on account of them; for we love the person, we hold in abhorrence the crimes or offences, which they have committed. Since the act cannot be undone by us or by them, it is rather incumbent on us that we bring them back to a better moral life, and that, if they should desire to reform of their own accord, we should not stand in the way to prevent it; a thing which would certainly occur, if there were no place for compassion. Nevertheless we do not therefore deny that those are more worthy of compassion who go into exile without fault on their part, or have been driven into exile for an unjust cause. This also is here properly to be noted, that when an evil is such of itself that it ought not to be punished, no attention is to be paid to it by another nation, if any one has gone into exile for the sake of avoiding punishment; in order that this may be more plainly apparent, I propose to add the following proposition.
§ 151. Whether any one can be punished by a nation against which he has not offended
§ 642, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 1061, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 832, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 34, part 8, Jus Nat.
He who has offended against a nation or committed some crime against it cannot on that account be punished by another nation to which he has come. For since the evil is not such of itself that it ought to be punished, and by nature the right belongs to a man to punish one who has injured him; by nature also the right belongs to no nation to punish him who has not injured it. Therefore, although the right to punish is a part of the civil power, and consequently belongs to the nation against which any one has offended or committed some crime, nevertheless one nation cannot on this account punish him who has offended against another nation or committed some crime against it. And so it is plain that he who has offended against one nation or committed some crime against it, cannot be punished by another nation to which he has come.
§ 559, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 579, part 8 Jus Nat.
Evil deeds are punished in a state because either some member of the state, or the corporation itself, has been injured. But he who for
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the purpose of escaping a penalty comes as an exile to another state, has not on that account injured any member of the state or any private citizen, nor the corporation itself. Therefore both reasons fail, as to why any one can be punished by a certain state, consequently a wrongful act committed in one state does not affect another state, nor from that thing itself does any right arise against an exile.
§ 152. Who should be called suppliants
Those fugitives are called suppliants who beg another nation, or the one who has the right of the people, to defend them against their own nation, or the ruler of the state whence they come.
Suppliants of course are to be distinguished from exiles. For although exiles may be suppliants, nevertheless not all exiles are suppliants, whether they be voluntary or involuntary. So if one expelled from his native country on account of religion comes to another nation and seeks admittance there, he as a suppliant can entreat the ruler of the state to see to it that his property, which he has been compelled to leave, be delivered over to him. Likewise if any one is spitefully accused, without a cause, of fraudulent administration of the public goods, he can as a suppliant entreat the powerful ruler of another state to defend him against the threatened injuries. But what the rights of suppliants are will be more clearly evident when we have discussed the duties of nations toward each other and the rights arising therefrom. Of course this word is taken in the stricter meaning, although the broader meaning allows him to be called a suppliant who begs another that he defend him against some other.
§ 153. What the right to emigrate is
The right to emigrate is permission to go into voluntary exile.
So the right to emigrate belongs to subjects to whom permission is given to depart from the state, because they are devoted to a religion which the ruler of the state does not wish to tolerate. For it would not be necessary for them to depart if they consented to give it up. That the right to emigrate does not belong to every voluntary exile is readily evident. For exile is voluntary, when any one for the sake of escaping punishment becomes an exile, nevertheless he does not have the right
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to emigrate; for he goes into exile only in opposition to the will of the ruler, who cannot be said to permit it.
§ 154. Of the source of this right
§ 153.
§ 407, part 8, Jus Nat., and § 145 h.
§ 789, part 3, Jus Nat.
§ 77, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since the right to emigrate is permission to go into voluntary exile, moreover since the ruler of the state can allow this, either at his own discretion, or by virtue of the agreement entered into with other nations, or is understood to do this by virtue of the fundamental law; the right to emigrate arises either from agreement or from fundamental law, or depends upon the will of the ruler.
In a state of nature there is no right to emigrate; for this assumes that there are established states, consequently it depends upon the law of the state. Therefore the things which are to be maintained concerning the law of emigration are derived from that law as their source. At the same time the reason is to be considered, on account of which that must be granted. Moreover, that the law of a state can be changed by agreements and limited by fundamental laws is plain enough from the general principles of the law of nature and the special principles of universal public law.
§ 155. Of wrongs done to those who have the right to emigrate
§ 145.
§ 153.
§ 239, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 859, part 1, Jus Nat.
If the ruler of the state is unwilling to allow those to depart from the state who have the right to emigrate, he does a wrong to them. For he who has the right to emigrate may depart from the state, since that right consists in permission to go into voluntary exile. If then the ruler of the state is unwilling to allow this, that is contrary to his right. Therefore, since he does a wrong to another, who does what is contrary to that person’s right, if the ruler of the state is unwilling to allow those to depart from the state who have the right to emigrate, he does them a wrong.
§ 77, part 8, Jus Nat.
This happens if the right to emigrate comes from agreement entered into with other nations, or from fundamental law. If you say that the right to emigrate can likewise exist by force of the agreement entered into with the ruler of the state at the granting of the sovereignty, it is easy to see that by this agreement a fundamental law was established.
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