whether it desires to engage in commerce with another nation or not. Which was the first point.
§ 60.
§ 11, part 3, Jus Nat.
For since by allowing commerce with a nation some right is granted to it, while it depends upon the will of the one transferring and consequently granting the right upon what condition it wishes to grant a certain right to another; likewise it depends upon the will of any nation upon what
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condition it wishes to engage in commerce with another. Which was the second point.
§ 128, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 156, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 906, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 356, part 3, Jus Nat.
For no one has the right by nature to purchase for himself from another that which the other himself needs. Moreover by force of natural liberty the decision must be left to the other, as to whether he himself needs those things which you wish to purchase for yourself from him. And therefore that right is an imperfect one, as we have already shown elsewhere. Therefore in these matters the mere whim of the nation rules, in which one must acquiesce. Therefore likewise any nation can declare the condition upon which it desires to allow or bind itself to commerce with foreign nations.
§ 74. How a perfect right to external commerce is acquired
§ 73.
§ 393, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 788, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 364, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 23.
Since it depends upon the will of any nation, whether it desires to engage in commerce with another nation or not, and upon what condition it desires to engage in it, since moreover no one can bind himself perfectly to another except by a promise, that is, by agreements; a perfect right to engage in commerce with another nation cannot be acquired except by agreements, consequently that right is only a stipulative right.
§ 1043, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 55, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 393, part 3, Jus Nat.
§§ 235, 236, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 788, part 3, Jus Nat.
The ruler can impose internal commerce on his subjects and these are bound to obey him. But there is certainly another rule for external commerce, since nations are naturally free. Therefore since no private individual can bind another private individual to himself perfectly, and thus acquire a perfect right against him, except by a promise, so also no nation can acquire a perfect right to external commerce except by agreements. By agreements of course an imperfect obligation becomes perfect.
§ 75. Of the bare allowing of commerce
§ 61.
§ 74.
§ 73.
Since a perfect right to engage in commerce with another nation, that is, in external commerce, is not acquired except by agreements, if one nation simply allows another to engage in commerce with it, from that fact a perfect right to this external commerce is not attained, therefore since it depends upon the will of the other whether it is willing or unwilling to
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engage in it and upon what condition it wishes to engage in it, the one nation does no injury to the other, if it restricts commerce in any way whatsoever and arranges as to the manner of engaging in it according to its liking, however and whenever shall seem best to it.
§ 58.
§ 124, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 268, part 4, Jus Nat.
§ 9.
§ 61.
§ 229, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
Here is pertinent, what we have already shown above, although that may seem quite plain, that the transportation of foreign merchandise and its sale in his territories can be prohibited by the ruler. For although nations, like single individuals, are bound to give up their goods to each other in case of mutual need, although not gratis, nay although nations are understood to have united into a certain supreme state, whose individual members are single states, and in this respect external commerce may be likened to internal commerce, nevertheless it does not follow from this, that nations are bound by nature to engage in commerce with others, so that the freedom of determining according to their liking in these matters is taken away from them. So formerly the Chinese, for the purpose of preserving their own interests, did not wish to unite in trade with other nations. Nor did they err in that, because they do not need the goods of other nations; but even if the things which they themselves were able to do without had been of especial use to other nations, nevertheless the duty toward themselves was superior to the duty toward others. But if you think of nations as fellow citizens, and the commerce, in which they are engaged, as internal, no other conclusion follows from this than that it depends wholly upon the will of the nations, whether or not they wish to keep up trade with one another, and whether the practice ought to be a matter of liberty or of necessity. For is not any one in the state free to buy from and sell to any one he wishes, and may not the two as they desire make definite stipulation concerning buying or selling, in order that perfect rights may be acquired? No obstacle is presented by civil laws promulgated concerning commerce in general by which that liberty is hardly abridged. Moreover corresponding to these laws are natural laws, by which nations are ordered to engage in commerce one with the other, as will be proved a little later. So nothing is taught by us which involves a contradiction, but one point is accordant with all, there is one harmony, provided only all things are observed with keen insight. Therefore this concept of the supreme
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state clears up wonderfully all things which are to be maintained concerning the commerce of nations, nay, it leads us by the hand to the discovery of them.
§ 76. What the rights of pure power and the acts of pure will are
The rights of pure power are said to be those which any one may exercise or not as seems best to himself, free from all outside coercion. And from this, acts of pure will are said to be those which depend upon our will alone, as to go and to stay, and consequently acts of pure will are those which belong to the exercise of rights of pure power, as to buy or sell wine or whatever merchandise you choose, where you will.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. 2, c. 4, § 15.
The rights of pure power are not subject to definite laws, nor do they depend upon agreement, but in their case the mere will of the one exercising them rules. These rights therefore are altogether free, and in this respect they are even called jura libertatis [rights of freedom] by Grotius. Nor is there need with him to distinguish from the rights of freedom those which are not exercised daily, but only once when it shall be convenient, as the redemption of a pledge, if there has been no agreement concerning a definite time within which it ought to be redeemed. For then you are undoubtedly free to use that right when you will, nor can you be compelled to do contrary to your desire what must be done once for all, for example to redeem
