respect dimensions may intersect, not least as material interests can further intensify the psychological evaluative sentiment dimension and vice versa. For instance, a state’s desire to obtain adequate consideration of its self-ascribed status, identity and overall self-worth conceptions often involve material, non-evaluative considerations as well. The same holds true for respect-related objectives caused by disrespectful conduct: the urge to re-establish the level of respect deemed appropriate may, at the same time, help achieve certain material objectives as well. Similarly, prestige, an essential element of the psychological respect dimension, is “distinct but not isolated from power: material, social or imagined” (Wood, 2013, p. 387). That said, while this project is primarily interested in the non-instrumental, self-evaluative dimension of respect, rather than material considerations like power capacities or economic revenues (Carr & Callan, 2002; Gilpin, 1981; Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1979), these two are not mutually exclusive, hence, a clear separation is not feasible as both mutually enforce one another.
[32] 2.1.1.3 Cognitive Effects of Disrespect
Against this backdrop, what does a collective experience of disrespect imply, on the one hand, for the relationship between disrespect, anger and injustice and, on the other hand, for dynamics and response patterns triggered by non-adequate consideration of a given state’s collective respect needs and expectations?
First, as to the link between disrespect and anger28, preliminary studies maintain that a strong sense of being treated with disrespect causes anger, representing “one of the most essential emotions in the study of international relations” (van Kleef et al., 2008, pp. 13–14). Essentially, anger can be regarded a sentiment of frustration caused by (deliberate) non-recognition (or non-verification) of a distinctive element of an actor’s identity and status29 (Miller, 2001; Stets & Burke, 2000; Taifel, 1978). Usually, it is a specific insult or offense caused by an offender that fuels anger (Lazarus, 1991). Yet, there is no common sense as to whether disrespect is necessarily required to cause anger. It is widely agreed, however, that disrespect does not always arouse anger, especially if the victim does not believe that respect is required and deserved in the first place (Heuer et al., 1999). Similarly, studies indicate that anger and aggression increase the likelihood that an actor interprets certain conduct or attitude by others as disrespectful (Dodge et al., 1990; Graham & Hudley, 1994). As to injustice, social psychologists reason that feelings of injustice can negatively affect an actor’s level of self-esteem (Smith et al., 1998). As such, injustice arguably amounts to the most widespread kind of disrespect (Lupfer et al., 2000; Messick et al., 1985; Mikula, 1986; Mikula et al., 1990). Finally, there also is a conceptual link between disrespect and injustice, which is fairly straightforward30. Two logics appear particularly evident in this regard. According to Bourdieu (1966), a (disrespectful) insult by one actor is regarded as unjust once it is seen as a deprival of something that another actor feels entitled to. Following Miller, instead, an insult is [33] deemed unjust if it is said to provide the alleged offender with an undeserved material or psychological/symbolic advantage (Miller, 1993).
Second, non-adequate recognition by external actors can have multiple negative psychological and emotional effects on those actors in need of respect. First and foremost, contempt and perceived denial of respect can have negative implications for an actor’s sense of importance and self-ascribed self-worth conceptions. If the desired level of adequacy thereof is viewed as not being granted by others, disrespect is experienced. The level of disrespect is contingent, among others, on the harm it inflicts on the victim’s self-worth. For instance, outright ignorance of its status conceptions tends to be more severe than sole status inadequacy. In a similar vein, the level of anger and injustice experienced can affect the degree of disrespect perceived and vice versa (Greenwell & Dengerink, 1973). Several factors determine the extent of injustice and anger, most of which revolve around the so-called offender’s responsibility (Miller, 2001). The latter includes the offender’s (alleged) intent to inflict harm as well as foreseeability thereof. Accordingly, if certain behavior is interpreted as having been committed intentionally, perhaps by consciously targeting the victim country, (moralistic) anger and injustice are more severe due to the harm doer’s responsibility than if that measure was to have occurred in an unplanned, perhaps even coincidental manner (Dyck & Rule, 1978; Heider, 1958). Likewise, foreseeability of harm is also found to contribute to the victim’s perception of anger and injustice. In this case, the harm doer is still held accountable, as it did not prevent a likely offense from occurring in the first place (Goffmann, 1971). Further factors affecting the level of anger and injustice may include: the stance and responses of third parties, the level of publicity of the offense (and following responses), duration of the offense, sincerity of the offender, the relationship between victim and perpetrator (incl. status), and additional cultural or social factors (Miller, 2001). On the other hand, preliminary research suggests that justifications by the offender can have a mitigating effect on the level of anger and injustice experienced. For instance, an explanation provided can alleviate anger by signaling acknowledgment of the victim’s respect needs (Folger & Martin, 1986; Sitkin & Bies, 1993). This positive effect may be somewhat stronger if the offender does not just explain his actions but even apologizes for the harm inflicted (Heider, 1958). In sum, disrespect experiences emerge when external parties, deliberatively or inadvertently, downgrade an actor’s self-ascribed status and identity conceptions or violate claims (e.g. rights, norms, ideas) on which such self-worth conceptions are based upon.
Against this backdrop, disrespect experiences are commonly associated with specific patterns of social interaction and preferences. First, if an actor’s [34] status and identity conceptions31 are seen as not being recognized adequately, it may feel inclined to respond in a way deemed necessary to obtain such recognition. Similar to the protection of self-worth, retaliation may be deemed necessary by the victim to maintain its national image and honor. Either way, such kind of retaliation can be categorized as “a form of self-defense” (Miller, 2001, p. 534). Responses can range from verbal complaints32 and protests, withdrawal from cooperation or the introduction of conditionality, to outright confrontation and violent retribution33. In this vein, Lindemann found that non-recognition, for instance of a state’s self-ascribed right to equal sovereignty, can arouse aggressive responses (2010, p. 6). Equally, studies yield that struggles over status and resulting uncertainties thereof can be a significant source of disrespect. That said, status conflicts are found to be capable of spurring aggression that in turn inclines actors to pursue both assertive and confronting approaches rather than cooperative ones (Freedman, 2016; Hogg, 2001; Volgy, et al., 2011; Wohlforth, 2009). A non-response, in contrast, is not a feasible option to retaliation. Inaction toward and neglect of (open) acts of disrespect further degrade the victim’s status and prestige, both in the eyes of itself and others (Arendt, 1963; Felson, 1982; Vidmar, 2000) but also bear the risk of depriving it of control over the public definition and categorization of the insult (Ringmar, 1996). Moreover, inaction limits the victim’s capacities to prevent disrespect in similar conflicts in the future, because it already signaled that ‘it can be treated this way’ (Lind, 2000). In addition, anger and injustice can activate (or support) similar retaliatory patterns. Accordingly, preliminary research indicates that both negatively affect a victim’s capability to process information as well as curtail its desire for information about the perpetrator, eventually culminating in a perception bias solely focused on negative aspects of the latter’s behavior. In lack of appropriate information and facing such negativity bias, victims neither properly reflect on their own past wrongdoings, nor on potential negative ramifications of their own future retaliatory responses to other actors (Geva & Skorick, 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Rosen, 2005). In other words, the increase in disrespect-induced [35] anger and injustice negatively influences the victim’s empathy34. Consequently, a less emphatic but emotional victim is also less hesitant to retaliate against the perpetrator, as such a response is deemed increasingly necessary, justifiable and just (Carpenter & Darley, 1978; Robinson & Darley, 1995; Tedeschi et al., 1974). In a similar vein, a developed sense of injustice is expected to enhance a victim’s propensity to engage in formal and informal efforts of (subjective) justice restoration (Miller, 2001). As a result, anger and injustice can fuel fiercer,
