Principles of Equity. Henry Home, Lord Kames
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That man is by nature a social being, is evident from many of his principles and faculties, calculated chiefly or solely to qualify him for the social state. This is eminently the case of the moral sense; the very purpose of which is, to regulate our conduct in society. That the uniformity of this sense among the different tribes of men, intitling it to be termed the common sense of mankind, must be calculated for the further improvement of society, is highly probable; and yet does not appear altogether so clear at first view. For may it not be urged, that we are bound notwithstanding
[print edition page xliv]
to regulate our conduct by our own sense or private conviction; and that to act otherwise would be to act against conscience? This argument is at least plausible; and if it hold true, society, it must be yielded, cannot be benefited by a standard that is not calculated to regulate any branch of our conduct. But the Almighty leaves no imperfection in his works: he intended man for society; he endued him with a sense of right and wrong; he made the perceptions of that sense uniform in all men; and to complete us for society, he has moulded our nature so admirably, as that even the man who has the most correct sense of morals, is not better qualified for society, than they are who deviate the farthest from it. The contrivance, simple and beautiful, is, to bind us by a law in our nature to regulate our conduct by the common sense of mankind, even in opposition to what otherwise would be our own sense or private conviction. And that this truly is the system of nature, I endeavour to make out as follows.
We have an innate sense or conviction of a common nature, not only in our own species, but in every species of animals: and our conviction is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity among creatures of the same kind, and a disformity, not less remarkable, among creatures of different kinds. This common <10> nature is conceived to be a model or standard for each individual of the kind. Hence it is a matter of wonder, to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the species, whether in its internal or external structure: a child born with aversion to its mother’s milk, is a wonder, not less than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.
Secondly, With respect to the common nature of man in particular, we have an innate conviction, that it is invariable not less than universal; that it will be the same hereafter as at present, and as it was in time past; the same among all nations, and in all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived; because giving allowance for the difference of culture, and gradual refinement of manners, the fact corresponds to our conviction.
Thirdly, We have an innate conviction, that this common nature or standard is PERFECT and RIGHT; and that every individual OUGHT to be framed according to it. Every remarkable deviation from the standard, makes an impression upon us of imperfection, irregularity, or disorder;
[print edition page xlv]
and raises a painful emotion: monstrous births, exciting the curiosity of a philosopher, fail not at the same time to excite aversion in a high degree.
This conviction of perfection in the common nature of man, reaches every branch of his nature; and particularly his sense of the morality and immorality of actions, termed the moral sense. This sense accordingly, considered as a branch of the common nature of man, is admitted by all to be perfect; and, consequently, to be the ultimate and unerring standard of morals; to which all are bound to submit, even in opposition to their own private sense of right and wrong. At the same time, as this standard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not conspicuous to every individual, we find instances, not few in number, of persons deluded into erroneous moral opinions, by mistaking a false standard for that of nature. And hence, with respect to individuals, a distinction between a right and a wrong sense in morals; a distinction which, from the conviction of a moral standard, is obvious to the meanest capacity; but of which distinction we could not otherwise have the slightest conception.
The final cause of this branch of our constitution is illustrious. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determining our endless controversies about matters of interest, the strong would have recourse to open violence; the weak to cunning, deceit, and treachery; and society would be altogether intolerable. Courts of law could afford no resource: for without a standard of morals, their decisions <11> must be arbitrary, and consequently have no authority nor influence.
Happy it is for men, that in all their disputes about right and wrong, they have this standard to appeal to: it is necessary, that in society the actions of individuals be uniform with respect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is necessary that their perceptions of right and wrong be uniform: to produce such uniformity, a standard of morals is indispensable; which is daily applied by judges with great success.
To complete this theory, it must be added, that, independent of the author’s opinion, it is the goodness or illness of the effect intended which qualifies an action to be right or wrong. Thus, when a man impelled by friendship or pity, rescues from the flames one condemned to be burnt for heresy, the action is right, even though the man, convinced that heretics ought to be destroy’d, be of opinion that the action is wrong.
[print edition page xlvi]
But with respect to the author of the action, nature leads us to judge of him by a different rule. He is approved, and held to be INNOCENT, when he does what he himself thinks right: he is disapproved, and held to be GUILTY, when he does what he himself thinks wrong. Thus, to assassinate an Atheist for the sake of religion, is a wrong action: and yet the enthusiast who commits that wrong may be innocent: and one is guilty who, contrary to conscience, eats meat in Lent, though the action is not wrong. Upon the whole, an action is perceived to be right or wrong independent of the author’s own opinion: but he is approved or disapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.
We learn from experience, as above, that every right action is agreeable, and every wrong action disagreeable. But the author appears to us in a different light: he is agreeable when he acts according to conscience, though the action be wrong; and disagreeable when he acts against conscience, though the action be right. He is, however, more agreeable, when he does a right action according to conscience; and more disagreeable, when he does a wrong action against conscience: in which light he must always appear to himself; for when he acts according to conscience, he must think the action right; and when he acts against conscience, he must think the action wrong. <12>
CHAPTER II
Laws of Nature that regulate our conduct in Society.
Having thus established a standard for morals, which lays a solid foundation for the science of morality, the regular progress is, to investigate the laws that are derived from this standard: and these laws may be shortly defined, “Rules of conduct that are declared to be such by the common sense of mankind, which is the moral standard.”
When we endeavour to investigate the laws of nature, those regularly take the lead that concern our duty: and as duty is of two kinds, duty to others, and duty to ourselves, we begin with the former. Of the duties we owe to others, some tend to action, some to restraint; and before entering into particulars, it may be proper to present them in a general view.
[print edition page xlvii]
There is one duty so general as to comprehend all mankind for its object, all at least that are innocent; and that is the duty of forbearing to hurt others, whether externally or internally. A man may be hurt externally in his goods, in his person and relations, and in his reputation. Hence the laws, Thou must not steal, Thou must not defraud others, Thou must not kill nor wound, Thou must not be guilty of defamation.
A man