fourth challenge covered involves the issue of identification of respect dynamics and respect experiences66. In general, respect considerations including an actor’s status and identity needs are not articulated literally and directly in the majority of cases67. Hence, respect dynamics have to be analytically extracted from the wider context of using qualitative data analysis and further qualified by means of the theory-guided hypotheses68 provided. In this vein, reference points and indicators are called for in order to guide and enable respect and disrespect identification processes. These reference points and indicators are outlined in the following.
[51] 2.3.1 Reference Points and Respect Indicators
Given the subjective character of respect perception, its discursive identification cannot be executed solely by means of universal criteria. Instead, an additional brief look at some country-specific criteria is necessary. Against this backdrop, the domestic significance criterion (Wolf, 2011) represents an appropriate starting point. As established previously, respect and face are traditionally rooted in Chinese (and Asian) culture and history. In the words of Nathan & Scobell, “Chinese tradition emphasizes the importance of giving and getting ‘face’, or favourable personal recognition. Face has long been a central consideration in interpersonal relations in China” (2012, p. 25). In recent years, Chinese philosophy and Confucian thought have increasingly developed into key pillars and concepts of official Chinese historiography, thereby shaping China’s identity conceptions (Chen, 2005; Feng, 2007; Zhang, 2015c). At the same time, aside from its Confucian origin, China’s political system is assumed to be somewhat conducive to respect dynamics. According to Bakr. et al., respect is more likely to matter in countries governed by “authoritarian elites with a fragile popular legitimacy” (2003, as cited in Wolf, 2008, p. 29; cf. Heller, 2013). Overall, the PRC clearly appears to meet the domestic significance criterion69. In addition, identity stability (Wolf, 2011) is another crucial reference point. Accordingly, several scholars point to the existence of a Chinese national identity crisis in recent years (chapter 4.1). In this vein, Yan stresses, “China is not prepared for world leadership. When the world asks China: what do you want to be? It doesn’t know, and that’s the problem“ (Yan, 2012, as cited in Shambaugh, 2013, p. 13). Hence, the criterion of identity stability or fragility can also be considered to be met. Furthermore, as respect dynamics are said to be particularly eminent in conflict-prone and unstable environments, the general nature and setting of the SCS dispute as well as its overall significance to the PRC are noteworthy, too. This assessment is underscored by Roy who contends that ”China’s perception of whether its external environment is accommodating versus threatening, and offers opportunities versus dangers, will shape PRC foreign policy“ (2013, p. 2). [52] Accordingly, the SCS region’s fragile, unstable and conflict-prone order, its conflictual history, the highly sensitive issues at stake (national sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc.) all suggest that respect dynamics are indeed playing a vital role in Southeast Asia, a region in which conflicting norms, values and political systems are clashing with one another.
Building upon these reference points suggesting a general significance of respect in Chinese FPTT discourses on the SCS, the disrespect identification process has to be discussed in detail. Drawing upon constructivist logic, disrespect, while frequently not articulated in a literal and direct manner, is assumed to be reflected in performative acts, particularly speech acts and discourses (Austin, 1962) but also signs, gestures and concrete conduct. Accordingly, for the sake of identification, this project applies six theory-guided indicators70:
(1) literal usage and direct reference to respect and related concepts,
(2) references to status & social importance,
(3) references to rights & interests,
(4) references to dominant Chinese national identity narratives,
(5) emotional critique of external conduct (the question of adequacy),
(6) reliance on minor issues (e.g. rights) regardless of disproportionate costs involved.
Those respect indicators and the major reasons as to why states tend to respond to disrespect by means of confrontation call for a brief introduction.
2.3.2 Literal Usage
Focusing on FPTT discourses, the monitoring of semantic patterns and arguments naturally rests at the heart of the analysis. While discursive manifestations of respect can be voiced both directly and indirectly, this first and most obvious indicator only covers direct references to respect and related concepts such as recognition, pride, reputation and honor. To be sure, lexical references do not per se provide an exclusive indication of the respect as sentiment dimension, as official Chinese public diplomacy tends to frequently adopt respect terminology.
[53] 2.3.3 References to Status and Social Importance
As status and status concerns represent the core component of the shared definition of national respect as the perceived adequate recognition of an actor’s self-ascribed self-worth by others (expressed in words, gestures and deeds), status constitutes the second and perhaps most crucial indicator of respect dynamics. In line with sociology and social psychology, status is often understood as “social esteem and respect that usually yields influence” (Ridgeway, 2006, p. 301). That said, groups seek to be treated in a manner congruent to their self-ascribed status and “rightful position” (Wolf, 2011, p. 3). Status misrecognition or deprivation, in contrast, is expected to cause the opposite effect, namely disrespect. As discussed earlier, states may seek status for material or self-evaluative reasons. For instance, a powerful (not necessarily positive) international image and reputation may have a positive effect on the political legitimacy of China’s political elite, for instance due to dominant patriotic and nationalist sentiments among Chinese citizens desiring international respect for self-esteem grounds (Lepsius, 1990; Noesselt, 2012, p. 128). Likewise, conduct by interaction partners viewed by China as adequately reflecting its status entitlements can serve as an external confirmation of China’s self-worth and its related psychological needs. Moreover, this second indicator seeks to examine whether a link between status self-perception and the status of interaction partners can be observed. In this vein, it is scrutinized whether a greater Chinese status is accompanied by higher sensitivity to questions of status or not. This is because Chinese FPTTs are expected to be more eager to obtain respect from a high-ranking actor and more likely to perceive that actor’s conduct in a more critical manner than that of a lower-status actor (Fikenscher & Wolf, 2015, p. 170). Against this background, manifestations and signs of status awareness and concerns are located, contextualized and qualified here.
2.3.4 References to Rights
“Interests can conflict and must be balanced; rights must be defined so that they do not conflict” (Scanlon, 2008, p.68).
States pursue external recognition of their self-ascribed rights associated with its status and identity, let alone self-worth conceptions. Conversely, [54] misrecognition (whether deliberatively or coincidental) of such rights71 is associated with disrespect. Rights, as understood here, can involve rather material factors72, for instance, the right to economic prosperity and security, and somewhat non-material aspects such as (legal) equality, fair treatment, legitimacy or ‘voice’73. A distinction between the two is neither straightforward74 nor feasible for this project’s purpose as they are both, closely related to status and respect. In this vein, external support of a country’s rights75 can serve as a signal of self-worth (incl. status and identity), whereas neglect, violation or inadequate consideration thereof can inflict harm and negatively affect an actor’s self-worth. In sum, this third indicator discusses the most frequently invoked political, legal, economic and military
