perfection being so intrinsecal and essential to it: but it was a binding determination in reference to the creature, which yet in respect of all irrational beings, did only fortiter inclinare [strongly incline], but in respect of Rationals, it does formaliter obligare18 [formally bind].
By this great and glorious Law every good action was commanded, and all evill was discountenanc’d, and forbidden from everlasting. According to this righteous Law all rewards and punishments were distributed in the eternal thoughts of God. At the command of this Law all created beings took their several ranks and stations, and put themselves in such operations as were best agreeable and conformable to their beings. By this Law all essences were ordained to their ends by most happy and convenient means. The life and vigour of this Law sprang from the will of God himself; from the voluntary decree of that eternal Law-giver, minding the publike welfare of being; who when there were heaps of varieties and possibilities in his own most glorious thoughts, when he could have made such or such worlds in this or that manner, in this or that time, with such & such species, that should have had more or fewer individuals, as he pleased, with such operations as he would allow unto them; he did then select and pitch upon this way and method in which we see things now constituted; and did binde all things according to their several capacities to an exact and accurate observation of it.
So that by this you see how those eternal ideas in the minde of God, and this [37] eternal Law do differ. I speak now of Ideas not in a Platonical sence, but in a Scholastical, (unlesse they both agree, as some would have them.) For Idea est possibilium, Lex tantum futurorum [an idea relates to the possible, a law only to the future], God had before him the picture of every possibility, yet he did not intend to binde a possibility, but only a futurity. Besides, Ideas they were situated only in the understanding of God; whereas a Law has force and efficacy from his will; according to that much commended saying, In Coelesti & Angelica curia voluntas Dei Lex est19 [in the heavenly and angelic court the will of God is law]. And then an Idea does magis respicere artificem [relate more to the author], it stayes there where first it was; but a Law does potius respicere subditum [relate more to an inferior], it calls for the obedience of another, as Suarez does very well difference them.20
Neither yet is this eternal Law the same with the providence of God, though that be eternal also. But as Aquinas speaks, Lex se habet ad providentiam, sicut principium generale ad particulares conclusiones [the law has the same relation to providence, as a general principle to particular conclusions]; or, if you will, Sicut principia prima practica ad prudentiam21 [as practical first principles to prudence]; his meaning is this, that Providence is a more punctual and particular application of this binding rule, and is not the Law it self but the superintending power, which looks to the execution and accomplishment of it; or as the most acute Suarez has it, Lex dicit jus in communi constitutum, providentia dicit curam quae de singulis actibus haberi debet22 [law refers to a rule of right established in common, providence to the care which should be exercised about individual acts].
Besides, a Law in its strict and peculiar notion, does only reach to rational beings; whereas Providence does extend and spread it self over all. But that which vexes the Schoolmen most, is this, that they having required promulgation as a necessary condition to the existence of a Law, yet they cannot very easily shew how this eternal Law, should be publisht from everlasting.23 But the most satisfactory account that can be given to that, is this, that other Law-givers being very voluble and mutable before their minde and will be fully and openly declared, they may have a purpose indeed, but it cannot be esteem’d a Law. But in God there being no variablenes nor shadow of turning,24 this his Law has a binding vertue as soon as it has a being, yet so as that it does not actually and formally oblige a creature till it be made known unto it: either by some revelation from God himself which is possible only, and extraordinary; or else by the mediation of some other Law, of the Law of Nature, which is the usual and constant way that God takes for the promulgation of this his eternal Law. For that νόμος γραπτὸς,25 that sacred Manuscript, which is writ by the finger of God himself in the heart of man, is a plain transcript of this original Law, so far [38] as it concerns mans welfare. And this you see does most directly bring