act, and their power to act rightly is derived from the rulers, as long as they are controlled by the wisdom and foresight of the rulers, so that they are kept healthful, and contribute what they ought to the healthfulness of the body as a whole. For that reason the rulers of states tower above their
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nations, just as the soul is superior to the body, and as the law of their nations abides in them, so also do that intellect and will, without which it is not possible to use that law. It has seemed fitting to communicate a knowledge of this law by that method which I have used in all of the law of nature and in other departments of philosophy, so that the truth can be clearly seen. But since, indeed, the force of examples is very great, both in knowledge and action, an example ought to be cited. But why should I seek an ancient example, when I may use one present and living? For Your Highness offers an example of such a nature that, if all rulers of states would follow it, there would be no complaints of the misfortunes of the times. Your skill in action, your wisdom and foresight, your love of humanity implanted in you by nature, your desire to give consideration to the welfare of those who repose all confidence as to their well-being in you, your zeal in promoting the fortunes of others without advantage to yourself, and finally, to mention nothing else, that exalted and perfect reputation, in which you excel, has induced the citizens of the whole Confederacy of the Netherlands, by unanimous consent in these most troublous times, as though filled by a certain divine inspiration, to desire to have you, Most Serene Prince, as governor, supreme commander in war on land and sea, and perpetual ruler of the East Indies. Such is your kindness that you have readily consented to their pleas and have willingly assumed this very heavy burden. Now you shine like the sun among the planets throughout the allied provinces, but you are never idle. For just as the sun by its power keeps the planets in their orbits and preserves the whole system by mutual actions and reactions, so that the individual planets complete their circuits around it according to fixed law; so also Your Highness holds the allied provinces united together by a very strong bond of union, and while the performance of duties demanded by mutual affection is secured, their entire system exists in such a form that each province enjoys those blessings which produce a happy state. The artist has portrayed this elegantly on the gold medal, by which the memory of the hereditary rule over the whole of the Confederacy of the Netherlands conferred upon Your Highness, is handed down to posterity. Since, Most Gracious Master, contrary to all my hope and expectation I have been honoured by you with that decoration; wherever learned men have recognized therefrom and publicly honoured your patronage
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of letters, I too have been fully convinced that my effort to make philosophy definite and useful to the human race, is not displeasing to Your Highness, and I experience daily the influence of so splendid a gift upon the mind, an influence which usually attends gifts conferred by princes upon learned men, when I turn my attention to the continuation of the work which was begun so many years ago. Therefore, relying upon this perfectly assured hope, Most Wise Prince, that you will not disapprove of my coupling the splendour and authority of your name with my learning, I appear with most humble mind to offer this volume to Your Highness. May God preserve you, Most Exalted and Serene Prince, that by your example you may show how nations may be happy and useful to other nations; which is the desire of Your Highness’s.
Most humble and devoted admirer
Christian Freiherr von Wolff
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Since nations in their relations with each other use no other law than that which has been established by nature, a separate treatment of the law of nations and the law of nature might seem superfluous. But those, indeed, who feel thus do not weigh the laws of nations in scales that are perfectly balanced. Nations certainly can be regarded as nothing else than individual free persons living in a state of nature, and therefore the same duties are to be imposed upon them, both as regards themselves and as regards others, and the rights arising therefrom, which are prescribed by the law of nature and are bestowed on individual humans, to the extent that they are by nature born free, and are united by no other bond than that of nature. And so whatever right arises and whatever obligations result therefrom, come from that unchangeable law which has its source in human nature, and thus the law of nations is undoubtedly a part of the law of nature, and therefore it is called the natural law of nations, if you should look at its source, but the necessary, if you should look at its power to bind. And this is a law common to all nations, so that any nation which does anything contrary to it, violates the common law of all nations, and does a wrong. But since, indeed, nations are moral persons and therefore are subject only to certain rights and duties, which by virtue of the law of nature arise from the society entered into, their nature and essence undoubtedly differ very much from the nature and essence of individual humans as physical persons. When therefore the duties, which the law of nature prescribes to individuals, and when the rights, which are given to individuals to demand the performance of these duties, are applied to nations, since they can be such only as are allowed by their subjects, they must be suitably changed by them, that they may take on a certain new form. And thus the law of nations does not remain the same in all respects as the law of nature, in so far as it governs the acts
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of individuals. What therefore stands in the way of treating it separately as a law peculiar to nations? Indeed, he who speaks of the law of nature and nations, shows by that very fact, unless he should wish to utter sound without sense, that there is some difference between the law of nature and the law of nations. But if, indeed, any one shall be too obstinate to admit that the law of nations is different from the law of nature, he may call our present volume, which we have written on the former subject, the ninth part of “The Law of Nature.” For we consider it unseemly to quarrel over such a trifle. But as indeed the condition of men is such that in a state one cannot completely satisfy in all details the rigour of the law of nature, and for that reason there is need of positive laws, which do not differ altogether from the law of nature, nor observe it in all details; so likewise the condition of nations is such that one cannot completely satisfy in all details the natural rigour of the law of nations, and therefore that law, immutable in itself, should be adapted only so much that it neither departs entirely from natural law, nor observes it in all details. But since the common welfare itself of nations demands this very adaptation; therefore nations are none the less bound to admit as between themselves the law arising therefrom, than they are bound by nature to an observance of natural law; and the former no less than the latter, if consistency in the law is preserved, is to be considered a law common to all nations. But this law itself we, in company with Grotius, have been pleased to call the voluntary law of nations, although with not exactly the same signification, but with a slightly narrower meaning. But far be it from you to imagine that this voluntary law of nations is developed from the will of nations in such a way that their will is free in establishing it and that free will alone takes the place of reason, without any regard to natural law. For as we have proved in the eighth part of “The Law of Nature,” civil laws are not matters of mere will, but the law of nature itself prescribes the method by which the civil law is to be fashioned out of natural law, so that there can be nothing which can be criticized in it; so also the voluntary law of nations does not depend upon the free will of nations, but natural law itself defines the means by which voluntary law may replace natural law, which is only admissible when necessity demands it. Since nature herself has united nations into one supreme state in the same manner as individuals have united into
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particular states, the manner also in which the voluntary law of nations ought to be fashioned out of natural law, is exactly the same as that by which civil laws in a state ought to be fashioned out of natural laws. For that reason the law of nations, which we call
