not been based on the natural theory of civil laws. When this happens, the ruler abuses his right. But this abuse has to be endured by subjects, and those things have to be endured by a private individual which he is not able to change.
§ 147. Of the right of the exile to dwell anywhere in the world
§ 145.
§ 7, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 66, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 562, part 6, Jus Nat.
By nature the right belongs to an exile to dwell anywhere in the world. For exiles do not cease to be human beings, because they are driven into exile, consequently compelled to depart from the place where they have domicile, a thing which is evident of itself. Therefore, since by nature all things are common, moreover since in primitive society any man is allowed to dwell anywhere in the world, and since by the introduction of ownership the necessary use of things, and consequently the right of living anywhere in the world cannot be absolutely taken away from any one, by nature the right belongs to an exile to live anywhere in the world.
§ 64, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 563, part 6, Jus Nat.
§ 145.
A right belonging by nature to a man or born in him could be taken away from no one, and for this reason ownership could not be
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introduced, nor consequently could definite tracts of land be subjected to ownership, except with this tacit restriction, that, if in a special emergency the necessary use of things should happen to be taken completely from any one, some right would remain to him in those things which are subject to ownership, consequently, that it should be possible for him to dwell in a land subject to the ownership of some nation, even if he should be restrained from living with his own nation. Exiles are driven out or are compelled to depart from the place where they have domicile, and so they are not allowed to dwell with their own nation. Therefore by nature the right belongs to them to dwell in any place in the world which is subject to some other nation. He who is driven into exile cannot be driven out of the entire earth, for this cannot be done in a physical sense, unless life is destroyed, nor is it morally possible, since the ruler has no right over the lands not under his sovereignty.
§ 148. Of asking admittance
§ 147.
§ 409, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since by nature the right belongs to an exile to live anywhere in the world, moreover since it depends altogether on the will of the people, or on the will of the one who has the right of the people, whether or not he desires to receive an outsider into his state, an exile is allowed to ask admittance, but he cannot assuredly according to his liking determine domicile for himself, wherever he shall please, and if admittance is refused, that must be endured.
§ 693, part 6, Jus Nat.
§ 400, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 456, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 475, part 8, Jus Nat.
Elsewhere already we have suggested that there may be several reasons on account of which admittance may be denied and that they must be determined by the state. Therefore since in the entire third chapter of the eighth part we have shown what things are to be considered in establishing a state, if any one shall desire to consider properly the details, he will without difficulty recognize that there are legal causes for the denial of admittance. Here properly belongs the fact that the number of subjects is greater than can be provided for adequately from the things which are demanded for the needs, comforts, and pleasures of life, both as regards the people in general and also as regards the class of people who follow the same pursuit in life. Here also belongs the reason that there is fear lest the morals of the subjects
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may be corrupted, or lest prejudice may be aroused against religion, or even lest criminals be admitted, because of whom injury threatens the state, and other things which are detrimental to public welfare.
§ 149. Whether exiles are to be admitted
§ 145.
§ 137.
§ 148.
§ 693, part 6, Jus Nat.
A permanent residence in its territory cannot be denied to exiles by a nation, unless special reasons stand in the way. For since exiles have been expelled from the place where they have a domicile, consequently dwell, they are allowed to seek admittance elsewhere. Therefore, since to these who, driven from their homes, seek admittance, a permanent residence in the territory subject to its control cannot be denied, unless special reasons stand in the way; permanent residence in its territory cannot be denied to exiles by a nation, unless special reasons stand in the way.
Note, § 148.
§ 2.
§ 156, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 121, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 906, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 237, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
We have already indicated what reasons prevent the admittance of exiles. Moreover, since nations are free, the decision concerning these matters must be left to the nations themselves, and that decision must be respected. The right belongs to an exile to dwell anywhere in the world, but no absolute right to settle in any particular lands belongs to him, a thing which in fact is opposed to ownership. And if this right should be claimed as regards these lands, it is imperfect, consequently no nation can be compelled to receive exiles.
§ 150. Of compassion toward exiles
§ 145.
§ 137.
§ 259, part 4, Jus Nat.
We ought to be compassionate toward exiles. For exiles have been expelled from the place where they had domicile or have been compelled to depart from it on account of offences, therefore they have no fixed abode so that they can dwell in any place and support themselves honestly. Wherefore, since they cannot free themselves from this evil with which they are afflicted, and we ought to be compassionate toward those who cannot free themselves from the evil with which they are afflicted, therefore we ought to be compassionate toward exiles.
§ 652, Psych. Emp., and § 256, part 4, Jus Nat.
§ 619, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 256, part 4, Jus Nat.
§ 642, part 8, Jus Nat.
There is no reason why you should object that exile is also inflicted as a punishment, nay more, that certain ones even desiring to go into exile because of fear of punishment plan flight for themselves, and that these are not worthy of compassion. Compassion, indeed, is not
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confined to those who have fallen into misfortune without fault on their part, but since it arises from love, which is extended to all men generally, it applies also to all who are wretched generally, whether they fall into wretchedness of their
