of one mind and one will; even so are the members of that society united, which nature has established among men. After the human race was divided into nations, that society which before was between individuals continues between nations.
§ 8. Of the purpose of that state
§ 7.
§ 142, part 7, Jus Nat.
§ 144, part 7, Jus Nat.
§ 141, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since nature herself has established society among all nations, in so far as she has established it among all men, as is evident from the demonstration of the preceding proposition, since, moreover, the purpose of natural society, and consequently of that society which nature herself has established among men, is to give mutual assistance in perfecting itself and its condition; the purpose of the society therefore, which nature has established among all nations, is to give mutual assistance in perfecting itself and its condition. Consequently the common good must be promoted by its combined powers.
Just as one human being alone is not sufficient unto himself, but needs the aid of another, in order that thereby the common good may be promoted by their combined powers; so also one nation alone is not sufficient for itself, but one needs the aid of the other, that thereby the common good may be promoted by their combined powers. Therefore since nature herself unites men together and compels them to preserve society, because the common good of all cannot be promoted except by their combined powers, so that nothing is more beneficial for man than man; the same nature likewise unites nations together and compels them to preserve society, because the common good of all cannot be promoted except by their combined powers, so that nothing can be said to be more beneficial for a nation than a nation. For although a nation can be thought of which is spread over a vast expanse, and does not seem to need the aid of other nations; nevertheless it cannot yet be said that it could not improve its condition
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still more by the aid of other nations, much less that other nations could not be aided by it, however much it could itself dispense with the aid of others. Just as man ought to aid man, so too ought nation to aid nation.
§ 9. Of the state which is made up of all nations
§§ 7, 8.
§§ 4, 9, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 504, part 5, Jus Nat.
§ 5, part 8, Jus Nat.
All nations are understood to have come together into a state, whose separate members are separate nations, or individual states. For nature herself has established society among all nations and compels them to preserve it, for the purpose of promoting the common good by their combined powers. Therefore since a society of men united for the purpose of promoting the common good by their combined powers, is a state, nature herself has combined nations into a state. Therefore since nations, which know the advantages arising therefrom, by a natural impulse are carried into this association, which binds the human race or all nations one to the other, since moreover it is assumed that the others will join it, if they know their own interests; what can be said except that nations also have combined into society as if by agreement? So all nations are understood to have come together into a state, whose separate nations are separate members or individual states.
§ 138, part 7, Jus Nat.
§ 7.
Note, § 142, part 7, Jus Nat.
Reasoning throws a certain light upon the present proposition, by which we have proved that nature has established society among men and compels them to protect society. Nay, rather the state, into which nature herself orders nations to combine, in truth depends on that great society which she has established among all men, as is perfectly evident from the above reasoning. But that those things may not be doubtful which we have said concerning the quasi-agreement, by which that supreme state is understood to have been formed between nations; those things must be reconsidered which we have mentioned elsewhere. Furthermore, in establishing this quasi-agreement we have assumed nothing which is at variance with reason, or which may not be allowed in other quasi-agreements. For that nations are carried into that association by a certain natural impulse is apparent from their acts, as when they enter into treaties for the purpose of commerce or war, or even of friendship, concerning which we shall speak below in their proper place. There is no need to persuade yourself that there
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is no nation that is not known to unite to form the state, into which nature herself commands all to combine. Just as in tutelage it is rightly presumed that the pupil agrees, in so far as he ought to agree, nay, more, as he would be likely to agree, if he knew his own interest; so in the same way nations which through lack of insight fail to see how great an advantage it is to be a member of that supreme state, are presumed to agree to this association. And since it is understood in a civil state that the tutor is compelled to act, if he should be unwilling to consent of his own accord, but that even when the agreement is extorted by a superior by force that does not prevent the tutelage from resting upon a quasi-agreement; why, then, is it not allowable to attribute the same force to the natural obligation by which nations are compelled to enter into an alliance as is attributed to the civil obligation, that it is understood to force consent even as from one unwilling? But if these arguments seem more ingenious than true, and altogether too complicated; putting them aside, it is enough to recognize that nature herself has combined nations into a state, therefore whatever flows from the concept of a state, must be assumed as established by nature herself. We have aimed at nothing else.
§ 10. What indeed may be called the supreme state
The state, into which nations are understood to have combined, and of which they are members or citizens, is called the supreme state.
§§ 17, 23, Proleg.
The size of a state is determined by the number of its citizens. Therefore a greater state cannot be conceived of than one whose members are all nations in general, inasmuch as they together include the whole human race. This concept of a supreme state was not unknown to Grotius, nor was he ignorant of the fact that the law of nations was based on it, but nevertheless he did not derive from it the law of nations which is called voluntary, as he could and ought to have done.
§ 11. Of the laws of the supreme state
§ 10.
§ 4, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 46, part 7, Jus Nat.
§ 965, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 969, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since the supreme state is a certain sort of state, and consequently a society, moreover since every society ought to have its own laws and the right exists in it of promulgating laws with respect to those things which
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concern it, the supreme state also ought to have its own laws and the right exists in it of promulgating laws with respect to those things which concern it; and because civil laws, that is, those declared in a state, prescribe the means by which the good of a state is maintained, the laws of the supreme state likewise ought to prescribe the means by which its good is maintained.
§ 965, part 8, Jus Nat.
Note, § 965, part 8, Jus Nat.
It occasions very little
