see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision, – what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, – will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?
Far truer.
And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?
True, he said.
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.
Not all in a moment, he said.
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?
Certainly.
Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.
Certainly.
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?
Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the cave and his fellow prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?
Certainly, he would.
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, ‘Better to be the poor servant of a poor master’, and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.
Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?
To be sure, he said.
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the cave, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.
No question, he said.
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed – whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.
I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.
Specimen Questions
1 Why does Plato compare ordinary human existence to that of chained prisoners in a cave?
2 Critically examine Plato’s contrast between the visible world of the senses and the intelligible world of the Forms.
3 What is Plato trying to show by his allegory of the ascent of the soul out of the cave into the upper world?
Suggestions for Further Reading (Including Internet Resources)
1 For editions of Plato’s Republic and other relevant materials see suggestions for reading at the end of Part I, extract 2.
2 Two important free online resources with useful entries on Plato are the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/ (by R. Kraut), and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy at https://www.iep.utm.edu/republic/ (by A. Coumoundouros).
3 P. Adamson makes available an excellent series of short podcasts on Plato as part of a comprehensive project, The History of Philosophy without any gaps. For an episode on Plato’s theory of Forms see Episode 26 https://historyofphilosophy.net/plato-cave-allegory-republic (recorded in 2011).
4 Another series of 24 audio lectures is D. Roochnik’s illuminating Introduction to Greek Philosophy, https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/introduction-to-greek-philosophy.html.
5 For Plato’s theory of Forms, see J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), as well as R. Dancy, Plato’s Introduction of Forms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Two excellent introductory titles are C. Meinwald, Plato (London: Routledge, 2016) and R. Kraut, How to Read Plato (London: Granta, 2008).
6 For a wide-ranging collection of essays on Plato, see G. Fine (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2019).
7 See also G. Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato’, in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London: Routledge, 1965); N. P. White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976); R. Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Ch. 1 and Ch. 9.
Notes
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