of curve, makes plain in the instance of the circle what holds true of all curves, and, following his example, Apollonius proves the same things concerning particular conic sections.4 Moreover they were able likewise to prove the same things in general concerning curves and then to apply them to the circle and to conic sections as to species included under a genus, just as afterwards Barrow gave general proofs in his “Geometrical Lectures.”5 If there should have been reasons why there ought to be a consideration of a certain species before there was a consideration of the genus, it cannot be otherwise than that the things which could be proved in regard to the genus, would likewise be so proved in regard to the species that the general demonstration would be applied just as to the species. And hence it happens that something can be proved in regard to the genus in the same manner in which it has been proved in regard to the species. We think it well advised that such cautions be given for the sake of those who have a special liking for accurate method, and in order that the captious criticism of the superficial may be avoided, who seem to themselves not even to have discovered what boys find in a bean, if they censure those things which because of a lack of intelligence they do not adequately understand.
§ 91. Whether the consent of the ruler of the state is needed for alienation and pledge
§ 395, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 90.
§ 658, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
If necessity urges the alienation or pledge by a corporation of property belonging to it, or its evident advantage recommends it, that ought not to be done without the consent of the superior or ruler of the state. For since the right belongs to the ruler of a state to compel his subjects by force to regulate at least their external acts according to the law of nature, he also ought not to allow corporations to alienate or pledge corporate property at will, and since that may not be done except in case of extreme necessity or plain advantage, the ruler of the state ought to judge the necessity or advantage. Therefore if necessity urges or plain advantage recommends
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that the property of a corporation be alienated or pledged by it, it is necessary that this be done with the consent of the superior; consequently without his consent alienation or pledge ought not to be made.
§ 489, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 494, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 768, part 7, Jus Nat.
§ 842, part 7, Jus Nat.
Undoubtedly it is to the public advantage to take precaution lest the property of a corporation be alienated or pledged to the disadvantage of the corporation in the future, and lest those who now make up the corporation take some right away from those who shall constitute the corporation in the future, when they diminish their right. But the consideration of public advantage belongs to none other than the superior or ruler of the state, to whom likewise are subject the actions of those who form the corporation, so far as they have regard to the end of the state. Since corporations consist of individuals and therefore remain the same, even if some withdraw and others succeed to their places, and consequently even if all have died who are now in the corporation, in this respect they are like minors, who have need of a curator in the management of their property, consequently without the consent of their curator they cannot alienate or pledge their property. And so the superior or ruler of the state plays the part of a curator. This indeed is also the reason why the civil laws confer the rights of minors upon corporations. It is customary also to compare corporations to wards whose tutor is the ruler of the state. The natural obligation not to alienate or pledge the property of the state to the prejudice of the future is not sufficient to provide adequately for the future. Therefore it is necessary that there should be some external check in addition, as that the act of alienation or pledge may be invalidated at the will of the superior or ruler of the state.
§ 92. Of eminent domain over the property of a corporation
§ 111, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 88 h, and § 6, part 8, Jus Nat.
Eminent domain over the property of a corporation belongs to the ruler of the state. For eminent domain over the property of citizens belongs to the ruler of a state. Therefore since the property of a corporation is likewise the property of citizens, eminent domain over the property of a corporation belongs to the ruler of the state.
Note, § 91.
§ 93.
Eminent domain is not to be confused with that right of the ruler of a state upon which depends his consent to alienation and pledge, as is apparent from its effect.
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§ 93. Of its effect
§ 92.
§ 111, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since eminent domain over the property of a corporation belongs to the ruler of a state, moreover since by virtue of eminent domain he can dispose of property belonging to citizens for the sake of the public good in case of necessity; the ruler of a state also can dispose of the property of a corporation for the sake of the public good in case of necessity.
§ 23, part 8, Jus Nat.
N., § 92.
With respect to the advantage of the public the advantage of any corporation or community is considered as a private matter, just as the goods themselves of any corporation with respect to those of the whole state or commonwealth are considered as private goods, although in other respects they are and can be spoken of as public also. And hence is plain the difference we have just mentioned between eminent domain belonging to the ruler of the state over the goods of a corporation and the right otherwise belonging to him over them. Obviously, by virtue of eminent domain consideration is had for the public advantage or the advantage of the whole state, but by the remaining right only for the advantage of the corporation or of that group to which the goods belong. For example, let us assume that in some city there is a public granary, which must be destroyed for the purpose of saving the city. It is allowable to destroy that by virtue of eminent domain, since it is to the advantage of the commonwealth that the city should be defended in the best way.
§ 94. Of the use of the property of a corporation
§ 88.
§ 129, part 2, Jus Nat.
Individuals who are in a corporation have the right to use and enjoy its property, and the use is either open indifferently to the individuals, as shall seem best to each one, or limited by definite conditions. For since the goods of a corporation are in a mixed common holding of definite groups or communities, and since the ownership of the goods in a mixed common holding belongs to the corporation, but the use of them belongs indifferently to the individuals, according of course as each one shall have need, the use of the goods of the corporation also is open indifferently to the individuals who are in it, as shall seem best to each. Which was the first point.
§§ 118, 216, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 789, part 3, Jus Nat.
But if indeed the property does not admit of that use which shall seem best to each, it is necessary that it should be limited by definite conditions
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agreed upon between the individuals. And since the individuals can jointly dispose of the use of the goods
