So far have we been carried in a beaten track: but in attempting to proceed, we are intangled in several intricacies and obstructions. Doth an action well intended, though it fall short of its aim, intitle the author to a reward; or an action ill-intended, though it happen to produce no mischief, subject him to punishment? The moral sense, in some individuals, is known to be so perverted, as to differ, perhaps widely, from the common sense of mankind; must the former or the latter be the rule for punishing or rewarding such persons? At first there will be little hesitation in affirming,
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that the common sense of mankind must be the standard for rewards and punishments, as well as for civil claims: but these questions suggest some doubts, which, after due examination, lead to an important discovery, That rewards and punishments are regulated by a different standard.
It is the common sense of mankind that determines actions to be right or wrong, just or unjust, proper or improper. By this standard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and, in a word, every demand founded upon interest; not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with respect to the moral characters of men, and with respect to rewards and punishments, a standard is established far less rigid; which is, the opinion that men form of their own actions: and accordingly, as mentioned above, a man is held to be innocent when he does what he himself thinks right; and is held to be guilty when he does what he himself thinks wrong. Thus we are led, by a natural principle, to judge of others as we believe they judge of themselves; and by that rule we pronounce them virtuous or vicious, innocent or guilty; and we approve or disapprove, praise or blame them accordingly.* Some, <24> it is true, are so perverted by bad education, or by superstition, as to espouse numberless absurd tenets, flatly contradicting the common standard of right and wrong; and yet even these make no exception from the rule: if they act according to conscience, they are innocent, however wrong the action may be; and if they act against conscience, they are guilty, however right the action may be. Here then is a conspicuous standard for rewards and punishments: it is a man’s own conscience that declares him innocent or guilty, and consequently fit to be rewarded or punished; for it is abhorrent to every natural perception, that a guilty person be rewarded, or an innocent person punished. Further, in order that personal merit and demerit may not in any measure depend upon chance, we are so constituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the intention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man will be praised for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.
But what if a man intending a wrong, happen by accident to do a
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wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by shooting the rabbits, he accidentally wound a child unseen behind a bush? The delinquent ought to be punished for intending to rob; and he is also subjected to repair the hurt done to the child: but he cannot be punished for this accidental wound; because the law of nature regulates punishment by the intention, and not by the event.* <25>
The transgression of the primary virtues is attended with severe and never-failing punishments, which are much more effectual than any that have been invented to inforce municipal laws: on the other hand, there is very little merit ascribed even to the strictest observance of them. The secondary virtues are directly opposite, with respect to their rewards and punishments: the neglect of them is not attended with any punishment;
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but the practice of them is attended with the highest degree of approbation. Offices of undeserved kindness, returns of good for evil, generous toils and sufferings for our friends, or for our country, come under this class: to perform actions of this kind, there is no motive that, in a proper sense, can be termed a law; but there are the strongest motives that can consist with freedom, the performance being rewarded with a consciousness of self-merit, and with universal praise and admiration, the highest rewards human nature is susceptible of.
From what is said, the following observation will occur: The pain of transgressing justice, fidelity, or any primary virtue, is much greater than the pleasure of performance; but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any secondary virtue, is as nothing, compared with the pleasure of performance. Among the vices opposite to the primary virtues, the most striking moral deformity is found: among the secondary virtues, the most striking moral beauty.
CHAPTER V
Reparation.
Reparation, a capital part of the moral system, promotes two ends of great importance: it represses wrongs that are not criminal; and it also makes up the loss sustained by wrongs of whatever kind. With respect to the former, reparation is a species of punishment; and with respect to the latter, it is a branch of justice. These ends will be better understood, after ascertaining the nature and true foundation of reparation. Every claim for reparation supposes a wrong action done by one, and loss or mischief thereby occasioned to another: And hence, 1mo, There can be no claim for reparation <26> if the action was innocent, whatever be the mischief; 2do, Nor can there be any claim unless mischief have happened, however wrong, or even criminal, the action may be. That the reparation to be awarded must correspond to the extent of the loss or mischief, is self-evident. The single difficulty is, to separate, by precise boundaries, actions that are wrong from those that are innocent. In order to explain the qualities of right and wrong, it was sufficient at first to lay down in general, That an action done
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intentionally to produce an agreeable effect, is right; and done intentionally to produce a disagreeable effect, is wrong. But upon examining this subject more narrowly, certain actions are discovered to be wrong, though the mischief they have produced was not intended; and certain actions are discovered to be innocent, though they have produced mischief. And these I shall endeavour to explain, as follows.
The moral sense dictates, that in acting we ought carefully to avoid doing mischief: the only difficulty is, to determine what degree of care is requisite. An action may produce mischief that was foreseen, but not intended; and it may produce mischief that was neither intended nor foreseen. The former is not criminal; because no action has that character, without an intention to produce mischief: but it is CULPABLE or FAULTY, because the moral sense prohibits every action that may probably do mischief; and if we do mischief by transgressing that prohibition, we are blamed by others, and even by ourselves. Thus, a man who throws a large stone into the marketplace among a crowd of people, is highly culpable; because he foresaw that mischief would probably ensue, though he had no intention to hurt any person. With respect to the latter, though the mischief was neither intended nor foreseen, yet if it might have been foreseen, the action so far is rash or incautious, and consequently culpable or faulty in some degree. Thus, if a man, in pulling down an old house adjacent to a frequented place, happen to wound a passenger, without calling aloud that people may keep out of the way, the action is in some degree culpable, because the mischief might have been foreseen. But though harm ensue, an action is not culpable or faulty, if all reasonable precaution have been adhibited: the moral sense declares the author to be innocent: the effect is perceived to be accidental; and the action may be termed unlucky or unfortunate, but cannot be said to be either right or wrong.* <27>
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With respect to rash or incautious actions, where the mischief might have been foreseen, though neither intended nor actually foreseen, it is not sufficient to escape blame, that a man naturally rash or inattentive acts according to his character: a degree of precaution is required of him, both by himself and by others, such as is natural to the generality of men. The author, in particular, perceives, that he might and ought to have acted more cautiously; and his conscience reproaches him for his inattention, not less than if he were naturally
