China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), further specifies this dynamic as follows:
“[T]he protection – or saving – of one’s mianzi is extremely important in building and maintaining self-esteem. When a Chinese person feels that they have lost mianzi, their self-esteem will be hurt, and balance in emotion and even in life will also be lost. Therefore, Chinese do not only maintain mianzi passively; they also try to elevate mianzi proactively” (2011, p. 52).
However, unlike deliberate affronts, unintentional non-consideration of an actor’s face needs can be quite difficult to identify by others, particularly by actors from other cultural backgrounds. This is due to the fact that “what a sensitive person feels as ‘loss of lien’ may be regarded as no more than ‘looking bad on his or her mien-tzu’ by an outsider” (1944, p. 62). Qin Yaqing distinctly underscores this argument, thereby also pointing to the dual perception character of Chinese face at large:
“Mianzi is relational in nature for it is significant only in social relations. Mianzi is obtained only when one is socially recognized. It is self-perceiving and other-giving. It is both about how Chinese perceive themselves and how they feel other people perceive them. There is no mianzi without social recognition. Mianzi is very important among Chinese people and within the relational Chinese society. It concerns not only one’s social status in a relational society, but also the possibility of being accepted by others and even the privileges one is entitled to in the social process of interaction” (Qin Yaqing, 2011, p. 52).
Ultimately, both the relevance of face-work in Chinese culture and the close resemblance between face and respect further underpin the prospect that inadequate consideration of Chinese respect needs (and vice-versa) indeed impedes the establishment of trust and cooperation as general political [43] preconditions for effective conflict management in the SCS. Subsequently, the following section outlines the theory-guided hypotheses and elaborates on a number of questions guiding the critical discussion thereof.
2.2 The Hypotheses
As discussed previously, the project accedes to the constructivist and social psychology argument that states’ policy preferences, or role performances46, are shaped by the interplay between self-conceptions and the perception and assessment of external conduct. Accordingly, the main focus of analysis rests on China’s self-evaluation, its assessment of other SCS stakeholders’ conduct and cognitive effects and policy preferences resulting thereof. As such, it is interested in whether or not external behavior, from a Chinese perspective, takes into adequate consideration Beijing’s self-worth conceptions. Such adequate consideration is regarded as respect, the independent variable of this project. Similarly, it intends to scrutinize as to whether the presence or absence of such disrespect experiences can account for Chinese foreign policy preferences (dependent variable) in response to U.S. and Philippine conduct in the SCS region. In order to structure the process of the analysis, three hypotheses are derived from the project’s theory-guided variables and are intended to provide concise answers to the superordinate research question. In the following, these hypotheses are adumbrated in consecutive order.
2.2.1 Hypothesis I: ‘China’s self-ascribed status and identity conceptions were subject to change between 2007 and 2016’
“China’s unique view of itself and its place in the region heavily colours the perceptions and expectations that shape PRC policies“ (Roy, 2013, p. 2).
Focusing on the self-evaluative dimension of Chinese self-perception, Hypothesis I investigates as to whether a change in self-ascribed status and national identity conceptions can be observed in the time period between 2007 and 2016 and as to whether these conceptions correspond to China’s SCS [44] policy. Accordingly, status is regarded as the relative rank China (and Chinese scholars) believes it occupies in the regional and global context. As such, its status is the result of a social transaction as it does not simply derive from China’s capacities and capabilities but requires social recognition by others47. Similarly, identities are not generated from within and by every actor itself but are negotiated through ongoing dialogue with other actors (Taylor, 1991; White, 1992) instead and produced in differentiation from some kind of ‘otherness’ or ‘out-group’. Hence, identity conceptions are subjective, discursively constructed and, as a relational term, also require a certain degree of social recognition and interaction. In defining how a country (significant domestic groups) perceives itself, the term national identity refers, as a special version of conventional identity48, to the collective level assuming a collective and national dimension. As such, for the purpose of this project, national identity shall be understood as a “collective narrative of the nation” (Hall, 1996, p. 613) and its characteristics and peculiarities. While there is no such thing as a uniform and stable national identity, several of them, just like status conceptions, may overlap, coexist, and replace one another over time. In the view of Wodak, “the discursive construction of national identity revolves around the three temporal axes of the past, the present and the future” (1998, p. 26). In this vein, Hypothesis I argues that a shift in both, predominant status and identity conceptions, can be observed in Chinese elite discourses over time. Accordingly, if such a shift was indeed being observed, it would be expected to have a significant effect on the scope of China’s self-evaluative needs and expectations, and, ultimately, on its policy preferences pertaining to the South China Sea dispute. The two questions guiding the discussion of Hypothesis I read as follows:
- Can a (relative) shift in discursive patterns of self-ascribed predominant status and identity conceptions be observed over time (2007–2016)?.
- Are there any indications that such a shift in status and identity is associated with a change in self-confidence, self-evaluative needs and interests?49
[45] In doing so, Hypothesis I solely addresses the ego or input dimension of Chinese self-ascribed status and identity conceptions. Subsequent chapters, then, will refer back to this dimension, particularly when discussing a possible connection between shifting identity and status conceptions and their effect on China’s respect expectations (output dimension) and, ultimately, policy preferences.
2.2.2 Hypothesis II: ‘Chinese50 disrespect experiences in the context of the SCS dispute are severe and have been increasing over time’51
The degree to which respect expectations are met is said to depend on an “actor’s interpretation of its partner’s behavior” (Wolf, 2011, p. 11). Therefore, Hypothesis II concerns the identification of discursive manifestations of respect and disrespect experiences in Chinese discourses on U.S. and Philippine conduct pertaining to the South China Sea. As respect dynamics, particularly experiences of disrespect, are usually not apparent at first sight, a set of six indicators is utilized for the sake of respect tracing (see chapter 2.3.1). Accordingly, if the majority of these indicators can be confirmed for a given sub-case, respect dynamics and disrespect experiences are considered present. Moreover, in the event that respect dynamics are found significant, Hypothesis II seeks to determine and critically reflect on prevailing patterns of respect expectations52. In this vein, it is anticipated that a shift in (self-perceived) status (Hypothesis I) and the resulting increase in relative status differences have facilitated a blunt articulation of respect expectations following a growing sense of entitlement53. That said, a growing mismatch between China’s self-attributed status and the adequacy of external conduct is estimated to cause mounting disrespect experiences. Furthermore, it is discussed as to whether [46] respect expectations positively correlate to the status of the opposing country. In other words: is China more eager (sensitive) to obtain respect by a high-status than by a low-status actor? The following questions are guiding the discussion on Hypothesis II:
- Which of the respect indicators can be identified and to what extent do they prove significant?
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