overseen by CPC Central Committee),
- China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) (affiliated to Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
- Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (affiliated to State Council),
- Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) (affiliated to Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
- Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) (affiliated to Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
In addition, several other smaller institutes95 are directly related to famous Chinese universities, yet still being subject to governmental oversight:
- Tsinghua University [63] (e.g. Institute of International Studies/Modern International Relations),
- Beijing University (e.g. Center for International and Strategic Studies),
- Renmin University,
- China Foreign Affairs University,
- Fudan University,
- Shanghai International Studies University.
Altogether, Chinese FPTTs, due to their omnidirectional and multidimensional influences on foreign policy-making and debate, constitute a particularly interesting research subject. At the same time, their significance is substantially and continuously increasing given their rapidly growing role in China’s scientific advisory system. This development is associated with China’s foreign policy decision-making, the special structure of FPTTs therein, and the PRC’s increasing dependence of and reliance on such expertise (see box below). That said, foreign policy-making in China is neither transparent nor does it follow transparent rules and procedures. Hence, several alternate research subjects such as parliamentary debates on issues of foreign policy are either largely absent or not accessible from the outside. At the same time, reproducibility and identification of decisive decision-making processes and negotiations in China remain almost impossible tasks for researchers. Against this backdrop, a close look at FPTTs, given their special affiliation with government and/or party bodies and their official function to inform and advise the political elite as well as their ability to influence political agendas, constitutes a viable option for gaining insights into Chinese debates, perception patterns, preferences, and interpretations on foreign policy issues regardless96.
2.5 Summary Analytical and Theoretical Chapter
In sum, this chapter introduced the theoretical framework required to address the research question later on. To be precise, respect dynamics were conceptualized as an alternative variable of international relations research. In addition, three theory-derived hypotheses have been established with the purpose of providing substantial answers as to the existence, role and possible implications of respect dynamics in Chinese elite discourses on the South China Sea. Finally, six indicators of respect dynamics have been introduced that guide the respect experience identification process in chapters 4.2 and 4.3. Consecutive chapters will entail the analytical application of the theoretical and methodological framework to this book’s case study. At first, a general overview of the latter will be provided.
[64] 3. The South China Sea Dispute
This chapter introduces the single case study, the South China Sea dispute. In general, the case study is divided into two sub-cases to provide for “in-case comparison” (Collier, 1993, p. 112). As the case design (see below) demonstrates, both sub-cases have been chosen based on estimates regarding the status of these two countries as attributed by China. Another selection criterion is associated with the key role that both actors inhibit in the SCS dispute and region, respectively.
Table 1: Single Case Design
| Single case design | Status ascribed to external SCS stakeholder | Self-ascribed status (China) | Recommendation/preferences |
| Sub-case I: Discourses on U.S. conduct in the SCS | High (estimated) | Before 2012: medium (estimated) | Subject to analysis |
| Sub-case II: Discourses on Philippine conduct in the SCS | Medium (estimated) | As of 2012/2013: high (estimated) | Subject to analysis |
Source: Own representation
Overall, the single case study selected requires a special emphasis on the context the SCS dispute is embedded in, particularly the dispute’s historical background, its sources of conflict and tension and its core stakeholders as well as the claimant parties’ conflicting claims and objectives.
[65] 3.1 Historical Background and Sources of Conflict
The South China Sea refers to a vast marginal sea area of around 3,500,000 square kilometers (Figure 2). It is located south of the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), east of Vietnam, west of the Philippines and north of Malaysia and Brunei. To be clear, the term South China Sea (hereafter SCS) is by no means used in any uniform manner. Whereas in China, Nanhai Zhudao is the most prominent term, which in its literal translation means south sea, Biển Đông, which translates as the east sea, is more common in Vietnam. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines had adopted the term ‘South China Sea’ until the Philippines, in the wake of its dispute with the PRC regarding the Spratly Archipelagos in 2011, began to prefer the term ‘West Philippine Sea’97. Even though the SCS and in particular the area surrounding its two most important archipelagos Spratly and Paracel, have largely been frequented for many centuries by fishermen of nearby countries, they have received profound attention in recent years and are at the center of a significant proliferation of tensions. This general development raises several crucial questions as to the roots and origins of the dispute. Similarly, it begs questions regarding the significance of the SCS at large. First and foremost, the SCS – connecting the Indian Ocean with the Pacific – is one of the world’s most strategic waters. Its bordering chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca witness roughly one-third of global maritime traffic passing through per annum. It is said that almost 60 percent of the energy supplies of both Taiwan and Japan, 80 percent of China’s imports of crude oil and 66 percent of South Korean energy supplies are transported through SCS waters (CSIS, 2017; IMF, 2016).
The SCS also serves as a source of natural resources itself: oil reserves of 7 billion barrels have been verified, contested estimates even suggest quantities of up to 130 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2015; Reed, 2014).
[66] Figure 2: Map of the South China Sea Cambridge University Press, n.d.
[67] To be sure, energy sources represent just one out of several categories of goods that are regularly shipped through the SCS. Its unique strategic location in Eurasia at the heart of international trading routes and its rich amount of natural resources that provide the SCS with geo-economic and geostrategic importance further render the settlement of multiple legal and political disputes that already prevail among bordering SCS claimant states difficult. That said, the SCS claimant parties
